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Abstract
This dissertation aims to contribute to the emerging field of automated 
behavioural profiling tools/technology (AMLPT) as applied to anti-money laundering 
(AML) and fraud detection. We research the effectiveness of the use of profiling 
technology within the context of compliance Organisations located in large and medium­
sized retail and commercial banks within the City of London. The phenomena of 
profiling and money laundering are quite complex. Subsequently, their study 
encompasses several academic disciplines: language use, artificial intelligence, 
categorisation, and the managerial domains of organisational behaviour, networking, and 
innovation. Using an interpretivist approach, we examine the AMLPT artefact’s 
effectiveness through the use of Rogers’ Diffusion o f Innovation (Dol) theory, utilising a 
pluralist methodology that encompasses two case studies for contextual understanding of 
the domain and survey-based field work. In furthering our understanding of innovation 
within organisations, we utilise Organisational Effectiveness (OE) theory to provide an 
analytical framework for the fieldwork and measurement methodology.
The proliferation of AMLPT raises a variety of issues arguably more important 
than market share and technical functionality, particularly such issues as data privacy and 
the potential for the egregious use of personal or proprietary information (Schwartau 
1994; Jennings and Fena 2000; Lyon 2003). Furthermore, what was once perceived as 
“normal” identity management, data security and data privacy practice may no longer be 
acceptable in the application of next generation AMLPT in risk-aversive, highly 
sensitive global financial contexts. Moreover, are the cost and Organisational demands 
inherent in deploying AMLPT proportionate to the desired result (Bisantz and Ockerman 
2002; Vavpotic and Bajec 2009). In understanding the effectiveness of AMLPT, we look 
beyond the traditional methods of information systems evaluation, and draw on other IS 
reference disciplines such as IS success and user competence, along with a variety of
Organisational effectiveness measures, and their applicability in further defining 
effectiveness through measures of innovativeness. Critically, we look to examine 
innovation in an Organisational context, rather than the more traditional domain of 
individual innovation, the core construct of Rogers’ original (1962) work on diffusion.
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Introduction
This dissertation aims to contribute to the emerging field of automated 
behavioural profiling tools/technology (AMLPT) as applied to anti-money laundering 
(AML) and fraud detection. We research the effectiveness of using profiling technology 
within the context of compliance organisations located in large and medium-sized retail 
and commercial banks within the City of London. The phenomena of profiling and 
money laundering are quite complex, and subsequently their study encompasses several 
academic disciplines: language use, artificial intelligence, categorisation, and the 
managerial domains of organisational behaviour, networking, and innovation. Using an 
interpretivist approach, we examine the effectiveness of AMLPT artefacts through the 
use of Rogers’ Diffusion o f Innovation (Dol) theory, utilising a pluralist methodology 
that encompasses two case studies for understanding the context of the domain and 
survey-based field work (Mingers 2001). In furthering our understanding of innovation 
within organisations, we utilise Organisational Effectiveness (OE) theory to provide an 
analysis framework for the fieldwork and measurement methodology.
A Note on the Duration of the Research Project:
The field research began December of 2004 and finished in August of 2006; 
however, due to serious illness in the author’s family, which necessitated repeated, 
extended international travel, the analysis and collating of the data took an additional two 
years. The final dissertation was written during 2009, and submitted in April of 2010.
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Chapter 1. Problem Domain and Scope of Research
Type “profiling” into Google and the subsequent 4,360,000 hits (Wasel 2009)
illustrates the many guises and sheer breadth of “profiling”. Profiling serves as an
analytical tool in a variety of applications, be they characterising types of criminal
behaviour or how much Coca-Cola is consumed in Boston, Massachusetts in a given
year. Subsequently, a more formal definition becomes necessary, in this case, one culled
from the Oxford Dictionary of the English Language. While we are concerned with the
act of profiling, the definition is best found using the root word “profile”:
1. a. trans. To represent in profile; to delineate the side view or outline of; to draw 
in section; to outline. Also fig. (1715) LEONI Palladio's Archit. (1742) I. 2 1 ,1 have 
profil'd the Imposts of the Arches. Ibid. 30 The method of profiling each Member. 
(1882) E. P. HOOD in Leisure Ho. Apr. 225 Instances in which he thus profiles his 
contemporaries. (1902) Contemp. Rev. Dec. 838 The delicate tracery of the leaves 
[was] profiled against the sunset sky.
Interestingly, in analysing the numerous definitions of a profile, either as a noun or
verb, there is no reference to either profiling or a profile in a demographic context, nor is
reference made to the profiling of a constituency. Furthermore, there is no mention of
profiling as applied to an information system medium or within an information systems
context. Lastly, there is no mention of profiling in a legal context. When “profile” is
used as a noun, the definition given below provides a start in helping narrow the
contextual parameters of the verb to profile, at least lexicographically, particularly in the
use of “an attitude” as a definitive device.
Definition: to profile - A characteristic personal manner; an attitude, a policy (of 
a country, government, etc.). low profile: see LOW a. 23. (OED 2004) This is o f  
particular interest, as the “profiling tool" or “profiler” is trying to ascertain a 
particular “attitude" or behaviour more so than a general state o f  being 
(author’s italics).
While this may appear somewhat existential, the distinction becomes more
apparent when investigating the design logic in the various AMLPTs discussed in later
chapters, such as the choice of algorithm or data mining model that assist in categorising
14
the various detection methods used in profiling. However, the similarity to the other 
profiling definitions cited (relative to the specific focus of this investigation), 
substantiates that, as an infinitive, “to profile” appropriately describes the activity of 
using data, characteristics, monitored behaviour and other elements to create a profile. 
This can then be referred to in certain contexts as a behavioural profile (Canhoto and 
Backhouse 2008), which assists in further understanding of behaviour that may be of 
interest. However, it should be noted that, while defining one’s individual characteristics, 
such as intent or motive, and that such behaviour comprises a key locus in profiling, 
there is still much ambiguity in accurately defining “behaviour” (Canhoto and 
Backhouse 2007). In current practice, behavioural profiling sets out to assess a subjects’ 
situated actions, contextualising and classifying those actions and facilitating 
development of a relational understanding of suspect behaviour, particularly among 
actors of varying significance (Suchman 1987; Suchman 1993; Ashforth and Humphrey 
1997; Star 2002; Yang and Huh 2008). At its essence, profiling depicts this effort to 
separate the “wheat from the chaff’, helping to narrow-down traits, habits, and other 
identifiers that result in the creation of accurate behavioural models.
Arguably, the proliferation of AMLPT raises issues more important than market 
share and technical functionality, particularly those regarding data privacy and the 
potential for the egregious use of personal or proprietary information (Schwartau 1994; 
Jennings and Fena 2000; Lyon 2003). Furthermore, what was once perceived as 
“normal” identity management, data security and data privacy practice may no longer be 
socially acceptable in the application of next generation AMLPT in risk-aversive, highly 
sensitive global financial contexts (Badenhorst and Eloff 1990; Birch and McEvoy 1992; 
Baskerville 1993; Backhouse and Dhillon 2001; Hildebrandt 2006). Moreover, we 
should also ask whether the cost and organisational demands are proportionate to their 
desired effectiveness (Bisantz and Ockerman 2002; Vavpotic and Bajec 2009).
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In understanding the effectiveness of AMLPT, we look beyond the traditional 
methods of information systems evaluation, and draw on other IS reference disciplines 
such as IS success (DeLone and McLean 1992; DeLone and McLean 2003; DeLone, 
McLean et al. 2005; Wu and Wang 2006; Bradley 2008; Petter, DeLone et al. 2008), user 
competence (Munro, Huff et al. 1997), as well as a variety of organisational 
effectiveness measures, (Cameron and Whetten 1981; Fry and Slocum Jr. 1984; 
Cameron 1986; Lewin and Minton 1986), and their applicability in further defining 
effectiveness through measures of innovativeness (Rogers 1976; Van de Ven 1986; Van 
de Ven and Poole 1990; Slappendel 1996; Mahler and Rogers 1999; Rogers 2003). 
Critically, we look to examine innovation in an organisational context, rather than the 
more traditional domain of individual innovation, the core construct of Rogers’ original 
work on diffusion (1962).
1,1 Applicability o f the Research
To understand the impetus behind the use of behavioural profiling, specifically its 
applicability in countering money laundering within a context of banking and financial 
services, one must comprehend the behaviours and agency amongst several inter-related 
themes: money laundering as it relates to trans-national crime (TNC) and international 
terrorism, along with the role of institutional and organisational regulators, and 
subsequently, the place of AMLPT within the regulatory and compliance regime. While 
an in-depth analysis of global terrorism is beyond the remit of this dissertation, the 
convergence and resultant prevalence of these themes emanates from the events of 
September 11, 2001, when al-Qaida terrorists attacked the World Trade Centre in New 
York City, an event now commonly referred to as “9/11”. This event has served as a 
significant motivator for many of the laws, statutes and other formal instruments 
introduced on a global scale to halt the spread of money laundering as a means of
16
terrorist financing, and furthermore, has spurred on the introduction and development of 
behavioural profiling tools examined within the scope of this research. These legal and 
regulatory instruments have methodically created an enforcement regime charged with 
the prevention of terrorist financing since 9/11; yet addressing the more fundamental 
question, that of determining what is in fact money laundering or what may constitute 
terrorist financing (versus the legitimate movement of capital amongst individuals, 
groups or extra-national organisations) has proved problematic (Collier, Hoeffler et al. 
1999).
There is considerable research available as to the use and accuracy of profiling 
technology when applied to business intelligence, or its traditional demographic uses 
such as product market research and consumer behaviour, as well as customer 
relationship management and analytics (Blahunka 2000; Osterfelt 2001). Profiling, when 
applied to detecting money laundering, is a relatively unexplored area of academic study. 
When viewed in an anti-money laundering context, behavioural profiling pertains to 
technologies tailored for use by compliance professionals within banks and other 
financial institutions and regulators, along with law enforcement, fraud investigators and 
other governmental entities. Indeed, such has been the demand for behavioural profiling 
capabilities that the market for AMLPT has shown considerable growth since the events 
of 9/11 (Brenneman and DeLotto 2001; Aberdeen Group 2002; FinCEN 2002; McGuire 
2002). Given that since 2001 banks have been purchasing “profiling systems” on a 
regular basis, and subsequently spending a great deal of money and time on their 
purchase and implementation, understanding what (and why) banks are purchasing 
becomes of interest. On the surface, many factors seem obvious, such as automating the 
regulatory, compliance, and risk analysis functions; however, other domain issues are 
more subtle. These include the design and engineering of these technologies, (for 
instance, what rationale separates the various vendor’s product innovations or selection
17
of specific features and functionality), along with unforeseen ancillary uses, such as the 
potential for data abuse through use of AMLPT, due to the quantities of extremely 
sensitive information these technologies gather.
In some quarters, profiling technology is perceived as the “silver bullet” in 
helping identify current threats, along with providing a means to better classify 
behavioural types, to provide an historical context to prevent potential threats, and to 
deliver this information in a timely manner to interested parties worldwide. The use of 
AMLPT is an innovation in varying stages of early adoption and development (Rogers 
1976; Olshavsky 1980; Bridges, Coughlan et al. 1991; Bunker, Kautz et al. 2000; 
Galliers, Swan et al. 2000; Moore 2002; Hausman and Stock 2003; Sadik 2008; Tucker
2008) and the subsequent dearth of long-term analysis provides opportunities for 
academic research in a variety of management, information systems, and organisational 
research disciplines.
Furthermore, for practitioners in the engineering and technology fields, 
understanding how profiling technologies are designed, specified, engineered, and 
brought to market, may uncover improvements in software development practices that, 
with additional refinement, could enhance the probability of detection beyond current 
capabilities. For civil libertarians, law enforcement and government parties, 
understanding the advantages, limitations and inherent complexities of the current 
generation o f AMLPT could be of great benefit. Such understanding should enhance the 
contextual coherence needed to address the unforeseen consequences of the use of 
AMLPT, for instance, in addressing the legal ramifications regarding data protection, 
search, seizure and surveillance. Indeed, further research may firmly establish if the use 
of behavioural profiling is in fact the most efficient means of identifying and quantifying 
illegitimate behaviour.
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Given the rapid proliferation of behavioural profiling, researchers seeking further 
understanding of the process of innovation adoption within organisations (in this case, 
through the adoption of AMLPT), may find several questions within this study 
insightful. For instance, if designers use practices perceived as innovative, to what extent 
do they contribute to enhancing organisational effectiveness and compliance practice? In 
an organisational context, how do innovative norms improve AMLPT performance? 
Conversely, in what way is the innovation and implementation process static, 
subsequently having a null or depreciative impact? To what extent is the input from 
traditional knowledge sources, such as professional associations, customers, or other 
interested parties, over-valued? Lastly, could these technologies be simply check boxes 
on a compliance list, a process that involves nothing more than compliance for 
compliance’s sake? Given current regulatory pressures versus practical application, this 
last question could prove quite revealing as to the acceptance and legitimacy of 
behavioural profiling.
1.2 Current Academic & Practitioner Research
Distinctions in theoretical approaches abound in evaluating the current status of 
research into behavioural profiling and the use of AMLPT. From a cultural perspective, 
practitioner and academic research in the United States tends toward the techno-centric, 
focussing on racial profiling by law enforcement and other government bodies, as well as 
electronic surveillance and the resultant implications in both the real and virtual worlds.
Specifically, the locus of techno-centric research tends towards the applicability 
and effectiveness of data mining, knowledge management, business intelligence and 
other like technologies in addressing the aforementioned, and is usually undertaken from 
a functionalist perspective. Beyond the functionalist, techno-centric perspective, the US 
PATRIOT Act (USAPA), given its broad regulatory remit, is a primary impetus for
19
much of the purely social-institutional and organisational-centric research currently 
underway in the US, and is extensively grounded in constitutional considerations and the 
individual rights therein, along with investigations into the nature of the “surveillance 
state” (Bogard 1996; Lyon 2003; Vlcek 2008). Research in the European Union (EU) 
tends to focus on privacy and identity management (Brownsword 2008), in areas such as 
identity cards and biometrics (Prabhakar, Pankanti et al. 2003; Andronikou, 
Yannopoulos et al. 2008), a result of the long-established body of technology and 
procedural compliance instruments required by the extensive data protection regime in 
place, as well as the extant neo-socialist reality that defines financial regulation in the 
EU.
In the United States, academia, private sector, and NGO groups such as the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), along with a diverse community of privacy 
advocates, have driven the investigations into USAPA and similar acts (EFF 2001); 
conversely, the EU took a decidedly more formalised, government-sponsored research 
approach and created a research body specifically to investigate not only profiling, but 
other privacy and data protection concerns resulting from technological impetus. The 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) was formed in 2004 to draw on a 
variety of disciplines to study the domains of identity, surveillance and other related 
norms that comprise the European Information Society (EIS) (FIDIS 2009). Portions of 
the core research used in this dissertation come from FIDIS-related investigations as well 
as the author’s participation therein.1 Aside from FIDIS and localised academic research, 
AMLPT as a research domain has not been widely investigated. For example, how do all 
the various artefacts within the domain, (such as those of compliance, regulation and
1 The reader is encouraged to visit http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/profiling/, which contains a 
rich archive o f research papers that address the European perspective on not only behavioral profiling, but 
also identity management and a variety o f other domain-related subjects.
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technology platforms) interact and shape the use of AMLPT artefacts, actions which 
Hildebrandt and Backhouse (2005) describe as “technique, technology, and practice”?
Research within the computer science fields of cognitive systems, “intelligent” 
machines and other artificial intelligence (Al)-based disciplines are dedicating more 
studies to improving the contextualising of profiling and the modelling of human 
behaviour, exploiting breakthroughs in the military use of semantic networks and 
knowledge discovery through data mining (KDD) (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro et al. 
1996; Spence and Tsai 1997; Zhang, Salerno et al. 2003; Gersh, Lewis et al. 2006; Siau 
and Wang 2007; Wolff2007).
A survey of practitioner contributions shows a marked tendency towards end-user 
organisational surveys and product delivery methodology, as well as positioning papers 
relative to deploying propriety technology, consulting services and support. AMLPT 
vendors use an information-oriented approach rather than one of traditional marketing, 
and stress technical sophistication through the use of “white papers” and case studies, 
rather than touting organisational transformation or vague statements promising “order- 
of-magnitude” improvements in AMLPT detection performance (Aberdeen Group 2002; 
Kentouris, Kite et al. 2002; Katkov 2006; Ltd. 2006; Sandman 2008).
Overall, current trends in AMLPT research within the finance sector continues to 
evolve, with an emphasis on improving contextual understanding of the social 
ramifications of AMLPT use. Much of this emphasis is a result o f concerns now arising 
that these tools will no longer simply reside in the compliance group, but may indeed 
become a “customer service” aid, and therefore a means to determine one’s suitability 
for financial products and services. Such boundary-spanning use (Tushman 1977; Manev 
and Stevenson 2001) induces further lines of inquiry, such as:
• If similar technology can be employed in an actuarial fashion - for instance, to 
determine suitability for health care, insurability, and other lifestyle behaviours -
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are there controls to ensure individuals are not the victims of ambiguity, 
erroneous categorical schemas or identity fraud?
Lastly, taxonomic, categorical and ontological ambiguity is consistently evident 
within the development and use of behavioural profiling, and is a recurrent contextual 
motif throughout this dissertation.
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Chapter 2. Historical Context, Thematic Discussion and Research Question
Although this dissertation is specifically aimed at the use of technology in anti­
money laundering methods, the subject’s complexity demands a substantial analysis of 
money laundering regulations and the domain of AML-CFT, along with a discussion of 
the numerous socio-institutional considerations therein, so that technological factors can 
be placed in context. This chapter starts by supplying that analysis.
In practice, money laundering has evolved in parallel with the needs of the ever- 
increasing complexity of transnational crime and terrorism, particularly as a result of 
globalization (Cooper and Deo 2006; Stana 2006). Criminals are utilising the concept of 
the Trans-National Corporation (TNC) to spread their wealth, thus hindering the creation 
of a money “audit trail” that would facilitate tracking both cross-border financial crime 
and the trafficking of contraband (Naylor 1994; Robinson 1998; Blunden 2001; Naim 
2005). Underworld figure Meyer Lansky was the first “mobster” to realise that if he had 
no money to tax, then the US Department of the Treasury’s income tax enforcement 
officers would have no cause to harass either him or his “business partners”. Lansky’s 
dictum was that “any money the Internal Revenue Service does not know about is not 
taxable” (Robinson 1998; Blunden 2001). Lansky’s motivation was Al Capone’s fall in 
1931 through his subsequent conviction and imprisonment for income tax evasion, a 
crime some say pales in comparison to Capone’s record of murder, extortion and bribery. 
Lansky saw Capone’s mistake as an indelible lesson in how not to handle the proceeds of 
crime.
Looking for alternate means to dispose of large sums of cash, Lansky was one of 
the first criminals to recognize the benefits of Swiss banking secrecy laws and 
procedures. Subsequently, over a period o f some 20 years, Lansky was able to squirrel 
away upwards of $100,000,000 dollars, all profits from the mob’s various enterprises, 
such as gambling, racketeering, bootlegging and extortion, and make it invisible to
23
United States tax authorities. In his oft-cited work “The Laundrymen, ” Jeffrey Robinson
provides a succinct description of exactly what exactly constitutes money laundering:
"Money laundering is called what it is because that perfectly describes what takes 
place - illegal, or dirty, money is put through a cycle of transactions, or washed, so 
that it comes out the other end as legal, or clean, money. In other words, the source 
of illegally obtained funds is obscured through a succession of transfers and deals 
in order that those same funds can eventually be made to appear as legitimate 
income" (Robinson 1998).
Robinson and others agree that the exact timing of when the term “money 
laundering” enters the mainstream vocabulary is unclear. Its first use in the press was 
during the Washington Post’s reporting on the Watergate hearings in 1973, held to 
investigate the burglary of the Democratic National Committee’s offices, by individuals 
at the direction of White House officials, up to and including then-president Richard M. 
Nixon (Group 1973-2009). While other anecdotal evidence attributes the term’s origin to 
the use of coin Laundromats by American mobsters as a legitimate front to “launder” 
profits from their various rackets, Blunden (2001) disputes this, stating that “this is 
wrong - the term perfectly describes the cycle of transactions that dirty money passes 
through so that it becomes clean on the other end”. Following the trail of money 
launderers was often foiled by the bank secrecy laws in many of the target jurisdictions, 
particularly Luxemburg, Switzerland, and numerous Caribbean nations, such as Antigua, 
Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands. Many of these “offshore” entities that hid behind 
their nation’s various banking secrecy laws were created simply for the purpose of 
money laundering or specifically in many instances, tax avoidance; merely “following 
the money” in many cases was the best “process,” rather than any established 
“procedure” in tracking a money launderer.
In a 16-year period, from 1970 to 1986, the United States was in the midst of a 
battle between law enforcement and drug traffickers who appeared to be targeting the US 
from a variety o f locales with illicit drugs such as cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and
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hashish. This 16-year span encapsulated a period of intense innovation on both the part 
of traffickers and law enforcement. However, cocaine was the catalyst, as it provided 
traffickers with unprecedented profits, and specifically, the need to launder vast amounts 
of cash. Such was the scale and efficiency of the cocaine economy that the street price of 
a gram of cocaine dropped considerably, from a high of $378.70 USD in 1981, to a low 
of $169.20 USD in 1998 (Policy 2000). For example, Pablo Escobar-Gaviria’s 
accountant states that such was the physical scale of cash processed monthly by 
Escobar’s Medellin cartel, that he regularly spent $2,500 a month simply on rubber 
bands to bundle the cartel’s cash proceeds.2 He even incorporated a “wastage” factor of 
10% to his monthly balance sheet to account for cash that may have been eaten by rats or 
simply rotted away, given the unusual means taken to secret the cash around the cartel’s 
various caches. One estimate of this “wastage” has Escobar losing $400 million in cash 
to rot in the basement of one of his safe houses (Naylor 1999). Given Escobar-Gaviria’s 
greatest run of profitability was some 13 years, from roughly 1980 until his death on the 
third of December, 1993, this represents an outlay of $390,000 on rubber bands, simply 
to bundle notes (Gaviria and Fisher 2009).
While Escobar’s “problem” was unique to the size of his organisation, the physical 
movement of drug profits created the need for criminal organisations to separate the 
“operational” or trafficking side of the enterprise, from that of the financial side, as 
money management demands were cutting into operational needs. Subsequently, other 
methods to integrate cash were further refined. For instance, along the US border with 
Mexico, money changing stores called “cambios” were doing a brisk trade in dollars for 
pesos, as were Mexican banks (Parker 1994-1995). These cambios, money remittance 
companies and other “Money Service Businesses” (MSBs) would morph, over the next
2 On December 3, 1993, Pablo Escobar-Gaviria shot himself on the roof o f  a building in Medellin, having 
been cornered there by a combined force o f Columbian national police and American DEA agents; his 
death had no apparent effect on the global flow o f Columbian-sourced cocaine.
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decade, into the preferred means of laundering, for not only drug traffickers, but also for 
trans-national criminals and terror organisations (FinCEN and Smith 2003; Passas 2003; 
Robinson 2003; Passas 2006).
However, the ease of integrating cash into both the Mexican and Canadian banking 
system was nothing compared to the ease of integration once the cash found its way to 
the Caribbean. “Banks” with no physical presence in places like Montserrat were 
“chartered” by a government desperate for hard currency. Money was now circulating 
around the globe in huge amounts, without regard to borders, institutional constraints, or 
provenance. Given that those who were primarily responsible for both generating and 
safekeeping these vast amounts of cash were making a fortune, little regard was given to 
any thought of regulation or government interference. This ambivalence was due in no 
small part to the fact that regulation in many areas of the globe simply didn’t exist, or 
existed in a vacuum and that the potential for huge profits mitigated the small risk that 
did exist. For instance, during the mid-1980s, it was estimated that the Cali cocaine cartel 
was moving annual profits of $7 billion, at that time roughly three times the profits of 
General Motors; it was estimated by the start of the 1990s that the Cali Cartel was 
exporting 80% of the world’s cocaine (Robinson 2003; Control 2007; Gaviria and Fisher 
2009). As a result of efforts in prosecuting drug traffickers, American authorities were 
beginning to prove adept at “following the money”, and it was an anti-drug cartel 
operation that provided the first significant “victory” against large-scale money 
launderers. Ironically, this first victory was against an off-shoot of Lucky Luciano’s 
original “French connection” heroin operation, wherein morphine “base” was moved 
from Turkey to Sicily, where it was then refined into pure heroin and moved on to 
Canada for distribution in the United States. Called the “Pizza Connection”, it moved 
approximately $1.6 billion worth of heroin through Canada and the Northwest and 
Midwest of the United States over an 8-year period, from 1976 to 1984. Using a chain of
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pizzerias, the Mafia - La Cosa Nostra’s (LCN) intent was to launder the drug profits 
through pizza sales, and while successful at first, the large quantities of cash soon 
overwhelmed this method (Jacobs and Gouldin 1999; Paoli 2002; Robinson 2003; FBI
2009).
2.1 The Rise o f Regulation: Ontological and Taxonomic Ambiguity
The scale of the “Pizza Connection” case, as well as growing evidence that 
money laundering and organised crime were inextricably linked in the majority of high 
profile cases then under investigation, spurred the United States Congress to pass the 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1970. Also known as The Currency and Foreign Transaction 
Reporting Act, the BSA was the first legislative attempt anywhere to codify money 
laundering as a specific crime (BSA 1970; Currency 2000). The BSA required banks and 
other financial institutions to keep certain records as determined by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, as well as requiring banks and financial institutions to report any transaction, 
to include deposits, withdrawals, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, over 
$10,000 (BSA 1970).
While not specifically an anti-money laundering law, due to its primary aim of 
policing institutions rather than individuals, as well as requiring reporting of legal, or 
“clean” cash as a means to identify tax evasion, it still provided a paper trail that would 
prove helpful to future investigations in establishing the presence of money laundering 
(Amann 2000; Cuellar 2003; Gouvin 2003). The BSA was timely, as launderers were 
becoming more innovative, utilising complex layering and integration methods to 
legitimize their profits. For instance, criminals employed teams of old age pensioners, 
later known as “smurfs” (Richards 1999; Bell 2002). “Smurfs” were contemporary 
cartoon characters with a distinctly blue skin tone, and given that a large percentage of 
the hired pensioners were women with rinsed grey hair that manifested a distinctly bluish
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hue, the name was uniquely appropriate (Bell 2002; Mathers 2004). Anyone willing to 
look the other way for a few dollars was employed for the sole purposed of moving and 
then integrating small amounts of money under the $10,000 limit.
Such was the prevalence of smurfing that a specific law was created in the US, 
the 1987 Anti-Smurfing Statute, which further clarified the original smurfing clause 
within the Money Laundering Control Act o f  1986 (Langford 2002). “Smurfing” would 
later be known as “structuring,” wherein a launderer knowingly arranges, or “structures” 
a series of transactions that 1) obscures the money source through multiple layers, and 2) 
distributes the integration efforts in multiple transactions under a specific regulatory 
threshold, thus avoiding the given reporting requirements of a particular jurisdiction 
(Plombeck 1988; Welling 1989; Cuellar 2003; Gouvin 2003; Mathers 2004). A further 
outcome of this statute were substantial improvements to the bank reporting provisos of 
the BSA, and more importantly, formalising the Currency Transaction Report (CTR) 
requirements. The CTR was the precursor to the Suspicious Activity Report, or SAR; 
one of the defining artefacts of the post-Millennial money laundering compliance regime 
in both the United States and the United Kingdom.3 The CTR became the primary 
reporting mechanism between banks and the legal/regulatory realm (Welling 1989).
Despite Congress passing the BSA, and in 1986, the Money Laundering Control 
Act o f  1986 (MLCA), as well as the United Kingdom’s enactment of the Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act of 1986 (DTOA), the law in both the United States and United 
Kingdom would continue to struggle with establishing what constituted criminal money 
laundering. Moreover, many of the alleged “criminal” cases brought in the early 1980s 
were actually civil or regulatory infractions. In many cases, the legitimate sequestering 
of funds, sometimes referred to as “flight capital”, or the use of non-traditional tax 
reduction measures, was misconstrued as laundering (Nichols 1997; Rider 1999;
3 Examples o f  a US CTR and SAR and UK SAR, are provided in sections 8.1 and 8.2 o f the Appendix.
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Lewisch 2008). This confusion necessitates a key distinction: the difference between 
illicit flight capital and licit flight capital. Illicit flight capital are the proceeds of crime, 
while licit flight capital denotes actions taken by the wealthy to shield their legitimate 
income from the risks of “perceived excessive taxation, interest rates, inflation, and the 
business cycle” (Collier, Hoeffler et al. 1999; Kennedy 2003). This legal ambiguity 
would aid launderers and vex prosecutors, particularly when organised crime and cartel 
heads began to hire accountants and advisors well-versed in the loop-holes created by 
these procedural ambiguities (Naylor 1999; Amann 2000).
The 1980s would witness further regulatory proliferation, particularly at the 
international level, primary as a result of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI) scandal.4 All through the decade, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was 
investigating numerous drug trafficking and laundering conspiracies that encompassed a 
variety of locales, transaction sizes, and product mixes. The BCCI scandal unfolded as a 
result of a multi-jurisdictional operation, “Operation C-Chase,” (“C” for “cash”), which 
had begun in the summer of 1986 (Lohr 1991). C-Chase was a classic “follow the 
money” operation, driven primarily by US Customs agents, led by agent Robert Mazur.
C-Chase involved a “sting” operation targeting Medellin cartel members in Los 
Angeles, Miami, and New York (Circuit 1992; Passas and Groskin 2001). Acting as 
couriers, the cartel members laundered drug profits through the Tampa branch of BCCI; 
such was BCCI’s complicity in the cartel’s efforts, that employees suggested alternative 
means to structure accounts, as well as the use of other branch locations to mitigate the 
risk of detection (Passas 1996). C-Chase provided a wealth of information through the 
collection of 1,200 secretly recorded conversations and 400 hours of video surveillance, 
which exposed an offshore laundering web running through Britain, France, Italy, and 
Panama. Indictments were handed down in 1990 as a result of all the evidence gathered,
4 A case study o f  the BCCI scandal is included in section 8.3 o f  the Appendix.
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which helped amass the convictions of 5 senior BCCI executives, as well as numerous 
cartel members and other criminal intermediaries (Circuit 1992; Robinson 2003).
However, while C-Chase represented a significant victory for US law 
enforcement, it revealed startling complacency in other international jurisdictions, the 
United Kingdom in particular. Significantly, while the BCCI investigation was the 
largest money laundering investigation to date anywhere, what was more startling was 
that the targeted “Laundromat” was not so much in BCCI; it was BCCI (Lascelles, 
Donkin et al. 1991; Passas and Groskin 2001; Robinson 2003). Given the scope of what 
was nothing less than institutionalised money laundering, as well as the vast scope and 
complexity of trans-national crime (TNC) exposed by the scandal and BCCFs 
complicity, the international community finally began to acknowledge the threat posed 
by the proliferation of money laundering. Furthermore, the threat posed by well-funded 
transnational crime organisations and drug cartels was now augmented by the appearance 
of increasingly sophisticated fund raising techniques, both legitimate and illegitimate, 
employed by terror and “liberation” movements to fund their operations. Consequently, 
the need for a cohesive international approach was identified by central bankers, 
regulatory authorities, and national governments, albeit targeting only money laundering 
involving the proceeds derived from drugs trafficking.
In June of 1989, the finance ministers of the Group of Seven (“G-7”) countries -  
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States -  met in 
Paris to discuss the threat posed by the proliferation of money laundering, and 
furthermore, what counter-measures were available, or should be developed, to curb the 
increasing abuse of the world’s banking system and financial institutions. Using many of 
the core anti-money laundering procedural recommendations outlined in the 1988 UN 
Vienna Conference, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was created. In addition to 
the members of the G-7, the President of the European Commission, and eight other
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countries were also in attendance (FATF-GAFI 1990; Johnson 2008; FATF-GAFI2009). 
This task force was given the mandate of assessing money laundering trends and 
techniques, along with examining the efficacy of actions already underway at both the 
national and international level. Per its founding charter, dated July 16, 1989, this 
mandate was to:
“ ...assess the results of co-operation already undertaken in order to prevent the 
utilisation of the banking system and financial institutions for the purpose of 
money laundering, and to consider additional preventative efforts in this field, 
including the adaptation of the legal and regulatory systems so as to enhance 
multilateral judicial assistance” (FATF-GAFI 1990; Gilmore 1995; Doyle 2002).
These assessments resulted in the creation of a body of standards, incorporating 
measures designed to augment perceived omissions in the various national and regional 
anti-money laundering approaches then in practice. In 1990, the FATF issued its Forty 
Recommendations, the first in a series of reports that would provide a comprehensive, 
standards-based approach to combating money laundering. The Forty Recommendations 
would become the sin qua non of multi-lateral money laundering regulation, or as it was 
being described with increasing frequency, “anti”-money laundering (AML) regulation. 
The Forty Recommendations remain at the heart of international initiatives to counter 
money laundering, and while not legally binding, realise their efficacy through 
consensual persuasion and the practice of “naming and shaming” non-compliant nations. 
While generally accepted as the most consistent, if not necessarily effective 
organisational approach to date, the Forty Recommendations are not without 
controversy. Over time the Recommendations would prove to conflict with notions of 
sovereignty, “deliberative equality” -  wherein all parties to a treaty or statutory 
instrument are treated equally -  and the desire for economic “command and control” 
held by many of its member states (Wessel 2006).
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2.2 Regulatory Excess -  The Cayman Islands Case Study
The perils inherent in implementing such a far-ranging scheme are illustrated in the 
following case study involving regulatory sanctions against the Cayman Islands. These 
sanctions were spurred, in part, by perceived enforcement inconsistencies, stemming 
from the FATF’s primary regulatory method, a process known as “mutual evaluation”. 
Mutual evaluation consists of a visit by a committee, derived from member states, with 
expertise in law, financial regulation, law enforcement, and international co-operation. 
The committee evaluates the member nation compliance with the Forty 
Recommendations, flags problems, and identifies strengths and weaknesses in the 
member’s compliance regime. To date there have been two rounds of mutual evaluations 
(Johnson 2008). Pursuant to the “naming and shaming” process, both member and non­
member states, should their AML processes be found wanting, face two significant 
FATF actions. Initially, “naming and shaming” occurs as a result of a non-compliant 
nation being placed on the “Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories” or NCCT list.
As a result of the FATF’s success in harmonizing AML standards, there is a 
significant stigma attached to nations placed on the NCCT list; consequently, they tend 
not to remain on the list for more than one evaluation cycle. The second, and more 
severe procedure, is the application of Recommendation 21 that provides for a series of 
significant steps, requiring FATF members to apply special attention to transactions with 
named jurisdictions. Recommendation 21 states that
“Financial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and 
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from 
countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. 
Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, 
their background and purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings 
established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities. Where such a 
country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF 
Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures” 
(FATF-GAFI 2003).
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The FATF’s first NCCT Review was held in 1990. One measure resulting from 
this review placed The Cayman Islands on the NCCT list for “deficient” money 
laundering controls. The FATF’s scrutiny of The Caymans was understandable to some 
extent, given that prior to the FATF’s review, the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network branch (FinCEN) had expressed concerns over the Island’s robust 
financial sector. As a result of a March 2000 report from the Island’s financial 
authorities, which detailed the presence of 570 bank and trust companies, 2,230 mutual 
funds, and 499 captive insurance companies, FinCEN expressed concerns as to the 
Island’s rather languid regulatory approach. Further concerns highlighted the fact that 
approximately 40,000 offshore companies had registered in The Cayman Islands.
Additional scrutiny called attention to the fact that most Cayman Islands financial 
institutions were not required to identify their customers, nor were they required to 
maintain records of customers, their financial transactions, or to document the opening of 
an account. For instance, Cayman Islands law makes it impossible for the supervisory 
and regulatory authority to obtain information held by financial institutions regarding 
their client’s identity without a court order. Lastly, officials have no access to 
information relating to investment funds held by 15 or fewer persons. FinCEN did not 
explicitly call for sanctions against the Cayman Islands; however, FinCEN’s 
observations, as those of a financial regulatory body of an FATF member state - and a 
very powerful one at that, did carry significant weight as a party to the mutual evaluation 
process (Sloan 2000; Wessel 2006).
The Cayman’s NCCT listing caused considerable outrage among the Islands’ 
regulators, bankers and neighbouring states, especially given the Islands’ regulatory 
efforts prior to its NCCI listing. While the appearance of such a vast network of financial 
institutions could be construed as facilitating an unregulated banking “paradise”, the 
Cayman Islands had taken significant steps, prior to the NCCT review, to improve both
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the regulatory and reputational environment on the island. On the surface, the disparate
nature of the relationship between small nations and the FATF was not as simple or as
one-sided as it appeared.
As part of its founding ideals, the FATF, rather than being confined to the G-7
nations, initiated the formation of FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) throughout the
globe as an inclusive means for smaller nations to be FATF accredited. In 1973 the
Commonwealth nations of the Caribbean basin formed the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) as a trade body, but did not include a regional crime fighting alliance. The
expansion of drugs trafficking during the 1980s hastened the realization that a common
approach against the commensurate increase in money laundering was needed. Several
regional meetings resulted in a consolidation of law enforcement and regulatory efforts
over several years, culminating in the Aruba Conference.
The Aruba Conference on Money Laundering in June of 1990 had resulted in 21
Recommendations with specific applicability to the region; however, as a result of the
Kingston Ministerial Meeting on Money Laundering, held November 5 - 6, 1992, they
were simplified to 19 Recommendations and unanimously adopted. Indeed, the CFATF
was to exhibit an innovative and flexible approach in defining its anti-money laundering
guidelines and regulations. Wilson and Rattray (2007) state that:
“Although complementary to the FATF recommendations the CFATF 19 
recommendations were in some respects very forward looking. For example, action 
against politically exposed persons is a rather recent creation in the FATF anti 
money laundering panorama. However, CFATF Recommendation Five, 
promulgated in 1990 recognised the possibility that public officials, a political 
candidate or political party could be the recipient of tainted proceeds and as such, 
CFATF member countries were encouraged to criminalize such behaviour with the 
imposition of enhanced punishment or other sanctions such as forfeiture of office”.
Recognizing the need for identifying “politically exposed persons”, soon to be 
known as “PEPs”, was prescient, as it was not until publication of the EU’s Third 
Directive, and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group’s (JMLSG) guidelines in
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2006, that the term would enter the accepted anti-money laundering lexicon (Herridge 
2007; Choo 2008). The PEP concept, while in later usage analogous to money laundering 
and terrorist financing, was initially concerned with corruption akin to influence 
peddling and political graft, an endemic problem in developing Caribbean economies.
Further disenchantment with the FATF process stemmed from the apparent “one- 
size fits all” nature of the Forty Recommendations. What was entirely appropriate for the 
developed world was in many ways unsuited for specific regional exigencies. It is 
perhaps telling that a FATF reference to PEPs does not occur until some 14 years later, 
in the 2003 -  2004 “Money Laundering Typology Report” (FATF-GAFI 2003-2004), the 
FATF’s annual report to members on trends, techniques and potential concerns relative 
to current money laundering practice.
This perceived lack of regional sensitivity, despite the promulgation of the FSRB 
relationship, coupled with the NCCI listing, caused the Cayman’s Financial Secretary, 
George McCarthy, to claim that "[t]he decision was made without due process, and is 
inconsistent with reports made by the FATF as late as last week... We were assured by 
the FATF that the review process would be fair and transparent throughout". He further 
castigates the FATF, adding “that repeated requests that the FATF conduct an on-site 
evaluation of Cayman's anti-money laundering system were disregarded, as were 
requests to be given adequate time to respond to aspects of the FATF report with which 
Cayman disagreed” (International 2002; Wessel 2006). Further questions were raised as 
to the denial of due process and a fundamental lack of transparency as to the way in 
which the decision to list was reached.
What was in effect the “final straw” and illustrates the dubious nature of 
“deliberative equality”, were revelations from other Caribbean nations that European 
jurisdictions, Austria and Monaco specifically, were being allowed to rectify FATF 
concerns without being NCCT listed. Austria had been sanctioned for its practice of
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anonymous savings passbooks, and Monaco for a variety of lapses in regulatory 
reporting and transparency. The FATF’s hypocrisy in handling the situation was telling, 
and suspicions were raised among the CFATF’s member states as to the true intention of 
the FATF’s, and by extension, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) inconsistent behaviour.
It was felt that the listing action was simply a way to marginalize the Cayman’s 
considerable advantages as a tax haven, relative to European competitors such as 
Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and the Channel Islands. The Cayman’s stay on the NCCT 
list was short, as the 2001 NCCT review found the Islands largely compliant, given their 
implementation of dedicated money laundering laws and other regulatory improvements. 
In this instance, the FATF’s actions, given its imperious behaviour, was perceived as 
regulatory hegemony, in pursuit of a European competitive advantage in the financial 
services market. Wessel states “[t]he exclusion of the European jurisdictions was offered 
as evidence of an effort to reduce the flow of taxable capital from the high tax 
jurisdictions of EU to the lower tax regions of the Caribbean” (FATF-GAFI 2003; 
Wessel 2006).
The concept of “deliberate equality” is meant to provide individual nation-states, 
organisations, or individuals -  all affected parties -  the right to deliberate and participate 
in the formulation of regulatory policies, with clear criteria, and critically, that the 
criteria is applied unequivocally. As a result of the FATF’s actions in the Cayman 
Islands and other cases, there is now substantial interest by practitioners of international 
law as to the legitimacy of the FATF’s enforcement policies and procedures. There is a 
consensus among legal scholars that the FATF, when viewed through the lens of 
deliberative equality, is in jeopardy of de-legitimacy as an organisation, given its 
inconsistent behaviour (Doyle 2002; Wessel 2006). Indeed, such wariness would be a
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significant consideration in the regulatory relationship between the United States, the 
EU, and supranational bodies such as the FATF throughout the remainder of the 1990s.
2.3 The United Kingdom's Regulatory Regime
Turning to the anti-money laundering regime in the United Kingdom, 1993 saw 
the passage of two significant pieces of legislation. The first, The Criminal Justice Act 
1993 (CJA 1993), introduced the concept of “mandatory reporting” as a result of 
requirements implemented in the EU’s First Directive on money laundering (1991). 
While the target of this legislation was again the profits of drugs trafficking, the 
mandatory reporting requirement broadened the reporting constituency far beyond that of 
the banking sector. Now anyone, be they solicitor, insurance agent or financial planner, 
who harbours suspicions as to the source of funds in their client’s possession, now had a 
duty to report their suspicions.
A secondary act to the CJA, though perhaps more significant in its long-term 
ramifications, were The Money Laundering Regulations 1993 (MLRs), which compelled 
financial institutions to introduce formalised anti-money laundering reporting and 
detection procedures. The MLRs were, much as the CJA, a furtherance of the EU’s First 
Directive (Gill and Taylor 2004). The Money Laundering Regulations 1993 mandated 
significant prevention measures, among them the creation of customer identification 
procedures, specific internal reporting procedures, and the implementation of systems 
and employee training to prevent money laundering (Rizkalla 1998; Stokes and Arora 
2004).
Indeed, the Guardian newspaper, in their March 29, 1994 legal section, led with 
the header “Grassing on the Client”; the subsequent article then went on to detail the 
impact this “onerous looking missive” would have on solicitor-client confidentiality. The 
City of London was rife with speculation, but it was hard to argue against the intent of
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the law. The MLRs specified that once a suspicion of money laundering was identified, 
the individual raising the concern had to report that suspicion to a “constable”(section 
16, (1993). It fell to the UK’s National Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) to serve as 
the recipient of these reports, as the “constable”, and to follow-up on money laundering 
inquiries, the balance of which constituted “suspicious activity reports”, or SARs. SARs 
were primarily generated by banks, as well as other financial services-related entities, 
solicitors, and other members of the new compliance milieu. While SARs had been a 
component of existing money laundering legislation since the Drug Trafficking Offenses 
Act 1986 (Lander 2006), the mandated reporting requirements of the CJA/MLRs 
established the foundation for the current KYC-SARs regime, resulting in a substantial 
influx of SAR generation from 1993 onwards.
The ad hoc nature of this initial reporting environment hampered efforts to 
investigate legitimate suspicions, given that more often than not, SARs were being 
generated to “cover all the bases”, as much as to identify a suspicion of money 
laundering. Indeed, such was the volume that the NCIS was forced to prioritise SARs by 
institutional size and the “estimated” size of the crime. Subsequently, banks took 
precedence in this prioritisation process, in a relatively unsophisticated exercise that 
loosely resembled one of “risk-based” SAR assessment (Fleming 2005; Lander 2006). 
This emphasis on SAR activity, along with the extant requirements of “know your 
customer” (KYC), would form the nexus of legal and regulatory enforcement in the 
coming years, especially as a measure of compliance effectiveness. SAR generation, 
when weighed against the effectiveness and legitimacy of the information therein, would 
be a continually contentious subject, especially as reporting requirements increased in 
complexity and become more institutionalised. Such was their ubiquity that SARs, along 
with KYC procedures, would evolve to become the defining artefacts of money 
laundering regulation post-9/11. This was primarily a result of both increased FATF
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influence and expanded national legislative requirements, requirements that mandated 
banks to implement standardised money laundering controls, inclusive of formalised 
processes and metrics (Middleton and Levi 2005; Harvey 2009; Harvey and Lau 2009). 
Subsequently, this regulatory expansion would help foster the development of AMLPT 
technology, in supporting efforts in quantifying their risk exposure as identified by SAR 
reporting and KYC procedures.
In the 1990s, authorities in the United Kingdom had been ambivalent towards a 
number of vehemently anti-Western extremists who were campaigning openly in support 
o f jihad or "holy war” against the West and her allies. Belatedly realising the threat, and 
when coupled with the pending expiration of several acts addressing terrorism and 
security in Northern Ireland, the Terrorism Act o f2000 (TA) was passed. The Terrorism 
Act 2000 significantly broadened the definition of terror financing to incorporate acts 
that occurred abroad, and while still maintaining a UK-centric thrust, its significance lay 
in the incorporation of judicial procedures that complied with the definition of equivalent 
offenses under the UN International Convention on the Suppression o f the Financing o f  
Terrorism of 1999.
Meanwhile, as transnational terror fundraising was finally being given proper 
legislative attention, on May 20, 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the 
reform of financial services regulation in the UK, and the creation of a new regulator: the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) (FSA 2005). The FSA was created as a result of 
Parliament’s passing the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and was to be the 
United Kingdom’s single major financial regulator. One of the four stated aims of the 
FSA is “the reduction of financial crime, including plans to tackle money laundering 
(Sections 2-6 of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000)” (Rees 2001). As has been 
previously discussed, there had been an ongoing concern as to the breadth and 
complexity of UK money laundering and terrorist finance law introduced over the years.
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Subsequently, agencies and individuals charged with fighting money laundering, 
such as the NCIS, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and the now legislatively 
formalised role of Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO), had been forced to 
draw on a variety of, at times, disparate instruments to detect and prosecute perpetrators, 
with varying degrees of success. With the creation of the FSA, it was the Government’s 
intent to remedy this situation, even though it intended the agency to operate within the 
then-current anti-money laundering regime’s regulations. These included the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, and the Prevention o f Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989; later provisions modifying and enlarging these remit 
of these Acts as contained in the Terrorism Act 2000 would also be included.
The FSA’s primary means of sanction from enforcement actions was a fine, 
which varied depending on the transgression. These could range anywhere from 
£500,000 to well over several million pounds (see section 5.2 for a discussion on the 
organisational response to fines levied early in the post-9/11 regime, circa 2003-04), and 
were initially directed at institutions. It would not take action against individual 
compliance officers until 2008, when Michael Wheelhouse of Sindicatum Holdings was 
fined £17,500 and his firm £49,000 for failing to implement proper money laundering 
controls (Lavan 2008). In 2006, in response to complaints of regulatory complexity, the 
FSA pronounced that it was streamlining the AML regulations, and that firms would no 
longer have to adhere to the letter of FSA regulations, rather, “...the emphasis will be on 
the senior management of regulated companies to make sure their own internal checks 
against money launderers are sufficiently robust” (BBC 2006).
In general, financial institutions have been provided a form of “safe harbour” 
from sanctions, save for the most egregious lapses, through adherence to guidance notes 
from the British Bankers’ Association and Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, a 
process that preceded the formation of FSA. Started in 1990/91:
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“The Guidance Notes have continued to evolve and gain in status since 
they were first published in 1990/91. Initially, they were published as a voluntary 
statement of good practice with the support of the Bank of England. In 1993 they 
acquired quasi-regulatory status by virtue of Regulation 5(b) of the Money 
Laundering Regulations 1993. Regulation 5 provides that in determining whether 
a person or institution has complied with the requirements of the Regulations, a 
court may take account of relevant guidance issued or approved by a supervisory 
or regulatory body...” (Mullen 2003).
FSA pronouncements normally take the form of guidance notes or the release of 
specific rule making and fact-finding on specific issues of concern with consultation 
from a variety of industry and regulatory bodies. A comprehensive organisational 
framework was now needed to manage not only the ever-evolving body of money 
laundering regulation, but also to analyse and process the increase in suspicious activity 
reports, a result of the enhanced reporting requirements mandated by the Money 
Laundering Regulations 1993.
Subsequently, the Government envisaged tackling all these requirements through 
imposing the remit of a single regulator: the FSA (Rees 2001). With the creation of the 
FSA, the UK now had a complex variety of bodies tasked with addressing financial 
crime, all with varying remits. The various regulatory bodies, organisations, statutes, 
standards, and other entities, recognised in the UK AML-CFT regime, in early to mid- 
2001, are referenced in figure 2.3.1.
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UK Primary 
Legislation
UK Secondary 
Legislation
International
Regulatory
Standards
Regulation
  ...
Terrorism  A ct 200(1 -  consolidates law on 
o f  UK terrorism law.
Money laundering Regulations 1993 - require financial institutions to put in 
place systems to deter money laundering, and to assist the relevant authorities 
to deter money laundering activities. *
Basel Com m ittee on Banking Regulation (.Customer due diligence for 
banks 2001): Egmont Group o f F lUs (1995) -  Cooperative body for info 
and intelligence sharing for Financial Intelligence Units
FSA’s Handbook o f Rules & Regulations (2001) -  imposes high-level 
obligations on firms to counter the risk o f  financial crime (SYSC); ML 
sourcebook; MLROs are now approved persons (APERs)
Industry
G uidance
Joint M oney Laundering Steering Group (JM LSG ) -  industry body that 
issues Guidance Notes on legal and regulatory requirements and on good 
practice.
Figure 2.3.1 -  The International & UK AML Legal & Regulatory Framework (from FSA (2003))
2.4 September 11th -  Apr es le *Deluge: Regulation and the Dawn o f  the Age o f  
Control
As a result o f the attacks o f 9/11, America assumed a war posture both globally 
and nationally: globally, by launching Operation Enduring Freedom, which removed Bin 
Laden’s Taliban benefactors in Afghanistan; and nationally, on October 24, 2001, some 
30 days after the 9/11 attacks, when Congress passed one o f the most sweeping anti­
terror laws in history: H.R. 3162, the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act 
o f 2001”, or “USAPA” (FinCEN 2002; Olsen 2002). While USAPA’s effect on the 
average citizen would play-out over time, its impact on financial institutions, both
domestically and internationally, was almost immediate; the laissez-faire regulatory 
mores of the 1990s were about to give way to a new age of control.
USAPA was in many ways a “rush” job, and its 342 pages contain changes, some 
minor and others quite significant, to over 15 long-established statutes. It further 
introduced a variety of expanded surveillance powers that reduced legal checks and 
balances, particularly in the areas of electronic monitoring, privacy, and civil liberties 
(EFF 2001; FinCEN 2002). Of significance was the vastly increased scope of Federal 
power - power that entailed a distinct lack of focus on matters pertaining to terrorism. 
Many of these powers involved warrantless searches, wiretaps, and other intrusive 
investigative methods, as well as introducing a reduced standard of justifiable cause for a 
variety of potential offenses. At face value, many of these offenses had a demonstratively 
tenuous link to established law, particularly when viewed in the context of acts as 
sweeping and ill-defined as those introduced under USAPA (FinCEN 2002; Olsen 2002; 
Gouvin 2003; Vlcek 2008).
The need for control, as well as the impetus to be seen “to do something” would 
manifest itself through a variety of means, primarily though legal instruments such as 
USAPA, as well as military action. It was the sheer magnitude of the attacks that 
underpinned the demand - indeed the obsession - with control, regulation and 
accountability in the post-9/11 world. Somehow, al-Qaeda had been able to completely 
circumvent American money laundering prevention measures, and more worryingly, 
FinCEN and others charged with preventing the funding of such a crime had no idea as 
to how it had been accomplished.
Subsequently, it was clear that the old AML regime was done for. However, the 
roots of several problems, such as discovering how Bin Laden was able to thwart not 
only FinCEN, but also the entire US intelligence establishment, or highlighting the 
pervasive lack of multi-agency co-operation among US law enforcement, could be found
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in a pre-9/11 philosophical debate. This debate involved balancing the relative fluidity of 
free markets against the increasing international call for more concerted global law 
enforcement and financial regulation, something that ran counter to American fiscal, 
social, and political sensibilities. Primarily, global efforts at financial regulation were 
viewed by some American authorities as a means to impose European-style tax 
harmonisation on US markets, an anathema to US elites (Bosworth-Davies 2007).
As was the case in the United States, prior to 9/11 the United Kingdom had a 
variety of anti-terrorism legislation already in existence, primarily as a result of the 
situation in Northern Ireland. The events of 9/11 provided much the same sense of 
urgency in the UK as in America, in regards to re-assessing those measures then in place 
regarding the funding of terrorism. Confronted with the need for re-vamping the 
measures then in place, the government was faced with the classic dilemma of open 
democracy: how to balance protecting the citizenry with allowing authorities greater 
powers to do so. While USAPA would make significant changes and amendments to 15 
distinct existing statutes, the United Kingdom, by way of already having comprehensive 
anti-terrorism and criminal statutes in place, would require much less in the way of a 
radical overhaul.
However, while not as sweeping, the act that would be the UK’s version of 
USAPA, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001{ATCSA), would contain 
similar structures that alarmed civil libertarians, and like USAPA, granted greatly 
expanded powers to the authorities. Furthermore, it also contained many enhanced police 
and surveillance powers that had little applicability to counter-terrorism, and was 
criticised for its swift implementation timetable for so important an act. Of great concern 
was Article 4, which on face value, appeared to conflict in many ways with the Human 
Rights Act -  Article 4, having later been proved incompatible with existing Human
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Rights law, would be overturned by the Law Lords on December 16, 2004. Helen 
Fenwick, writing in The Modem Law Review (2002) describes these concerns:
“It is equally commonplace to retort, as many commentators have done on numerous 
occasions, that measures aimed at combating terrorism will undermine rather than defend 
democracy and that counter-terrorist measures strike at democratic values if they are 
disproportionate to the aim of protecting them. It was said in debate in the Lords on the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: 'After the outrage of 11th September, the way 
to defend democracy is not to dismantle it; it is to strengthen it. Otherwise ... the Mother 
of Parliaments is being asked to put its name to achieving some of the aims of those who 
carried out the events of 11th September*. Those comments echo those of Tony Blair, the 
then Shadow Home Secretary, when he observed 'if we cravenly accept that any action 
by the government and entitled "prevention of terrorism" must be supported in its entirety 
and without question we do not strengthen the fight against terrorism, we weaken it'. John 
Wadham of Liberty finds: 'Draconian anti-terrorist laws ... have a far greater impact on 
human rights than they ever will on crime'.”
The ATCSA amends the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA), which along with refining 
previous legislation was used to implement the 1999 UN International Convention for  
the Suppression and Financing o f Terrorism as well. It included similar provisions to 
those that were later introduced in the Proceeds o f  Crime Act 2003 (POCA), in particular 
the so called ‘negligence test’ for failing to report offences. Over the next several years, 
ATCSA and other laws would be further refined, especially the Money Laundering 
Regulations, which would see two further iterations, in 2003 and 2007 respectively. 
ATCSA contained enhancements to the TA’s existing money laundering statutes, 
primarily through clarification of the definition of terrorist financing and what 
constituted criminal activity in support of terrorism, as well as introducing civil actions 
in the area of seizure and forfeiture of terrorist cash at the UK’s borders. Further 
measures were introduced that allowed the freezing of assets of governments “who are 
threatening the economic interests of the United Kingdom or the life or property of 
United Kingdom residents”.
In a classic example of unintended consequences, this later proviso would be used 
by Prime Minster Gordon Brown on October 12, 2008 to seize £4bn of Icelandic assets
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to cover the estimated £3bn of savings, both public and private, caught up in the collapse 
of Iceland’s three main banks, Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir, as a result of 2008’s 
global liquidity crisis (Telegraph 2008). Herein is the problem with such sweeping 
“anti-terror” instruments: a creative mind can make a case for almost any exigency 
outside of legislative intent. Brown’s actions, while outrageous to the Icelanders, were 
not that unusual, given the Bush Administration’s claims for the existence of 
Guantanamo Bay under the “war on terror’s” mantra of “extraordinary times call for 
extraordinary measures”.
2.5 Ambiguity and Quantification -  how big is big?
As already discussed, the events of 9/11 spurred a world-wide legislative avalanche 
at all levels of government, regulatory agencies and law enforcement. However, this 
avalanche would expose flaws in the preconceived notions then in vogue as to the 
relationship between money laundering and terrorism. It was now clear that money 
laundering was no longer a benign component of criminal enterprise, but a deliberate 
means of facilitating the funding of terror operations as well as a means to hide ill-gotten 
gains. Subsequently, the anti-money laundering lexicon was expanded to include the 
concept of “terrorist finance” or more specifically, “countering” the financing of terror 
(CFT).
The resultant acronym of “AML-CFT” would, over time, become the descriptor of 
choice when addressing the rubric of anti-money laundering, terror financing, and those 
methods, processes and regulatory norms undertaken in its prevention. The first use of 
the term “terrorist financing” was revealed in the UN General Assembly’s Declaration 
on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, released in 1994 (UN 1995; Bantekas 
2003). Bantekas (2003) goes on to state that:
“Although the Assembly was not addressing any particular state, one has only to
look at relevant Security Council resolutions of that time to understand that an
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agenda had been established to confront state entities that were not only suspected,
but known, to foster, support, and finance acts of terror.”
“Terror financing” covered a variety of activities: from drugs trafficking profits 
used in supporting terror groups, to smuggling, extortion, fraud and robbery. The 
absence of a universally agreed definition of “terrorism” would create insurmountable 
problems in trying to further address terror financing through international treaties and 
agreements. Aside from the ambiguities in establishing common ground as to what 
indeed defined “terrorism”, there was further ambiguity in differentiating terrorist 
activity from that of organised crime, given that both exhibited norms and behaviours 
that were more often similar than not. On one hand, terrorism is usually defined (or 
justified) as having an ideological motivation, while “organised crime” is provided no 
such out, given the perpetrator’s primary goal of financial gain. Indeed, such is the fine 
line delineating their mutual traits, that the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime, issued in 2000, simply avoids the inclusion of terrorism in its 
definition of organised crime, despite the understood and manifest links between the two 
(Crime 2000; Bantekas 2003). Indeed, as organised crime has gradually assumed the 
mantle of transnational crime, the relationship between terror and criminality becomes 
more linear. Makarenko (2004) describes this phenomenon as the “Crime-Terror 
Continuum”, with organised crime on one end of this spectrum, and terrorism on the 
other end. The methods and common “purpose” of criminal and terror organisations 
converge along this axis, usually through the existence of a political environment, or 
even state-sponsorship, that is favourable to this convergence, such as in Somalia, or 
Afghanistan under the Taliban (Oehme 2008). Civil Wars are another fertile ground for 
nurturing this confluence. Given the anarchy inherent in civil wars, as well as the 
minimal or complete lack of socio-institutional restraints evident in such receptive
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environments, these factors often contribute to what is referred to as the “black hole 
syndrome” as illustrated in figure 2.5.1:
Organised Crime TerrorismConvergence
Political
crime
Commercial
Terrorism
Black Hole 
Syndrome
Alliance
with
terrorist
group
Use of terror 
tactics for 
operational 
purposes
Criminal activities 
for operational 
purposes
Alliance
with
criminal
organisation
Figure 2.5.1 -  Stages within the Crime-Terror Continuum (Makarenko 2004)
The “black hole” metaphor is apt for these incubators o f transnational terror and 
crime. Such domains normally lack even a rudimentary legal framework, which then 
enables endemic corruption, resulting in a surfeit of criminal activity undertaken in the 
shadows -  the black hole -  unfettered and unhindered by any external or internal 
controls.
The operational tactics, techniques, and procedures of Columbia’s Medellin 
cartel, as well as those of the Taliban in Afghanistan, help provide an understanding how 
organised crime or terrorists and other similar groups, such as Islamic militants and 
insurgents, oscillate along the continuum. Moreover, the juxtaposition of their respective 
activity on the continuum further exposes the ontological and taxonomic opacity inherent 
in attempting to categorise criminal versus terrorist behaviour. We see the operations of 
the Medellin cartel progress left to the right on the continuum, one example being the use 
terror tactics for operational purposes. Tactics that, in the context of cartel behaviour, are 
now labelled “narco-terrorism”, as employed against the Columbian government during 
the 1980s. Escobar’s war was more about Government interference in his trafficking 
routes and operational methods, than anything about revolution, politics, or ideology. 
Conversely, the Taliban move from right to left, using the criminal activity of narcotics
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trafficking to fund terror operations throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve a 
supposed politico-religious goal. Thus, was Escobar simply a terrorist drugs dealer, or a 
drugs dealer who utilised terrorist tactics to wage war against the political establishment? 
Subsequently, are the Taliban simply a criminal drugs cartel using the goal of an Islamic 
state in Afghanistan to justify, indeed legitimise, ordinary criminal profiteering 
(Acharya, Bukhari et al. 2009; Gaviria and Fisher 2009; Peters 2009)?
Such distinctions further complicate the ontological dilemma that hampers many 
an AML-CFT investigation that, in the new age of “global” terrorism, attempts to follow 
the money. The fundamental question then becomes is the “crime” and the associated 
funds under investigation a judicial matter, or one for the security or intelligence 
services? Moreover, are the funds even ill-gotten? While this quandary is somewhat 
moot relative to organised crime, it is problematic in regards to terrorism in many 
respects. The ability of terrorist front groups to undertake legitimate fundraising under 
the guise of populist political struggle, support for “oppressed” minorities, or quasi- 
nationalistic causes, provides a semblance of legitimacy, thus serving as an excellent 
cover for layering their funds.5 The ontological challenges aside, what now becomes 
readily apparent, in almost a state of “me too” motivation, is the ongoing “laundry list” 
approach to tackling AML-CFT. It is clear that those drafting the plethora of proscriptive 
AML-CFT instruments, statutes, recommendations and concordats, are trying to cover 
every possible contingency, as well as every modus operandi a terrorist could possibly 
conceive.
What is glaringly lacking in current AML-CFT analysis is an idea of the scope of 
the problem; not that money was being laundered by trans-national terrorists, but by 
whom and in what quantities. Moreover, how could anyone seriously believe that merely 
creating an international regulatory maze would lead to any sort of effective curb, let
5 Examples o f legitimate and illegitimate funding methods used by the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
and the Liberation Tigers o f  Tamil Elam (LTTE) are detailed in section 8.4 o f  the Appendix.
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alone elimination of the problem? Indeed, most terror funding doesn’t even pass through
traditional banking channels, let alone is introduced into the system through typically
Western means, such as cash direct deposit; in most cases, no bank is even minimally
involved. Such transactions, known as Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) are
prevalent throughout the developing world6. The best example of an IVTS system is a
cultural component of Islam, hawala banking. According to Interpol,
“Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates 
outside of, or parallel to 'traditional' banking or financial channels. It was 
developed in India, before the introduction of western banking practices, and is 
currently a major remittance system used around the world. It is but one of several 
such systems; another well known example is the 'chop', 'chit' or 'flying money' 
system indigenous to China, and also, used around the world. These systems are 
often referred to as 'underground banking'; this term is not always correct, as they 
often operate in the open with complete legitimacy, and these services are often 
heavily and effectively advertised.
The components of hawala that distinguish it from other remittance systems are 
trust and the extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional 
affiliations. Unlike traditional banking or even the 'chop' system, hawala makes 
minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money 
take place based on communications between members of a network of 
hawaladars, or hawala dealers” (Interpol 2002).
Given that IVTS transactions maintain no formalised records, nor offer any more 
complex categories than buyers and sellers, how can the significant volume of cash flow 
in such a system be quantified, let alone analysed for “criminal” intent? Such is the 
quantitative ambiguity as to scope of money laundering that even the FATF won’t 
venture a guess, and publicly states on its website that “however it must be said that 
overall it is absolutely impossible to produce a reliable estimate of the amount of money 
laundered and therefore the FATF does not publish any figures in this regard” (FATF- 
GAFI 2009). In fact, Beare and Schneider (2007), citing a somewhat apocryphal story, 
infer that the whole global AML ambit is predicated on complete conjecture:
6 The use o f hawala, along with a diagram o f  a typical IVTS is included in section 8.5 o f  the Appendix.
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“Despite reference from other agencies to FATF estimates on the magnitude of 
money laundering, FATF has not generated its own reliable data estimating the 
size of the World’s money laundering problem. Amazingly for an organisation that 
was created to focus specially on money laundering, the estimate that FATF uses is 
from the IMF -  and i f  the story is correct, from a figure scribbled on a dinner 
napkin. In a speech at the plenary meeting of the FATF in Paris on February 1998, 
the managing director of the IMF, Michael Camdessus, while questioning the 
accuracy of this estimate, indicated that the 2 to 5 percent has come to be regarded 
as the general consensus:
I  hardly need to say that the IMF regards the anti-money laundering actions 
advocated by the FATF as crucial fo r the smooth functioning o f  the financial 
markets. While we cannot guarantee the accuracy o f our figures -  and you have 
certainly a better evaluation than us -  the estimates o f the present scale o f  money 
laundering transactions are almost beyond imagination - 2  to 5 percent o f global 
GDP would probably be a consensus range ” (Author’s italics)
Despite the fact that none of the agencies tasked with addressing money laundering
at the international level has any idea of the challenge at hand, it is still the majority view
of most politicians, regulators and central bankers, that money laundering represents a
threat to global financial stability, given that its international element is “virtually
undeniable” (Cuellar 2003). While the various estimates at hand are holistic in nature,
and seek to quantify the scale of money laundering at an elevated level of abstraction, at
a more practical level some estimates place the amount laundered in any particular year
at around $500 billion (Aberdeen Group 2002). While it categorically states that it does
not attempt to quantify money laundering,
“...the FATF generally adopts the IMF’s rough estimate that the extent of money 
laundering in the world is 2 to 5 percent of the world’s gross domestic product 
(GDP), which amounts to roughly between US$590 billion and US$1.5 trillion. No 
empirical evidence supporting this estimate is given in documents or in reports 
issued by these agencies. Regardless of the lack of evidence to support claims of 
the extent of money laundering, estimates repeated by the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO), the Council of Europe, and the UN are drawn directly from 
the IMF and indirectly from the FATF sources” (Beare and Schneider 2007).
Peter Lilley, in Dirty Dealing: the Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering
states that the problem is far greater, while also quoting the US$590 billion to US$1.5
trillion metric, he goes on to say,
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“The United Nations Human Development Report of 1999 commented that 
organised crime syndicates grossed $1.5 trillion per annum - which is more than 
many developed economies and multinational corporations. If you accept - and I 
think you should - that the scale of global money laundering each year is at least 
$1.5 trillion then either the staggering, horrifying scale of the whole problem 
suddenly snaps into place or you are so bemused that you still don’t really believe 
it. To put that $1.5 trillion figure into context, in real and comparative terms:
• $1.5 trillion is $1,500,000,000,000 - which when put like that is even more 
astounding.
• The estimated GDP of the United States in 1998 was $8,511 trillion - thus the 
annual money laundering figure is 17% of this. Or to put it another way the GDP 
of the United States is only just five times that of Global Organised Crime Inc. In 
fact the figure of $1.5 trillion is only dwarfed by three individual country’s 
economies.
• The largest corporation quoted in the Fortune 500 as of February 2000 is General 
Motors with a turnover of $161,315,000,000 which is about a tenth of the amount 
laundered each year (or money laundering per annum is ten times the annual 
turnover of General Motors).
• The GDP of Switzerland is $191,000,000,000 - just an eighth of the annual 
money laundering figure.
One could just go on - and the comparisons would become even more 
overwhelming. Normally when such a staggering financial value is placed on 
money laundering the normal reaction is one of incredulity and extreme scepticism. 
Combined with this is the claim that all such figures have no basis in actuality - 
that essentially they have been plucked out of thin air. The Australian, John Walker 
has addressed these problems in his work on ‘Modelling Global Money Laundering 
Flows'. The bad news for the sceptics is that output from the research and 
modelling process has produced a global money laundering total of $2.85 trillion 
per year. Rare for someone who introduces a new economic model, Walker 
actually admits that he is not claiming that the model is yet producing accurate 
estimates of money laundering flows. That being said, the critical fact is that the 
total produced is almost twice as much as official estimates or calculations. The 
basis of Walker’s model is as follows:
(It) uses a range of publicly available crime statistics to estimate the amount of 
money generated by crime in each country around the world, and then uses various 
socio-economic indices to estimate the proportions of these funds that will be 
laundered, and to which countries these funds will be attracted for laundering. By 
aggregating these estimates, an assessment can be made of the likely extent of 
global money laundering...”
Lilley’s sources, while relatively verifiable, reflect a less than accurate picture,
both chronologically and quantitatively, of the extent of post-9/11 money laundering, and
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more importantly, where “traditional” money laundering deviates into the funding of
terrorism. However, an understanding of the scope of terrorist funding can be
extrapolated from available data, particularly as a result of research into the Crime-
Terrorism Continuum, which suggests that a significant portion of laundered drug profits
are funding insurgencies and terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Southwest Asia, as well as attacks on the West (Mylonaki 2002; Makarenko 2004;
Oehme 2008). The vexing issue of quantifying terrorism-related money laundering
becomes even more doubtful in this regard, as, given the use of hawala and other forms
of IVTS it becomes impossible to validate funding vectors with any degree of certainty.
When studying AML-CFT, what is glaringly evident, through the use of applied
quantitative and qualitative research methods, is that the political posturing and oft-
voiced military metaphors now in vogue are laughable; if the West is indeed waging a
“war” on terror financing and money laundering, it has no idea of how big the “enemy”
is, nor the extent of his resources, or for that matter who “he” is. Friedrich Schneider,
Professor of Economics at Johannes Kepler University, in Linz, Austria, provides an
excellent summation of the problems of quantifying money laundering on a global scale
as it relates to drugs trafficking, as well as the debate on Walker’s and other
methodologies used in attempting to do so:
“For 2000 the IMF (2001; 2003) as well as the World Bank estimate that 2-4% of 
the world gross domestic product (GDP) stems from illicit (criminal) sources or 
from money laundering activities. Agarwal and Agarwal (2004; 2006) estimate 
with the help of forecasts from regression analyses (taken from economic 
intelligence units), that global money laundering amounts to more than 2.0 to 2.5 
trillion US$ annually or about 5-6% of World GDP in 2006 (44.444 trillion US$ in 
2006). In the finance and banking sector the authors find a figure of US$ 500 
billion to one trillion in 2004 (Agarwal and Agarwal (2004). Recent IMF estimates 
on money laundering by the drug traffickers who “introduce” the proceeds gained 
through the role of drugs into the legitimate financial market amount to between 2- 
5% of world’s GDP, about 600 billion annually. The IDB (2004) reaches the 
conclusion that for Latin America a rough estimate appears to be somewhere 
between 2.5 and 6.3 % of annual GDP of Latin American countries. A great deal of
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the money derives from drug-dealing, with total revenue of 338 Billion USD in 
2006.
[Walker’s] model of global money laundering is based on standard economic 
theory, in which he tries to develop an international input-output-model. The 
Walker model relies on estimates of the extent of various different types of crimes 
in single countries around the world, estimates of the proceeds resulting from these 
crimes and the probability of those proceeds being laundered (...) The model 
defines the types of data and analyses the need to be generated in order to 
effectively model global transnational crime and money laundering. Walker (2007) 
concludes that since 2000 global money laundering may account for as much as 
US$ 3 trillion p.a. and that business fraud exceeds illicit drugs as a source of 
laundered money (...)
Peter Reuter (1983; 2007), who is quite critical to the findings of John Walker, 
comes to the opposite conclusion that neither on the national nor on the global 
level, credible estimates are available (Reuter 2007). He admits that the aggregate 
annual figure globally is in the hundreds of billions of dollars, but whether that 
figure is a small number of only a few hundred billions or even a trillion is 
unknown according to his research. He argues that the vagueness of such estimates 
is a result of both disagreements over how to conceptualise money laundering, as 
well as weaknesses in the techniques used to quantify it. As a consequence 
estimated changes in the volume of money laundering cannot be used as a measure 
to judge effectiveness of global anti-money laundering regime. He concludes that 
aggregate figures provide little value added for policy makers. He justifies his 
conclusion as follows: First, these aggregate findings conceal as much as they 
reveal. Second, the anti-money laundering control regime has been constructed not 
so much to reduce money laundering as to namely reduce income producing 
crimes, increase the integrity of the financial system and control corruption and 
terrorist financing (Schneider 2005) ”.
When compared to the stratospheric sums bandied about at the global level, money 
laundering in the UK pales in comparison; a variety of sources in the literature claim the 
range of laundered funds in the UK to be somewhere between £19 billion to £48 billion. 
The most consistently quoted figure, £25 billion, derives from the first complete money 
laundering threat assessment compiled by the National Criminal Investigative Service 
(NCIS) in 2003 (NCIS 2003). In placing this figure in context, according to the British 
Bankers’ Association (BBA), the total amount of money on deposit in British banks in 
2001 was around £2,750 billion (BBA 2001; Harvey 2005); therefore, using the NCIS
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figure of £25 billion, laundered funds in the UK’s banking system represent less than one 
percent of the total. This figure is relatively consistent in among government 
publications, academic literature and industry data, despite the fact that more 
publications are beginning to make a distinction among money derived from crime, 
money laundered for tax avoidance and the like, and terror financing. This contrasts with 
past practice that tended to simply lump the lot under the rubric of “money laundering” 
or “financial sector abuse”.
For instance, in a House of Lords Report (2009), Money Laundering and the 
Financing o f Terrorism, the same £25 million figure is referenced, except it is broken 
into greater detail. Referencing Home Office-supplied organised crime data from 2007, 
the report goes on to state that “organised crime alone generated an illicit turnover of 
some £15 billion a year, leading to money laundering through the regulated sector... of 
£10 billion a year”. In comparing the situation 6 years later, deposit figures supplied by 
the Bank of England in July 2009, show £1,354.8 billion on deposit, so using the same 
ratio from the BBA figures7, laundered money is still around 1 percent of funds in the 
UK banking system, in this case, a little more, at 1.3 percent (England 2009).
While these numbers are reflective of what in essence is a stalemate in curbing 
money laundering, perhaps more disturbing are the apparent inconsequential outcomes 
from the shift towards a dedicated AML-CFT regime; more so, the gross disparity of 
reputed “successes” as reported by the UK’s various enforcement bodies since the 
regime’s inception. This is readily apparent when surveying a sample of figures from a 
variety of the major bodies tasked with regime enforcement, such as HM’s Treasury, the 
Home Office, and the Serious and Organised Crime (SOCA) office. Their figures are 
generated from a variety of sources, such as MI5, the National Terrorist Financial
j
See Jackie Harvey (2005). "An Evaluation of Money Laundering Policies." Journal of Money Laundering Control 
8(4): 339-345 for a concise over-view of further quantitative incoherence in the UK’s AML-CFT regime.
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Investigation Unit (NTFIU), which is under the command of Metropolitan Police’s 
Counter Terrorist Command, as well as the NCIS, and as of 2006, now part of SOCA.
Writing in 2004, Bradley C. Bamford, of the University of Toronto, refers to a 
Home Office claim that “since 11 September a total of $100 million in terrorist funds has 
been seized” (Bamford 2004), Given that dedicated measures to track terrorist finance 
were not in place until at least a year after 9/11, we can then say this figure accounts for 
monies seized from 2002 to 2004, roughly $50 million a year. Averaging the historical 
sterling to dollar interbank exchange rate of 1.64 over this timeframe (Brodie 2009), the 
Home Office figure works out to £30 million a year, £60 million over the life of the 
claim.
In November of 2005, HM Treasury, in their 2005 Pre-Budget Report, issued on
December 5th of that year, included a “Statement on Terrorist Finance,” that included yet
another series of claims in the same timeframe:
“The CTF regime aims to disrupt the support networks that make terrorism 
possible. Since 2001, for example, there have been:
• £400,000 of cash seizures under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001;
• £110,000 of forfeited funds;
• £475,000 of funds seized under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; and
• £382,000 subject to Treasury asset freezes all in relation to terrorist cases.
(This does not include the £78 million that was frozen until 2002 as part o f  UK 
action against the Talebcmf\
In the 2006 report Countering International Terrorism, under the heading 
Successful disruptions -  financial, HM Government offers the same statistics verbatim, 
save for a slight increase in the amount of funds subject to asset freezing by HM 
Treasury, and some minor wording differences:
“Since 2001, in relation to terrorist cases there have been:
• £400,000 of cash seizures under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2000;
• £110,000 of forfeited funds;
• £475,000 of funds seized under the Proceeds o f Crime Act 2002; and
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• £477,000 subject to Treasury asset freezes
(This does not include the £78 million that was frozen until 2002 as part o f UK action
against the Taliban)”.
If we are to believe the statistics published since the introduction of the post-9/11 
AML-CFT regime, the only effective results have been a less-than-impressive 8% 
increase in the amount of frozen terrorist assets. Given that frozen assets are not 
necessarily indicative of a conviction for terrorism offenses, this is a spurious figure.
What is perhaps more telling, is that in the first 5 years of enforcement, it appears, 
at least from these figures, that the government has had no success in curbing terrorist 
financing, beyond those in 2001, yet the Home Office claims over £60 million in funds 
have been seized from 2002 to 2004 per Bamford. However, the Home Office is not the 
only agency unable to agree on an accurate metric in determining the scale of money 
laundering, let alone the effectiveness of measures to curb its proliferation.
Again, the whole issue of quantitative legitimacy aside, the question is still one of 
source, of iteratively determining if funds are simply criminal in origin or monies 
destined for the funding of terror that may, or may not be the proceeds of crime. As has 
been noted, understanding what constitutes terror funding is as much a semantic, indeed 
an ontological exercise, as one of determining the origin of funds though traditional law 
enforcement methods or intelligence gathering. However, making this determination will 
always be a subjective exercise in many ways, given the regrettable lack of specifics 
provided by regulators and government. For instance, the FATF continues its pattern of 
delivering vague pronouncements, specifically as it relates to CFT policy in this regard, 
notably in a rather meandering guidance note to financial institutions. Stating in 
Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing (FATF-GAFI 
2002), the FATF recommends they take a more active role in CFT matters (Author’s 
italics):
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“It should be acknowledged as well that financial institutions will probably be 
unable to detect terrorist financing as such. Indeed, the only time that financial 
institutions might clearly identify terrorist financing as distinct from other criminal 
misuse of the financial system is when a known terrorist or terrorist organisation 
has opened an account. Financial institutions are, however, in a position to detect 
suspicious transactions that, if reported, may later prove to be related to terrorist 
financing. It is the competent enforcement authority or the financial intelligence 
unit (FIU) then that is in a position to determine whether the transaction relates to a 
particular type of criminal or terrorist activity and decide on a course of action. For 
this reason, financial institutions do not necessarily need to determine the legality 
o f the source or destination o f the funds. Instead, they should ascertain whether 
transactions are unusual, suspicious or otherwise indicative o f  criminal or 
terrorist activity.”
So then, the activity of how financial institutions ascertain whether a transaction is 
unusual or suspicious becomes crucial in understanding the viability of profiling. 
Complicating attempts at this understanding is the FATF’s observation that “determining 
the legality or source...” of funds, while convoluted, may be a tacit acknowledgement 
that attempts to quantify the problem are fruitless; perhaps it is better to focus institutions 
on those doing the laundering, rather than the laundering itself -  the profile of the 
launder. Such a philosophical transformation would develop over time, much as a result 
of the exponential expansion of SAR activity, a result of increasingly onerous regulatory 
oversight, as well as a response to the ever-evolving innovativeness of launderers and 
their methods.
This transformation would first occur among AML-CFT practitioners, rather than 
in political circles, for several reasons: 1) the pervasive need among politicians to 
measure and to quantify “things”, however woeful those metrics may be, resulting in an 
institutional myopia to this subtle shift in money laundering methods; and 2) legislation 
and statutes were insufficient in practically addressing the problem. It was becoming 
increasingly evident that for banks and financial institutions, detecting money laundering 
was now, reputation risk and compliance mandates aside, equally about protecting
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themselves from the politicians and regulators as much as from money launderers and 
organised crime (Bosworth-Davies and Malloy 2001; Bosworth-Davies 2007).
2.6 The Evolution o f a Response: Profiling use pre-9/11
The idea that an accurate behavioural model is created through the profiling
process has been used with some success in law enforcement, primarily in the study and
apprehension of serial killers (O'Connor 2004). Yet these successes are tempered by
examples such as the Washington DC sniper event. While the two shooters were a pair of
black males of mixed ages, behavioural “profiles” of them ranges from angry white “Tim
McVeigh”-types to a lone actor, despondent over a divorce or other life-changing
incident. However, the simplest reason is that such large-scale, randomized shootings
had never occurred before, so there was no a priori data from which to create even a
rudimentary profile (Ransford 2002; Goodwin 2009).
The profiling of criminal personality is an investigative technique developed by the
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is used for identifying the major
personality, behavioural and demographic characteristics of offenders based on an
analysis of the crimes they committed. It differs greatly from clinical profiling done by
mental health professionals, and during an investigation, established suspects already
identified are not profiled (Douglas and Burgess 1986; Bartol 1996; Cook and Hinman
1999). Among professional profilers, there is a common understanding that modem
practice is an outgrowth of the efforts of criminal anthropologists to relate criminal
psychology to physical characteristics of the criminal. According to O’Connor (2004):
“Jacob Fries (1820) started a long line of such inquiries that extended into the late 
19th century (with Lombroso) and well into the 20th century with body-type 
theorists (Kretshmer, e.g.). There were also early legal scholars, most of them 
interested in the topics of insanity or responsibility, that made mention of how to 
infer personality characteristics from the manner and nature of crime. A significant 
figure in this regard is Hans Gross (1870), considered by some to have started the 
fields of applied criminology and criminal investigation around 1891 (Gross
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1924). There is a science related to applied criminology called clinical 
criminology, but it is practiced mostly in Israel as the study of insanity. There is a 
tendency in England, Australia, and Canada to attach applied criminology to what 
is called profiling, but the university programs there are more applied social 
science curricula than anything else.”
As is evident in the above citation’s closing sentence, ambiguity as to what
constitutes profiling is already a concern at this early stage -  is it “applied criminology”
or “applied social science criteria”? A contextual ambiguity is emerging as early as 1891,
ambiguity that would continue through to the present. For instance, some criminal
profilers maintain that AMLPT is nothing more than pattern matching, rather than a
discrete set of defined characteristics, and that deductive, human-centric logic is superior
and more apt for unveiling the nuances of human behaviour. Profiling, in the view of
participant in the legal system, implies a degree of certainty in positively identifying
behaviours and/or individuals engaged in criminality, a phenomenon described as
intuitive profiling as Davis and Follette (2002) state:
“In each of these circumstances attorneys will argue, at least implicitly, that the 
party/defendant in question has the characteristics of a person likely to en- gage in 
the behaviour at issue-whether past (such as criminal activity or suicide) or future 
(such as future criminal activity and parenting skills)-thereby implying that the 
party/defendant more likely did (will) perform the behaviour...”
Furthermore, “essentially, the use of intuitive profiling to assess guilt relies on the 
following logic: ‘If persons who commit embezzlement are likely to be in debt, then 
persons who are in debt are likely to be embezzlers,’ or ‘If most A's are B's, then most 
B's are A's.’ Logically, of course, these conclusions are erroneous”.
Moving forward, the late 19th century until the early 1970s was a period of 
evolution, incorporating new tools and techniques: for instance, in the case where 
behavioural profiling was used in World War II to better understand Hitler’s motivations. 
The first real success with profiling was in the identification and successful prosecution 
of Albert De Salvo, better known as the Boston strangler. Using a series of techniques
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developed investigating arsons, murders, and other high profile crimes, Dr. James 
Bussell, of the New York Police Department, working with the authorities in Boston, 
was able to create a “profile” of who might be the likely suspect strangling young 
women in Boston during the Fall of 1964. Because of this success, the FBI began 
forming its Behavioural Sciences Unit (BSU), led primarily by Howard Teten and 
Patrick Mullany. Before creating the BSU, both men had been instructors at the FBI 
academy in hostage negotiation and applied criminology, fields that already allowed 
exposure to the more psychological side of police work.
The success of the BSU is significant, offering some sort of assistance in 77% of 
cases, providing leads for stakeout cases 45% of the time, and actually helping identify 
the perpetrator or “UNSUB” (Unknown Subject) in 17% of cases (Tetan 1995; O'Connor 
2004). From the 1990s to the present day, data mining and DNA matching have been 
used to solve so-called “cold cases” and have brought justice in long dormant crimes, 
much to the relief of those victimized.
2,7 Profiling as a Response to post-9/11 Regulation: Mitigating Risk and 
Ambiguity
With the introduction of the USAPA and its stringent financial reporting and 
identification clauses, the SAR and KYC processes became far more complex. 
Therefore, automating these processes became a priority, and the acquisition and use of 
behavioural profiling by financial institutions was deemed a necessity. When viewed in 
an AML-CFT context, profiling pertains to technologies tailored to the requirements of 
law enforcement agencies, financial institutions and regulators, and agents of the state. 
Profiling is a response to varying levels of regulation and control mechanisms generated 
by a variety of organisations. While banks have used profiling for collecting marketing 
data and developing new financial products, behavioural profiling is in direct response to 
the demands of regulatory compliance from three distinct hierarchical levels. Angell and
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Demetis (2005) define these as transnational, international, and local. As we have seen, 
the complexities inherent in the regulatory milieu constantly evolve, given the reflexive 
interplay between banks and launderers, which over time has developed into a systemic 
motif within the domain (Angell and Demetis 2005).
As a result o f this systemic approach, market demand for AMLPTs has shown 
considerable growth since the events of 9/11, as banks and financial institutions have 
needed to address not only KYC and SARs reporting, but also “watch lists” of suspected 
threats, as well as auditing and reporting above and beyond the local financial institution 
level (Brenneman and DeLotto 2001; Aberdeen Group 2002; FinCEN 2002; McGuire 
2002). Yet, while incorporating ongoing improvements in the capability of behavioural 
modelling, as well as accommodating the “systems approach”, the current generation of 
AMLPT still do not fully replicate human behaviour due to a variety of factors, for 
instance, the need to analyse, cognise, and process large volumes of transaction data. 
This is particularly acute in large financial organisations where upwards of 18 million 
discrete transactions can be processed daily (Katkov 2006). In 1995, the US Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) (1995) issued a report, Technologies for Control o f  
Money Laundering, that, while now over 14 years old, still has a great deal of 
contemporary validity in its assessment of the limitations of AMLPT, and also serves to 
highlight the systemic complexity in attempting to automate the profiling function. These 
include:
• A low incidence of money laundering relative to the total volume 
of transactions
• Lack of tested profiles
• Temporal and spatial dimensions of the profiles
• Dynamic nature of criminal conduct
• Similarity between licit and illicit conduct
• The need for multiple levels of analysis
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In response to the difficulty in modelling these complexities, Gill and Taylor 
(2003), in one of the first comprehensive studies of the use of behavioural profiling tools 
in banks and financial institutions, investigated the development and use of profiling data 
used by a variety of financial institutions in the UK. They concluded that the 
preponderance of institutions tended to use a transaction threshold standard, 
incorporating a variety of triggers that alert the system to possible fraud. The criteria 
varied from institution to institution; Gill and Taylor state that the institutions they 
surveyed had narrowed down their criteria to 6 specific areas (table 2.7.1). These 6 areas 
are used in isolation or in combination, and in essence, represent the salient fact that 
money laundering does not exhibit any one specific trait.
Criteria_______________________  % Using
Over a particular sum In isolation With others
By certain clients 18.6 45.9
From certain locations 6.3 48.0
From offshore entities 5.4 42.9
Departing from past client behaviour 11.1 59.0
Departing from normal account, product or service behaviour 12.1 61.6
Table 2.7.1 -AML Trigger Criteria - From Gill and Taylor(2003)
Gill and Taylor’s “trigger” criteria are reflective of the current methodology of 
AML-CFT practice. This methodology looks to define a set of parameters or attributes 
that, like the profiling process, may indicate the presence of illegitimacy. Such 
categorical flexibility is understandable, given the myriad unsuccessful attempts to 
definitively describe and quantify money laundering. What has also emerged from 
attempts at categorisation, similar in their intent to those of Gill and Taylor, is the 
concept of “risk-based” anti-money laundering regulation. The requirement for risk- 
based AML-CFT in the UK is primarily the result of implementation of the EU’s Third 
Directive on Money Laundering (“the directive”), which derives its position on risk and
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Qthe risk-based approach, from Basel II. The Basel II accords “expanded the prevalent 
notions of credit and market risk, and included operational risk. However, the qualitative 
nature of operational risk tended to confuse the more strictly quantifiable credit and 
market risk” (Angell and Demetis 2007).
Furthermore, the Basel II banking committee also states that it “recognises that 
the advanced measurement approaches (AMA) soundness standard provides significant 
flexibility to banks in the development of an operational risk measurement and 
management system” while “it is expected that supervisors provide flexibility in the 
practical application of such thresholds such that banks are not forced to develop 
extensive new information systems simply for the purpose of ensuring perfect 
compliance” (Basel 2004; Angell and Demetis 2007).
Although Basel II implies there is flexibility in the enforcement regime, the 
directive states that “there are considerable implications for what is referred to as risk- 
based supervision. Regulators will need to be more flexible themselves in their 
interpretation of compliance with AML guidelines. By necessity, risk-based supervision 
implies risk-based compliance, which in turn introduces the potential for (the risk of) 
considerable friction between AML stakeholders and regulators. The problems inherent 
in such vague notions of compliance therefore become ever more crucial as compliance 
cannot be easily quantified (e.g. a bank cannot be 84 per cent compliant; it either is, or it 
is not). The risk-based approach makes compliance even more complicated, because the 
risk of leaving a potential money-laundering case unreported still has to be addressed, 
but now the regulators must recognise that occasional failures are unavoidable” (EU 
2005; Angell and Demetis 2007). While the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 
explicitly enshrined the concept of risk-based AML into UK law, the risk-base approach
8 See http://www.bis.org/ for an extensive archive o f information on the Bank of International Settlements, 
who oversees the BASEL process.
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had been a component of EU law since 2005, as well as being adopted by the Joint 
Money Laundering Steering Group as early as 2004.
Essentially, risk-based AML-CFT is a method of developing and managing a 
firm's culture and business processes for fighting money laundering. Moreover, it is a 
tool that needs to be used both by the regulated and the regulator. Firms are required to 
act in a risk-based manner regarding AML-CFT, and management and staff need to 
be attuned to this in terms of what the regulator expects. Risk-based practices entail 
the deployment of automated and manual systems, along with processes and 
procedures that manage a firm’s risk exposure to money laundering and other forms of 
financial crime. Such practices validate a firm’s adherence to current AML-CFT 
regulatory requirements and monitor changes to the firm’s risk profile through changes 
to the business or from external threats. A risk profile is the result of identifying and 
assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks facing the firm and its 
employees. Risk is scaled according to a variety of factors, through the firm taking 
account of its customers, products and services, delivery channels and geographical profile. 
These factors are then assessed as to their probability for risk exposure and the subsequent 
impact on the firm, should any of the constituent elements be exposed to, or became a 
conduit for, money laundering or terrorist financing.
Earlier on in chapter 2, we mention that much of the regulatory regime is fraught 
with ambiguity and subjectivity. However, the 3rd directive actually attempts to define 
risk-based methods with some certainty, and, as Angell and Demetis state, “does actually 
refer to the creation of risk-defined parameters, and the process of parameterisation for 
the risk-based approach becomes a little more concrete and explicit. Risk is represented 
by various parameters related to money laundering, such as large cash payments. Such 
parameters can be viewed as proxies for modelling money-laundering behaviour; 
however, they are likely to lead to knee-jerk acceptance among compliance officers that
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all large cash payments are suspicious, and thus an increase in the reporting of false 
positives. In other words, there is a risk that the distinction between suspicious and non- 
suspicious will become a bureaucratic decision, and the code for the AML system is 
reduced to ticking boxes once again”. The field research demonstrates that while 
compliance consists of more than merely “box ticking”, it is still driven primarily by fear 
of sanctions by the regulator, rather than by any altruistic desire to curb money 
laundering. Indeed, a firm’s espousal of risk-based methods is in itself one more “tick 
box”, in that it serves to demonstrate to the regulators that a firm is “in compliance”. 
However, “compliance” could be construed simply as the existence of risk-oriented 
processes, rather than any meaningful deterrent.
2.8 The Locus o f Activity -  Identifying Money Laundering and Financial Crime
At its simplest level, money laundering involves three distinct operations: 
placement, layering and integration (Blunden 2001; Bedi 2004; Ltd. 2006). Placement is 
the physical disposal of the criminal proceeds, primarily cash. Placement involves a 
variety of methods, such as:
• Cash bank deposits that intermingle legitimate and illegitimate funds (to 
obscure any audit trail) and convert this cash to readily recoverable debt.
• Moving cash between jurisdictions.
• Making loans in cash to businesses that appear to be legitimate or are 
connected to legitimate businesses.
• Placing cash in the client account of a professional intermediary.
Layering is the stage in which the money is separated from its criminal source 
through the creation of transactions or “layers” that are designed to disguise the audit 
trail and provide a semblance of legitimacy. The success of the launderer in this process 
is due to a combination of ingenuity, the complexity of the layering, the competence of
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their chosen intermediaries, and their overall knowledge relative to the legal environment 
in which they operate. The layering process may include:
• Rapid transfers of funds between banks and/or jurisdictions.
• Using cash deposits as collateral for underwriting legitimate transactions.
• Creating and exploiting networks of legitimate and “shell” companies 
among several jurisdictions.
• Reselling in legitimate markets those physical goods or other assets 
obtained with tainted funds.
The last “cycle” in the laundering process is integration, wherein the criminal 
proceeds are integrated back into the economy in such a fashion as to appear legitimate. 
Integration can involve myriad steps, with some of the more common being:
• False or inflated invoices: paying inflated or deflated invoices for 
exports/imports.
• Real estate: using shell companies, criminals purchase property then sell 
the company’s assets for a “legal” profit.
• Front companies: the corporate governance laws in some countries allow 
the creation and operation of companies without revealing the actual 
owners, only the nominee directors. Criminals, as the shadow owners of 
these companies can then loan themselves tainted money in apparently 
legitimate transactions and pay themselves “interest” on the “loan.” This 
interest, in many cases, can be treated as a business expense for tax 
purposes with the resultant reduction in tax liability.
• Complicity of foreign banks: this hinders detection as it conceals money 
transfers. With the assistance of corrupt bank officers, tainted cash is used
as security against legitimate loans. A particular country’s banking
secrecy laws can minimize detection of such transactions. (Blunden 2001)
As the aforementioned description of the laundering process illustrates,
launderers can employ a variety of means to complicate detection at any stage of the
process, and moreover, that many of their subterfuges can use legitimate means. In order 
to detect anomalies, automated behavioural profiling tools attempt to emulate this
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process, using computational logic to dissect those subterfuges and identify the slightest 
indication of possible fraud.
2.8.1 The Automated Transaction Monitoring System
This profiling action compliments the “Know Your Customer” requirement and 
may include two tiers: a transaction analysis and monitoring component. These modules 
are intended to identify activities that may indicate the industry-accepted stages of 
money laundering: placement, layering, and integration. Depending on the profiling 
application in use, the configuration of these first-tier components may involve various 
combinations of analytical capabilities, and workflow management tools and data 
integration layers (see figure 2.8.1).
From these two tiers, the typical solution breaks the specific tier’s functionality in 
to even finer granularity:
1. Configuration and administration component - deals primarily with integrating all 
the key components. Licensing, report generation, and other management issues 
germane to complex, client-server and web-based applications, may also be 
administered here.
Sub-routines:
•  Watch list-PEP filtering
•  Risk-based due diligence
•  Automated alerts
•  FIU/N Cl S/Custom data
s
1. Institutional Meta Data
Structured & Unstructured Meta 
Data from Financial Institution:
•  Customer Data
•  Marketing Data
•  External Data Systems& 
Processes
BATCH or REAL-TIME 
Processing
ALERT
MANAGEMENTPROFILING CASE
MANAGEMENT
REGULATORY
REPORTINGDETECTION INVESTIGATION
Analysis Module
AML Data S tore
FIU
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Figure 2.8.1.1 -  Representative AML Transaction monitoring system (Adoptedfrom Norkom
(2009)
2. Data Warehouse - Most AML technologies have divided this function in two 
levels: one driven towards history, the data base-centric archiving of historical 
activity, using an existing data warehouse or an AML-specific “datamart” or in 
strict data mining terminology, a Knowledge Discovery Database (KDD) 
(Piatetsky-Shapiro and Frawley 1991; Fayyad and Uthurusamy 1996; Goh, 
Tsukamoto et al. 1996); the other layer is geared towards intercepting money 
laundering when it occurs, via transaction monitoring, ideally in real-time.
3. Money Laundering Detection Core (MLDC) - The MLDC is where the profiling 
“engine” resides, and as such, is the heart of any “profiling” system, regardless of 
engineering approach. There are three critical technology areas in use, depending 
on the vendor. They are:
a. The application of business rules and filters -  e.g. anyone from a 
specific country depositing or withdrawing more than £2,000 is 
engaging is suspicious activity: SARs report processing occurs in this 
stage.
b. Statistical Analysis -  For instance, a transaction having a value in the 
top 0.01% of all transaction in a specific geographic location and 
account type should be ear-marked for investigation. This approach 
may entail a combination of list-based comparisons (e.g. “PEP” 
(Politically Exposed Person” list) combined with a geographically 
determinate data set that is then analysed against statistical rules or 
mined against known behavioural determinants.
c. Neural, self-organizing networks or other AI methods -  a transaction 
that does not conform to the historical pattern of similar transactions 
assigned a 65% probability to fraud or money laundering. This can be 
stochastically determined, clustered, or linked, depending on the data 
mining approach in use.
4. Internal workflow manager - Manages SARs reporting, KYC and due diligence 
reporting and report routing; forwards reports to regulators.
5. Regulation, policy and procedure engine -  Manages incoming regulatory updates, 
audit inquiries, and automatically escalates SAR or exception report when 
monitoring activity encounters a clear regulatory violation.
6. Data management engine - Constantly updates the data models - given that 
targeted behaviour is never static - along with providing suggested changes to 
current profile configurations .This may be based on historical analysis o f logs,
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customised reports and database activity. These refinements may comprise the 
outcomes from regulatory analysis, input from professional bodies, and those 
changes generated by both commercial and governmental agencies, such as the 
FSA, JMLSG, American Bankers Association (ABA), International Money 
Laundering Information Network (IMOLIN) run by the UN Office for Drug 
Control and Crime Prevention, or other bodies such as FinCEN or the FATF.
While the sophistication of AMLPT is evident, what are less so are measures of 
effectiveness. AMLPT only identifies behaviour that may be indicative of money 
laundering; not a launderer’s intent. Moreover, detection is only as accurate as the 
predicate assumptions that the compliance staff utilise in creating the profile criteria and 
data structures. Thus effectiveness becomes subject to a variety of random variables and 
conversely, increases the risk of false positives and other failure indicators. While in 
Chapter 6 we discuss the results of our research into effectiveness, the 1986 Brinks-Mat 
case study (see appendix 8.6) provides a detailed example of 1) the inherent complexity 
of a sophisticated money laundering operation; 2) how human analytical capability is 
vital in the detection process. Additionally, the Brinks-Mat case study exposes the role 
that “offshore” financial entities play in the licit and illicit movement of capital.
What is evident from the Brinks-Mat case study is that following the trail of 
money launderers was often foiled by the bank secrecy laws in many of the target 
jurisdictions, particularly those with lax internal financial controls. These offshore 
entities hide behind their nation’s various banking secrecy laws, laws and regulations 
that were often created simply for the purpose of money laundering or in many instances, 
tax avoidance; as is evident in the Brinks case, merely “following the money” in many 
cases was the best “process”, rather than any established “procedure” in tracking a 
money launderer. Further to tax avoidance and other economic motivations for money 
laundering, Masciandaro goes on to state that some offshore capital havens may practice 
deliberate avoidance of supra-national regulatory bodies as a matter of economic 
development:
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“The economic and political analysis (Masciandaro 2004; 2005)can suggests a 
different perspective. It can be introduced and developed the assumption that lax 
financial regulation may be a strategic dependent variable for national 
policymakers seeking to maximize the net benefits produced by any public policy 
choice. Therefore, given the structural features and endowments of their own 
countries, policymakers may it find profitable to adopt financial regulations,that 
can attract also capital of illicit origin (money laundering services) or destination 
(terrorism finance services). The economic perspective suggests that money 
laundering can be considered a case of externalities, and the puzzle consists in the 
possibility to find a way to internalize the relative costs in the objective function 
of the OFC (offshore financial centres) policymakers (Masciandaro 2006)”.
Indeed, the opaque nature of offshore havens serves to further the ambiguity as to 
the intent of money launderering, more so the “predicate offense” that separates money 
laundering as a distinct offense from other suspect behaviours. Such behaviour could, for 
instance, comprise corruption or influence peddling aside from the typical proceeds of 
crime, and in many developing nations, the deterrence of such politically-motivated 
behaviour is often problematic or more so ignored (Naylor 1994; Blum, Levi et al. 1999; 
Naylor 1999). Chaikin and Sharman (2009) state that “corruption is the biggest single 
obstacle to development, while money laundering is at the heart of all profit-driven 
crime. The failure to appreciate the intimate linkages between these two crimes has 
undermined international efforts to combat these global scourges”, a similar challenge as 
that of identifying and isolating criminally-obtained illicit funds from those of terrorists 
and their supporters. Moreover, in certain instances, several nation-states or non-aligned 
territorial entities may actually encourage money laundering within their “jurisdictions” 
as a means of obtaining revenue or covert funding for intelligence activities, specifically 
Iran, North Korea, and autonomous regions such as Kurdistan and the tribal areas of 
Northern Pakistan such as Waziristan (Garcia 1997). For instance, in the emergent states 
of post-Soviet Russia, Kazakhstan in particular, the vast natural resource potential 
provides ample opportunity for money laundering, Such is the complexity of extant old- 
style corrupt communist cronyism that, when coupled with the ongoing sale of assets and
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granting of licenses for a variety of exploitive purposes, the subsequent economics of 
these transactions are ready-made for the placement, layering and integration of illicit 
capital (Intelligencer 2010).
2.9 Desired Research Outcomes and Research Question
As the Brinks-Mat case study illustrates, it was human intervention that 
uncovered the complexity of the money laundering in question. While AMLPT was not 
in use at the time, it is still questionable if such technology would have been able to 
identify Noye’s intentions, especially given how many banks and jurisdictions were 
involved. Of even greater consideration, were his innovative use of legitimate banking 
methods, such as account establishment and movement of capital. The case study 
demonstrates that money launderers constantly adopt ever more sophisticated and 
complex methods to move their funds. These methods appear to represent a variety of 
behaviours, inclusive of a variety of attributes; therefore, the profiling exercise must 
reflect these complexities. Further research may prove this observation questionable, but 
at this stage, this fundamental omission of a consistently accurate catalogue of complex 
behaviours, comprises one consideration in formulating the research question. The other 
concern is the level of interactivity within the innovation and adaptation process among 
money launderers and those tasked with their detection. Given that some institutions are 
at varying stages in the process of adopting profiling technology, and therefore exhibit a 
variety of behaviours and traits illustrative of varying levels of maturity, how effective is 
AMLPT in supporting compliance professionals?
Therefore, this dissertation will attempt to answer the following question: Are 
computerized profiling tools effective in support of AML procedures as required by 
MLROs and compliance officers in a banking sector context? The question can then be 
further dissected into two discrete considerations, the first being in what ways are
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AMLPTs effective, and the second, how is this effectiveness and support measured in an 
organisational context? The following model illustrates the structure of the inquiry:
How is this effectiveness and support measured in an organisational 
context?
X
A re computerised profiling tools effective in support ofAM L  
procedures as required by MLROs and compliance officers in a 
banking context?
Figure 2.9.1 -  Research Question Component Model (Adopted from Mustonon-Ollila and
Lyytinen (2003)
In attempting to answer this question, we seek an understanding of the 
developmental contexts of AMLPT (Ciborra 1992a; Ciborra and Lanzara 1994f; 
Sorensen and Comford 2003a); specifically, if their innovation, development, 
deployment, and organisational culture, (such as language, reasoning routines, and 
interpretive vocabularies, etc.), contribute to the effectiveness of MLROs and 
compliance officers, as well as the entire organisation ([Ciborra and Lanzara 1994f]).
Furthermore, can the iterative action of profiling provide a means of identifying 
abnormalities with any degree of accuracy? Innovation is an iterative process and also a 
catalyst for action; therefore, Diffusion o f Innovation (Dol) theory forms the primary 
theoretical foundation (Van de Ven 1986; Slappendel 1996; Utterback 1996; Tidd, 
Bessant et al. 2001; Fonesca 2002; Rogers 2003).
However, establishing a clear understanding of the forms of innovation, such as
the artefacts, behaviours and other traits that define the innovation process within
compliance organisations, requires a form of ordering and structure for analysis.
Subsequently, organisational effectiveness (OE) theory as articulated by Campbell,
Cameron and others, along with theories espousing the role of technology in
organisations, such as the work of Orlikowski (Orlikowski and Robey 1991a; Orlikowski
1992; Orlikowski 2000), and theories of categorisation, become important secondary
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In what ways are AMLPTs effective?
theoretical considerations, both as an object of study and as an structural means for this 
research. Categorisation is both a tacit and an explicit process. Using the work of 
Bowker and Star (Bowker and Star 1999; Star 2002), the author can draw on their tools 
and metaphors in discerning how categories and standards shape innovation, within the 
developmental context of profiling; for instance, as a means to classify the types of 
algorithms, data structures and organisational artefacts that comprise the creative process 
in building a profile. Moreover, Star’s work can provide categories to identify what types 
of infrastructure exist, along with the role they play in supporting innovation and 
knowledge exchange. Orlikowski’s use of structuration theory provides sound methods 
for understanding and interpreting the relationship between technology and 
organisations, as well as the various contexts embedded therein.
From an organisational perspective, classifying participants, business rules, and 
cooperative demands on knowledge workers, will further define the nature of these 
relationships, providing additional data to establish if the innovation process is indeed 
interactive or maintains a linear trajectory. Fundamental to this understanding of 
innovation and categorisation, is the question of how knowledge itself disseminates 
within an organisation, and for what purpose (Denzin 1983; Nonaka 1994; Carstensen 
and Sorensen 1996; Galliers, Swan et al. 2000). Language and communication facilitate 
collaborative structures so that innovation and improvisation can occur throughout an 
organisation.
Lastly, understanding organisational effectiveness is often dependent on grasping 
a collage of knowledge and action-centric considerations. For instance, how is 
organisational knowledge diffused and valued? In what ways are members of the 
compliance organisation collaborating with peers and colleagues outside the 
organisation? Is the organisational culture capable of sustaining innovative thought? 
How is this translated into action, or indicators of effectiveness or productivity?
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(Kimberly and Evanisko 1981; Hirschheim and Newman 1991; Orlikowski and Robey 
1991a; Suchman 1993; Mercer 2000) Lastly, collaborative networks, such as those found 
in compliance organisations, can be formal and informal, local and far-reaching, and 
comprise varying levels of expertise and obligation, all the while providing varying 
levels of value (Walsham 1993).
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Chapter 3. Philosophical and Theoretical Foundations
In researching the phenomenon of behavioural profiling and the use of AMLPT, 
we draw from several academic disciplines: information systems, language, 
categorisation, organisational behaviour, and organisational effectiveness. In formalising 
the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the research, we describe in this 
chapter the two theories that will provide the interpretive structure for the data gathered 
in the fieldwork. The primary theoretical perspective is Rogers’ Diffusion o f Innovation 
(Dol) theory; we further draw on other innovation theorists such as Van De Ven and 
Slappendel, primarily in the analysis of innovation in organisations and interactive 
innovation, and where the management o f  innovation is considered (Van de Ven 1986; 
1999; French and Martz 2008). Given that we examine AMLPT as an innovation within 
an organisational context, secondary theoretical support is derived from theories of 
technological use, and its adoption and effectiveness within organisations, primarily 
through Orlikowski’s structuralist perspective and the Technical-formal-informal (TFI) 
framework (Liebenau and Backhouse 1990; Stamper, Liu et al. 2000).
Within this foundation, we further draw on research addressing the relationships 
among technology, organisational effectiveness and control, and their correlation to the 
organisational complexities inherent in IS innovation, adoption, and adaptation 
(Orlikowski 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Orlikowski and Robey 1991a; 
Orlikowski 1992; Swanson 1994; Fichman 2004; Jeyaraj, Rottman et al. 2006). As the 
innovation process can be measured through a variety of methods, understanding the 
organisational context wherein the innovation occurs is crucial for refining and 
developing the appropriate research methodology and evaluation metrics for this 
dissertation.
Philosophically, we assume an interpretivist position (figure 3.0.1) in researching 
AMLPT use within compliance organisations, consistent with the tenets of the sociology
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o f regulation, employing a verstehen-like9 method in analyzing the social (regulatory) 
impetus for the adoption o f AMLPT, furthering an understanding o f its role and efficacy 
in the existing social system o f individuals, primarily compliance officers and MLROs 
within a banking domain. We look to understand this efficacy “within a realm of 
individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame o f reference o f the 
participants as opposed to the observer o f action” (Stamper, Liu et al. 2000).
THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF RADICAL CHANGE
:al Humanism
Anarchistic i 
Individualism
Contemporary
Mediterranean
Marxism
Russian \  
Social 
Theory
French Existentialism»
Critical 
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Conflict Theory
OBJECTIVE
Integrative
Theory
Phenomenology
Social ~
System
Theory Objectivism
Hermeneutics
Interactionism 
and Social 
Action Theory
Interpretive Sociology Functionalist Sociology
THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF REGULATION
Figure 3.0.1 -  Typology of paradigmatic explorations relative to social theory and the study of 
organisations (adopted from Burrell & Morgan (1979))
Furthermore, given the behavioural ambiguity that comprises the initial 
“understanding” o f a profile subject and the subjective nature o f exercise as a whole, the 
entire behavioural profiling process can be described as being created by individuals 
within the compliance organisation through a process “o f assumptions and
9Loosely synonymous with "understanding" or "interpretation”; particularly associated with the German 
sociologist, Max W eber, whose antipositivism established an alternative to prior sociological positivism 
and economic determinism, rooted in the analysis o f  social action (Burrell, G. and G. Morgan (1979). 
Sociological Paradigms and Organizational A nalysis. London, Heinemann.
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intersubjectively shared meanings” (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Though the predominant 
theories of organisation tend to fall within the functionalist paradigm of social science, 
we maintain our interpretivist position relative to the study of the process of diffusion 
within the organisation, particularly given the traditional focus on the individual in 
diffusion research and the subjective nature of our analysis. While the interpretivist 
paradigm traditionally rejects the idea of an organisation, given that it “rejects any view 
which attributes to the social world a reality which is independent of the minds of men”, 
Burrell and Morgan go onto state both “interpretive and functionalist theories reflect a 
common concern for the sociology of regulation”. For the most part, interpretivist also 
focus on investigations into the means through which social reality is purposefully 
constructed and normalised from the perspective of those directly involved; 
subsequently, normalisation may manifest itself ontologically as a social system or 
organisation. While a deeper exploration of the interpretive paradigm reveals 
contradictions relative to the “existence” of organisations, Burrell & Morgan go on to 
state that:
“Theorists of all schools of thought within the interpretive paradigm tend to share a 
common perspective, in that their primary concern is to understand the subjective 
experience of individuals. Their theories are constructed from the standpoint of the 
individual actor as opposed to the observer of action; they view social reality as an 
emergent process -  as an extension of human consciousness and subjective 
experience. Insofar as a wider social environment is accorded ontological status, it 
is regarded as the creation and extension of the subjective experience of the 
individuals involved. Ontologically, theories characteristic of the interpretive 
paradigm are indisputable nominalist; with regard to human nature, they are 
voluntarist” (Burrell and Morgan 1979).
In defining our research domain, we extend this understanding of “the wider social 
environment” to encompass the compliance organisation embedded within a banking 
context. Theoretically, while Diffusion o f Innovation theory is primarily concerned with 
the individual nature of innovation, philosophically, the use of the interpretive paradigm 
compliments Rogers’ predominately individual-centric thesis. The interpretivist
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paradigm provides sound philosophical methods for understanding innovation as an 
“emergent” phenomenon, not only as an individual behaviour, for instance from the 
perspective of the compliance officer or MLRO, but also as structured reality embedded 
in the “form” of a compliance organisation. Rogers’ inclusion of the social system as a 
fundamental unit of analysis acknowledges that systemic or organisational structures 
must be considered in properly understanding diffusion of innovations.
3.1 The Appropriateness o f Diffusion o f Innovation Theory
Historically, financial institutions have long been tasked with verifying the 
identity, and to some extent the source of their depositor’s funds, but the detail and 
subsequent volume of data collection that was now required post-9/11 has increased 
these requirements exponentially. Moreover, the need to identify (or profile) specific 
behaviour that could be indicative of terrorist financing was now mandatory. Financial 
institutions were faced with the need to completely overhaul their compliance systems, 
procedures and staffing requirements within a very compact timeframe and primarily 
through automation. Moreover, they were no longer facing traditional money laundering 
methods, so the need to develop, indeed innovate, new processes and procedures was 
paramount.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the desire to profile human behaviour, be it benign, 
commercial, or malicious in nature, is not a recent phenomena. However, the rapid 
adoption of automated behavioural profiling as an innovation, post-9/11, in the form of 
somewhat indiscriminate automated data collection mechanisms, has caused 
considerable consternation among legal, privacy, and social scholars. While there are 
social and legal norms interrelated within this research, primarily we look to understand 
the adoption of AMLPT as an innovation, rather than simply a social or legal 
phenomenon. This interrelation represents a thematic continuation of traditional works
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on business and organisations, such as Schumpeter’s The Theory o f Economic 
Development (1934), wherein he argues that innovation is simply a re-synthesis of 
existing skills, resources, and other assets.
There is the tendency to “objectify” the concept of innovation in daily use, such 
as a new computer processor, or mobile phone. However, innovation scholars agree that 
innovation can take on a variety of facets. Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) contend that an 
innovation can comprise “an idea, practice, or material artefact,” and that this 
heterogeneity can be reflected in classification schemes that discern between 
administrative and technical innovations, (Kimberly and Evanisko 1981; Slappendel 
1996), as well as organisational, labour (work), product, and process innovations (Whipp 
and Clark 1986). Deconstructing the AMLPT artefact establishes a locus comprised of 
data that is then computationally manipulated, based on a series of assumptions 
systematically optimised to mitigate complexity and ambiguity. Therefore we categorise 
the AMLPT artefact as an information system (IS), embedded within “practices, products 
and processes” that span both the technical and administrative categories of the 
compliance function.
While innovation is an acknowledged phenomenon within IS research, and is 
usually defined as any “new way of developing, implementing and maintaining IS in an 
organisational context” (Swanson 1994), innovations are more generally regarded as 
“combinations of normative rules and resources, which stand at hand, or are acquired 
into the environment before any development activity starts” (Giddens 1984; Mustonon- 
Ollila and Lyytinen 2003). The study of IS innovation and adoption in the areas of 
processes and technology have been studied over the years by a number of IS scholars 
though no systematic tradition has yet to emerge. Past studies include among others Huff 
& Munro (1985), Kozar (1989), Nilakanta & Scamell (1991), Premkumar & Potter 
(1995) and Sauer & Lau (1997), (Mustonon-Ollila and Lyytinen 2003).
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However, while innovation is viewed as an explicit, formalised process, what 
emerges from the body of previously noted scholarship is the neglect or exclusion within 
these studies, of a variety of intrinsic categories, behaviours and specific typologies 
germane to establishing the adoption and diffusion of an innovation. These omissions 
include the role of the organisation, task factors, and adopter taxonomies within the 
innovation domain, as well as the unique dimension of time; the one exception being 
Premkumar & Potter (1995), who covered multiple time periods in observing the 
adoption process. The use of longitudinal contexts in Diffusion o f Innovation theory, 
such as an innovation’s rate of adoption, provides a rich behavioural corollary. Writing 
in his paper, New Product Adoption and Diffusion, Rogers (1976) reiterates this unique 
linear research attribute, stating that “Diffusion studies are particularly able to rely on 
‘moving pictures’ of behaviours rather than on ‘snap-shots’ because of their unique 
capacity to trace the sequential flow of an innovation through a social system”. In 
furthering the suitability of diffusion theory, we also draw on the work of Jeyaraj, 
Rottman, and Lacity (2006), who examined research on the adoption and diffusion of IT- 
based innovations by individuals and organisations, analyzing 48 empirical studies on 
individual, and 51 studies on organisational IT adoption published between 1992 and 
2003.
From this sample, they then analysed the “predictors, linkages, and biases in 
individual and organisational IT adoption research”. In assessing these predictors, 
linkages and biases, they confirmed the neglect of consistently-applied evaluation norms 
in the majority of IS innovation diffusion research they surveyed; however, their work 
also helped to identify the narrow body of IS innovation scholarship that does indeed 
encompass a consistent and taxonomically exacting process and method for 
understanding diffusion of innovation by both individuals and organisations. 
Significantly, several of their “predictors” align with Rogers’ 5 characteristics of an
innovation (shown in italics), to include Perceived Usefulness (relative advantage), 
Behavioural Intention (trialability and observability), and User Support (<compatibility).
Accounting for semantic differences, Jeyaraj, Rottman and Lacity’s work 
demonstrated further consistency with Rogers’ adopter categories, particularly as they 
relate to innovation in organisations. Of the 11 theories examined, only three, Rogers 
(1962; 1983; 1995; 2003), Kwon and Zmud (1987), and Swanson (1994), were used in 
studies of organisational adoption studies, as illustrated in table 3.1.1. Further 
examination of their results establishes that Kwon and Zmud are derivative of Rogers 
more so than Swanson; in the former case, they use a six stage hybrid model of diffusion 
that combines Rogers with application implementation research, which is useful for 
contextualisation. Swanson posits that IS innovation “is fundamentally organisational 
innovation”.
While acknowledging the role of the individual, primarily as a participant within 
“adopting subunits”, Swanson’s Tri-Core theory of innovation views innovation as an 
activity by discrete ‘‘types”, more akin to a business or organisational process model, 
than specifically as a method of analysis for understanding the diffusion of innovation as 
a systemic phenomenon inclusive of both individual and environmental contexts.
Swanson’s work has made valuable contributions to diffusion research, and has 
applicability within this work, more so in evaluating diffusion in organisations. 
However, given his organisational bias, and more so, the product, rather than process- 
centric nature of the Tri-core model, Swanson’s work provides additional theoretical 
context, rather than directly contributing to this dissertation. In evaluating the theoretical 
suitability of the work of Rogers, Swanson, and Kwon and Zmud, as a foundation for 
this research, an objective weighing of the strengths and weakness of the three models 
resulted in selecting Rogers’ as the most appropriate. Rogers’ Diffusion o f Innovation 
theory offers rich categorical and behavioural metaphors, metaphors that assist in
82
interpreting AMLPT’s role as a stand-alone innovation, as well as providing a method to 
understand the means by which the relative advantage of AMLPT is communicated 
within the organisation.
Theory Main Author(s) Used in Individual Adaption Studies
Used in Organisational 
Adaption Studies
Innovation Diffusion Theory Rogers (1983, 1995) X X
Perceived Characteristics of 
Innovations
Moore and Benbasat 
(1991) X
Social Cognitive Theory Bandura (1986) X
Technology Acceptance Model Davis (1989) X
Technology Acceptance Model 
II
Venkatesh et al. 
(2003) X
Theory o f Planned Behaviour Ajzen (1991) X
Theory of Reasoned Action
Unified Theory o f Acceptance 
and Use o f Technology
Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1975)
Venkatesh et al.
(2003)
X
X
Diffusion/Implementation
Model
Kwon and Zmud 
(1987) X
Tri-Core Model Swanson (1994) X
Table 3.1.1 -  Theories used in individual and organisational IT adoption research (Jeyaraj,
Rottman et al. 2006)
Furthermore, Rogers also incorporates the unique dimension of time, such as the 
rate o f adoption or rejection of an innovation, as a means to define the process and 
participants within the adoption decision process, and significantly, the role of the social 
system in the propagation of an innovation. For instance, given the rapid adoption of 
AMLPT tools post-9/11, the use of time as a metric becomes crucial in understanding the 
contributory factors to adoption, as well as helping to categorise adopter behaviours that 
may have led to early, rather than late adoption of AMLPTs.
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3.2 The Genesis of Diffusion of Innovation Theory
Diffusion of Innovation theory is, as we have seen, just one method among many
available to the researcher in understanding the innovation process; indeed, diffusion
research is rich, multi-dimensional, and flush with categorisation, as Baskerville and
Pries-Heje (2001) describe:
“There are various theories that relate to the diffusion of innovation, and each 
implies its own unique model of the process (Jaakkola 1996) We can define 
complementary models by selecting an analytical dimension and identifying 
contrasting characteristics along such a dimension. One dimension, widely used in 
organisational studies, to simplify a variety of models regards the extent to which 
conflict and competition (as opposed to consensus and regulation) characterize the 
behaviour of those involved in the diffusion of innovation process (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979). An ‘ecological’ view centralizes the conflict and competition in the 
diffusion setting, whereas a ‘genealogical’ view centralizes consensus and 
regulation (Baum and Singh 1994) With regard to innovation diffusion theories 
relevant to IT, the conflict-regulation dimension has also been used to distinguish 
the ‘micro’ perspective from the ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ perspectives (Damsgaard and 
Lyytinen 1997). The micro perspective is a genealogical view that relies on 
concepts from economics and innovation theory, and helps us to understand 
diffusion patterns among similar organisations and populations. The meso and 
macro perspectives are ecological views that use power dependency analysis on 
networks of interacting agents to understand how extra-organisational power 
dependencies shape the diffusion process”.
Early attempts at defining innovation resulted in what is now established as the 
linear model o f innovation. This model describes innovation as flowing sequentially, 
from basic research to applied research, product development, and finally the
marketplace as illustrated in figure 3.2.1:
Figure 3.2.1 -  The linear model of innovation
This model, sometimes referred to as “science (or technology) - push,” was set out
for the first time in Vannevar Bush’s classic report, Science: The Endless Frontier
(1945). Other contemporary theoretical contributions paralleled Bush’s seminal work,
84
emanating from both economists and researchers in graduate management schools, as
summarised in table 3.2.1.
Mees (1920) 
Schumpeter (1939) 
Stevens (1941)
Bichowsky (1942)
Furnas(1948)
Mees and Leermakers (1950)
Brozen (1951a)
Brazen (1951b)
Maclaurin (1953)
Ruttan (1959)
Ames (1961)
Scherer (1965) 
Schmookler (1966) 
Mansfield (1968)
Myers and Marquis (1969) 
Utterback (1974)
Pure science, development, manufacturing 
Invention, innovation, imitation
Fundamental research, applied research, test-tube or bench research, 
pilot plant, (improvement, trouble shooting, technical control of 
process and quality)
Research, engineering (or development), factory 
(or production)
Exploratory and fundamental research, applied research, 
development, production
Research, development (establishment of 
small-scale use, pilot plant and models, adoption 
in manufacturing)
Invention, innovation, imitation
Research, engineering development, production, service
Pure science, invention, innovation, finance, acceptance
Invention, innovation, technological change
Research, invention, development, innovation
Invention, entrepreneurship, investment, development
Research, development, invention
Invention, diffusion, innovation
Problem solving, solution, utilisation, diffusion
Generation of an idea, problem-solving or development, 
implementation, and diffusion
Table 3.2.1 -  Taxonomies o f  Innovation (from Goudin)
Bernard Goudin writes in The Linear Model o f  Innovation: The Historical
Construction o f an Analytical Framework, that the work of these pioneers:
“...led to the addition of diffusion in the much-quoted linear model of innovation: 
Basic research —> Applied research —> Development —> (Production and) 
Diffusion ( . . . )  Yet, it is important to mention two areas of research that 
contributed to the focus on diffusion and its integration into theoretical models of 
innovation. The first was the sociological literature, particularly on the diffusion of 
invention. This tradition goes back to W. F. Ogbum and S. C. Gilfillan and their 
contributions to the United States National Resources Committee’s report on 
technology and its social impacts (1933). The model Ogbum and Gilfillan 
suggested was one of the first descriptions of innovation as a social process. It 
included diffusion as a phase in the process but also the social impacts of 
invention, an ultimate phase. It was E. M. Rogers’ classic book, however, that 
would be most influential on the literature. In Diffusion o f Innovations (1962), 
Rogers depicted the process of innovation as composed of four elements: 
innovation, communication (or diffusion), consequences on the social system, and
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consequences through time (Rogers 1962). By the third edition (1983) of his book, 
however, Rogers had assimilated the economic understanding of innovation. The 
process of innovation now was portrayed as composed of six main phases or 
sequential steps: needs/problems, research, development, commercialization, 
diffusion and adoption, and consequences (Rogers 1983)”.
3.3 Innovation, Infrastructure and Social Organisation
Rogers defines diffusion as “the process in which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system (figure 3.3.1). It is a special type of communication, in that the messages are 
concerned with new ideas” (Rogers 2003).
Figure 3.3.1 -  The Innovation Diffusion Process M odel (Adaptedfrom Rogers(2003)
He further states that diffusion is “a kind of social change, defined as the process 
by which alternation occurs in the structure and function of a social system. When new 
ideas are invented, diffused, and adopted or rejected, leading to certain consequences, 
social change occurs” (2003). What is consistent in the literature is that innovation is not 
a spontaneous, isolated phenomenon. In an organisational context, diffusion occurs either 
as a result of external stimuli (adopting an innovation) or internal stimuli (ire-invention, 
re-structuring, or re-defining). Within the diffusion process, this dissertation is primarily 
concerned with the adoption o f innovation.
Angle and Van de Ven (2000) have shown that adoption simply means that the 
innovation has been developed outside of the organisation, and is the result of the
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assimilation of a product, service, or technology new to the adopting organisation 
(Damanpour and Wischnevsky 2006). Invention is “the process by which a new idea is 
discovered or created” (Rogers 1976; Rogers 2003). In the case of IS innovation, the 
definition of “new” becomes subjective, given the derivative nature of technology and 
the penchant for “fads” and market-driven manifestations of “the next best thing”, rather 
than legitimate innovation (Abrahamson 1996; Swan, Scarbrough et al. 1999). According 
to Fichman:
“Much of diffusion theory was developed in the context of adopters making 
voluntary decisions to accept or reject an innovation based on the benefits they 
expect to accrue from their own independent use of the technology. Yet, adoption 
of IT may be encouraged by management (Leonard-Barton and Deschamps 1988) 
or even mandated (Moore and Benbasat 1991). Adopters, rather than making a 
binary decision to adopt or reject, may choose differing levels of IT use (Bayer and 
Melone 1989). In addition, the adoption decision of individuals or organisations 
may depend on the dynamics of community-wide levels of adoption (i.e., whether 
"critical mass" has been established) because of network externalities (Katz and 
Shapiro 1986; Markus 1987). These sorts of complicating factors are quite 
common in the context of IT adoption; hence, the opportunities to apply classical 
diffusion "as is" may be rare indeed”.
3.3.1 The Four Main Elements of Diffusion of Innovation theory
3.3.1.1 The Innovation -  An innovation is an idea, practice/process or artefact/object 
that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption. “Newness” in the 
objective sense is of no concern, as whether or not an idea is perceived as “new” is a 
function of time, in that it is measured by through the chronological lag between an 
innovation’s first use or discovery. If an idea appears “new” to the individual, regardless 
of gestation, it is an innovation.
3.3.1.1.1 Perceived Attributes of Innovation -  In Chapter 6, rate o f  adoption is used as
one measure to establish the effectiveness of AMLPT. Given that an innovation
encompasses a variety of activities or things, there is no “unit” of adoption per se, and it
therefore becomes necessary to assign characteristics or attributes to an innovation so as
to better understand why one innovation may be adopted over another. These attributes
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create a normative infrastructure that can articulate organisational mood, as well as 
providing a metaphor for adoptive intent (Ciborra 2001; Star 2002). Rogers (1983; 1995; 
2003) defines the 5 characteristics of innovations as:
• Relative advantage -  is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
being better than the idea it supersedes.
• Compatibility -  is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of 
potential adopters.
• Complexity -  is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
relatively difficult to understand and use. Any new idea may be classified 
on the complexity-simplicity continuum.
• Trialability -  is the degree to which an innovation may be experimented 
with on a limited basis. It is positively related to the innovation’s rate of 
adoption.
• Observability -  is the degree to which the results of an innovation are 
visible to others.
Amongst participants, those innovations perceived as providing greater relative 
advantage, trialability, and observability, as compared to those perceived as more 
complex, experience greater rates o f adoption. Among Roger’s five attributes, relative 
advantage and complexity historically command the greatest consideration in explicating 
an innovation’s rate o f  adoption.
3.3.1.1.2 Re-Invention -  When individual or group users of an innovation alter, modify 
or change that innovation during the process of adopting that innovation, that 
transformation process is categorized as re-invention. Theoretical awareness of the 
presence of re-invention occurred among diffusion researchers during the 1970s; some 
view re-invention as a metric for quantifying the extent that individual use of an 
innovation deviates from the “core” idea initially adopted.
Moreover, individual promulgation of an innovative outlier norm exemplifies a 
form of change agency, particularly in heterophilous diffusion (Eveland, Rogers et al. 
1977). Innovations are not invariant, and subsequently flexibility in adoption is a 
constant amongst participants, and customization manifests itself in a variety of ways,
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not just as a structure to employ a new idea. Re-invention furthers the rapid diffusion of 
an idea, as well as enhancing the chances of an idea’s sustainability over time. The 
ability to “tinker” with a proposed innovation improves an organisation’s hospitality to 
the idea, as flexibility implies a more localised sense of control (Ciborra 1992a; Ciborra 
1999c; Ciborra 2002).
3.3.1.2 Communication Channels -  As social systems, organisations rely on 
communication to impart meaning, purpose, and intent, the effectiveness of which is 
determined by a variety of factors such as culture, knowledge sharing and structure, both 
formal and informal (Pierce and Delbecq 1977; Denison and Mishra 1995; DeCanio, 
Dibble et al. 2000; Boudreau 2004). A communication channel is the means by which 
actors generate and share knowledge and information. Diffusion is a variant of 
communication wherein information about a new idea is imparted within the message 
content; in essence, the diffusion process is the means by which an individual 
communicates an idea to either a group or other individual (author’s italics). Essentially, 
this process involves 1) an innovation, 2) an adoption cohort or individual member of a 
group that has knowledge of, or experience with, the innovation being communicated; 
the communication channel is the mechanism utilised for communicating the innovation.
3.3.1.2.1 Heterophily, Homophily, and Diffusion -  Humans communicate more readily 
with those they perceive to be similar, and therefore, in diffusion, the transfer of ideas 
occurs more readily among those sharing similar values, beliefs or socioeconomic 
position or status. Heterophily is defined as the degree of communication among those 
sharing certain dissimilar attributes and few similarities. Given their shared attributes, 
norms and social grouping, communication among homophilous groups tends to happen 
more readily and subsequently is more enjoyable or rewarding. Rogers states that a 
significant problem in the diffusion of innovation is that predominate parties within the 
innovative domain tend to be heterophilous, which leads to ineffective communication.
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For instance, a change agent possesses certain institutional knowledge or a heightened a 
prior understanding of the need for adopting a proposed innovation. Given their unique 
contextual understanding, tacit concepts may not be readily understood or easily 
communicated. The subsequent need for explanation enhances diffusion confirmation.
Paradoxically, homophilous organisations with consistent peer cognisance and 
technical competence limit diffusion, as there is nothing new to communicate. Therefore, 
a modicum of heterophily must be present among those engaged in the communication 
process. The optimal context for diffusion exhibits a high level of homophilous 
individual and organisational norms, such as socio-economic status and education, 
differing only on their perceptions of the innovation. This is not to say that adopters must 
be always be predominately heterophilous, as perceptions of and hospitality to the 
innovation are more often than not related to one’s education, socioeconomic status and 
other existentialities.
3.3.1.3 Time -  The inclusion of time as a variable in Dol theory is unique within 
behavioural science research, given that a preponderance of behavioural research ignores 
the dimension of time; it is simply ignored or considered irrelevant. Although criticised, 
specifically as it relates to measurement, particularly when applied to a subject’s recall of 
an event, the inclusion of time in Dol research is considered a strength. As a metric, time 
is critical in understanding diffusion in three key dimensions of diffusion, (1) in 
measuring the innovation-decision process, wherein an individual’s cognisance of an 
innovation’s invokes reject or acceptance, (2) the adopter category of an individual or 
organisation, which can be defined as an individual or group’s innovativeness, as well as 
the relative “earliness/lateness” of an innovation’s adoption when measured against other 
system members, (3) and lastly, the rate o f adoption of an innovation by a system, 
normally gauged through measuring the number of adopting the innovation among the 
system’s constituents within a common timeframe.
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3.3.1.3.1 The Innovation-Decision Process - The manner in which an individual or 
organisation arrives at the decision to either adopt or reject an innovation is defined as 
the innovation-decision process. It can be described as the “process through which an 
individual (or other decision-making unit) passes from first knowledge of an innovation, 
to the formation of an attitude toward the innovation, to a decision to adopt or reject, to 
implementation and use of the new idea, and to confirmation of this decision” (Rogers 
2003).
The evolution of diffusion scholarship has consistently demonstrated that an 
individual or organisation’s receptivity to a proposed innovation is not a spontaneous act; 
it is the result of a variety of risk-reward evaluations, but essentially, it is an information 
seeking and information-processing activity aimed at reducing uncertainty. Indeed, the 
definition of an innovation-decision process has undergone several iterations relative to 
defining the exact steps within the process. This process was first documented during 
Ryan and Gross’s seminal work (1943), wherein they conjectured that the adoption of an 
innovation is a conscientious process, as was demonstrated during their Iowa seed com 
study. While not exactly emblematic of the five stages/steps currently accepted by most 
diffusion scholars, Ryan and Gross’s work established the understanding that adopting 
and innovation was neither spontaneous nor random. Moreover, further research over the 
next 50 years would show that the innovation-decision process consistently differs 
between individuals and organisations and these differences are further reflected in the 
complexity and steps within all facets of the innovation adoption process.
Essentially, the innovation-decision process “encompasses the timeframe from 
when the potential adopter first becomes aware of the innovation through to the point at 
which the potential adopter either adopts or rejects the innovation” (Rogers 2003). 
Rogers identifies five steps along the innovation-decision process continuum: 
knowledge,persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation (see figure 3.3.2).
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Knowledge occurs when an individual learns o f the innovation’s existence and 
gains some understanding o f how it functions. Persuasion takes place when an individual 
forms a favourable or unfavourable attitude toward an innovation. The decision occurs 
when an individual engages in activities that lead to a choice to adopt or reject an 
innovation. Implementation occurs when the individual puts an innovation into use. 
Confirmation occurs when an individual seeks reinforcement o f an innovation-decision 
that has already been made but may reverse this decision if exposed to conflicting 
messages about the innovation.
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Figure 3.3.2 — A Model o f  Five States in the Innovation-Decision Process (From Rogers (2003))
3.3.1.3.2 Innovativeness and Adopter Categories - Innovativeness is defined as the
“degree to which an individual or other unit o f adoption is relatively earlier in adopting
new ideas than the other members o f a system”. However, Rogers addresses this
potential ambiguity, stating
“Rather than describing an individual as ‘less informative than the average member 
o f a social system,’ it is more efficient to refer to the individual as being in the Tate 
majority.’ This shorthand saves words and contributes to clearer understanding.
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Diffusion research has shown that members of each of the adopter categories have 
a great deal in common” (Rogers 2003).
Furthermore, the use of “shorthand” categorisation becomes more crucial the more 
one works within Rogers’ theory. For instance, if an individual is included in the 
category of a late majority adopter, that individual is then categorised as an individual 
homophilous with those of a “relatively lower economic status, making little use of mass 
media channels, and learns about most new ideas from peers via interpersonal 
communication channels”. Thus the utility of shorthand categorisation is fundamental to 
Rogers’s work and provides an elegant medium to convey methods and roles as well as 
ensuring brevity does not hamper contextual understanding.
The use of adopter categories creates a taxonomy to gauge the proclivity o f an 
individual to adopt new ideas as compared to other members of the social system. Rogers 
(2003) defines these adopter categories, as innovators, early adopters, early majority, 
late majority, and laggards. Rogers (2003) states that innovativeness is seen as a 
“continuous variable, and partitioning it into discrete categories is a conceptual device, 
much like the continuum of social status into upper, middle, and lower classes. Such 
classification is a simplification that aids the understanding of human behaviour, 
although it loses some information as a result of grouping individuals”. Moreover, he 
goes on to state that “ideally, a set of categories should be (1) exhaustive, including all 
the unite of study, (2) mutually exclusive, by excluding a unit of study that appears in 
another category from also appearing in any other category, and (3) derived from a single 
classificatory principle”. Rogers developed a bell curve model (figure 3.3.3) of a social 
system based on the inventiveness of the members:
1) Innovators -  2.5%
2) Early adopters -  13.5%
3) Early majority -  34%
4) Late majority -  34%
5) L aggards-16%
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Figure 3.3.3 -Adopter Categorization on the Basis of Innovativeness (from Rogers (2003))
This model imparts use of two statistics, the mean ( x ) and the standard 
deviation (sd) to divide a normal adopter distribution into five adopter categories with 
the approximate percentage of individuals included within the categories of innovators, 
early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. 10
Innovators are the avant garde, actively pursuing and embracing unique, sui 
generis ideas; innovators are risk-tolerant, exploiting their considerable interpersonal 
networks and communication channels to ensure exposure to new thought, processes, 
and technologies. Early adopters, due to their position and status within a social system 
are receptive to change, yet because of their relative position, tend to be more risk 
adverse than innovators in accepting the adoption of a proposed innovation. Those in the 
early majority category trend towards adoption of an innovation just prior to the average 
member of a social system; early majority adopters more deliberate about their adoption 
decisions. The late majority adopters, also comprising about a third of the members of a 
system, are slower to adopt, and tend to be sceptical about innovation. Finally, the 
laggards are the traditionalists and the last group in a social system to adopt an 
innovation; they are suspicious of new ideas, processes, products, and services.
3.3.1.3.3 Rate of Adoption - Perhaps the least ambiguous application of Time as a 
dimension in diffusion is the rate o f adoption, defined as “the speed with which an
10 The innovativeness dimension, as measured by the time at which an individual adopts an innovation or 
innovations, is continuous. The innovativeness variable is partitioned into five adopter categories by laying 
off standard deviations (sd) from the average time o f  adoption ( x ).
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innovation is adopted by members o f  a social system”. Innovation adoption tends to 
follow an S-shaped curve as illustrated by figure 3.3.4. In interpreting the S-curve, it 
should be noted that it is innovation and system-specific, and describes the diffusion o f  a 
distinctly new or innovative idea among constituents o f a particular system. It cannot be 
used to describe an innovation that is not adopted, (i.e., unsuccessfully), as the S-curve 
shows the extent to which an innovation propagates among all potential adopters within a 
social system.
Figure 3.3.4 -  S-Curve rate o f  adoption model showing rate o f  adoption over time; this is shown 
relative to innovativeness reaching critical mass, described as the point at which enough 
individuals have adopted an innovation that the innovation’s further rate o f  adoption becomes 
self-sustaining. (Adoptedfrom Rogers (2003)
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Figure 3.3.5 -  Variables Determining the Rate o f Adoption of Innovations (From Rogers (2003)
According to Rogers, the rate o f  adoption is “generally measured as the number 
of individuals who adopt a new idea in a specified period, such as a year”. He goes on to 
state that the “perceived attributes of an innovation are one important explanation of the 
rate o f  adoption of an innovation. Most of the variance in the rate o f  adoption of 
innovations, from 49 to 87 percent, is explained by the five attributes: relative 
advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability” (Rogers 1995). 
Besides the five perceived attributes of an innovation, Rogers includes a further four 
variables: (1) the type of innovation, (2) the nature of communication channels diffusing 
the innovation at various states in the innovation-decision process, (3) the nature of the 
social system in which the innovation is diffusing, and (4) the extent of change agents ’ 
promotion efforts in diffusion the innovation; all affect an innovation’s rate o f  adoption 
as illustrated in figure 3.3.4.
3.3.1.4 Social System -  The fourth main idea in the diffusion of innovation is the social 
system, which can comprise individuals, informal groups, organisations and/or 
subsystems. Rogers defines social systems as “a set of interrelated units involved in joint
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problem solving to accomplish a common goal”. Moreover, diffusion “occurs within a 
social system. The social structure of the system affects the innovation’s diffusion in 
several ways. The social system constitutes a boundary within which diffusion occurs” 
(Rogers 2003). Social structures comprise both formal and informal units that utilise a 
variety of interpersonal networks and communication structures, demonstrating varying 
levels of homophily.
3.3.1.4.1 System Norms and Diffusion - Analysis of normative behaviour provides a 
beneficial method of understanding standards within a social system; system norms 
inform individuals of the expected behavioural performance standard. Systemic norms 
can inhibit change if perceived as a threat to established tradition or cultural contexts and 
can operate at the local, organisational, governmental or nation level.
3.3.1.4.2 Opinion Leaders, Change Agents and Champions - Paradoxically, those 
possessed with innovative primacy within a social system are often looked upon with 
disfavour, given their apparent deviance from the social system norm; this accords these 
individuals low credibility status among the average members of the social system and 
limits their role in diffusion. Yet, certain other members of the system, while not 
individually exhibiting traits of innovativeness can influence the adoption or rejection of 
an innovation; Rogers categorises these individuals as opinion leaders. Opinion leaders 
are members of the social system they seek to influence, and their effectiveness stems 
from demonstrated expertise, competence, accessibility, or leadership that conforms to 
the system’s norms.
The significant trait of opinion leaders is their position at the nexus of 
interpersonal communication networks; subsequently, they serve as the model to be 
imitated when it comes to either adopting or rejecting an innovation. The breadth of an 
opinion leader’s interpersonal communication network provides heightened visibility to
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that individual’s innovativeness, and subsequently serves as a social model of innovative 
behaviour for the other members of the system.
Conversely, change agents are professionals external to the system but represent 
change agencies and potential innovation to the system and normally possess singular 
subject matter expertise. Change agents are often perceived as dissimilar to the rest of 
the members of the system, yet their influences on a system’s innovation-decisions are 
normally viewed favourably given normative objectivity. Change agents often 
subordinate opinion leaders to gain acceptance within a social system to diffuse 
innovation or to mitigate the adoption of a potentially harmful innovation. Champions 
tend to be unique within organisational adoption o f  innovations. Rogers (2003) defines a 
champion as “a charismatic individual who throws his or her weight behind an 
innovation, thus overcoming indifference or resistance that the idea may provoke in an 
organisation”. Those championing a particular innovation possess the ability to 
overcome barriers within the organisation, span boundaries and build consensus 
internally and externally to the organisation. Studies of innovation champions within 
organisations have demonstrated that the involvement of an innovation champion 
facilitates the success of an innovation within an organisation (Rogers 2003).
3.4 Diffusion o f Innovation and the Innovation Process within Organisations 
Of the three types of innovation decisions: (1) optional innovation decisions, (2) 
collective innovation decisions, and (3) authority innovation-decisions, the innovation- 
decision process within organisations normally involves either collective or authority 
innovation-decisions, as optional innovation-decisions are those decisions made by 
individuals independent of other system members. Rogers further suggests the category 
of contingent innovation-decisions, “which are choices to adopt or reject that can be 
made only after a prior innovation-decision” (Rogers 2003). In researching innovation, 
organisations are often perceived as:
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“...constraints or resistances to innovations, as least to the extent that many 
problems are usually encountered in attempts to implement an innovation in an 
organisation. Alternatively, these difficulties can be seen as evidence that a 
particular innovation may not fit well with an organisation’s perceived problem, or 
that the innovation’s expected consequences are perceived by the organisation’s 
members as more negative than positive” (Van de Ven and Rogers 1988).
Rogers (1995; 2003) defines an organisation as a “stable system of individuals who 
work together to achieve common goals through a hierarchy of ranks and a division of 
labour. Organisations are created to handle large-scale routine takes through a pattern of 
regularized human relationships. Their efficiency as a means of orchestrating human 
endeavours is in part due to this stability, which stems from the relatively high degree of 
structure that is imposed on communication patterns”. He then defines 5 traits that 
comprise “a predicable organisational structure”:
1. Predetermined goals. Organisations are formally established for the 
explicit purpose of achieving specific goals and subsequently the structure 
and function of the organisation is determined accordingly.
2. Prescribed roles. Organisational tasks are distributed among various 
positions or duties; a role is a set of activities performed by an individual 
in a given position. A position is one’s place in an organisation -  i.e., the 
“boxes” on an organisation chart.
3. Authority structure. Authority is unequal in most formal organisations; 
subsequently authority is hierarchically structured to specify who is 
responsible to whom.
4. Rules and regulations. The formal set of written procedures that govern 
decisions and actions by members of an organisation’s members.
5. Informal patterns. Every formal organisation is characterised by various 
kinds of informal practices, norms and social relationships among its 
members. These informal practices emerge over time and fulfil an 
important function in any organisation. Nevertheless, the intent of 
bureaucratic organisations is often to depersonalise human relationships 
as much as possible by standardizing and formalizing them.
Bureaucratic efforts to impart order, social rigidity, would suggest a less than
favourable environment for innovation. Indeed, Max Weber’s (1958) “iron cage”
metaphor, suggestive of authoritarian norms wherein rules, diktats, mandates and
capricious control is accepted and acted upon by subordinates, and intimates drone-like
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compliance rather than independence of thought. Such oppressive structure creates 
barriers and an endemic cultural resistance to change; yet, contrary to the apparent status 
quo, Rogers observes that “innovation goes on all the time in most organisations,” and 
constitutes “one of the fundamental processes underway in all organisations” (Rogers 
2003).
The diffusion o f innovation within organisations includes a number of structural 
characteristics and independent variables that influence the extent of innovation adoption 
or rejection. At an individual level, a champion or individual leader’s characteristics can 
positively further innovation. For example, innovations necessitating an individual 
optional-innovation decision “are generally adopted more rapidly than when an 
innovation is adopted by an organisation”, most often at the instigation of a champion. 
Conversely, individual adoption may not occur if the innovation is not first adopted by 
an organisation; moreover, the more individuals involved in executing an innovation- 
decision, the more prolonged the rate of adoption.
Organisational complexity is reflective of the levels of knowledge and expertise 
of individuals, and is positively correlated with innovativeness. Moreover, the more 
extensive an organisation's level of formality, for instance, the degree to which it follows 
rules and exhibits complex hierarchy, the greater the probability organisational 
innovativeness is inhibited. Lastly, organisations demonstrating broad 
interconnectedness, via interpersonal network links within the social system, reflect 
greater levels of innovativeness. There is also a positive correlation between the amount 
of available resources in an organisation, “organisational slack”, as well as the size of an 
organisation; the larger the organisation, the more innovative.
Rogers formally categorises these characteristics as (1) centralization, (2) 
complexity, (3) formalization, (4) interconnectedness, (5) organisational slack, and (6) 
size (see figure 3.4.1). The innovation-decision process within organisations exhibits
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more complexity and different stages than individual innovation-decisions, providing for 
two distinct phases (see figure 3.4.2). The five stages of the innovation process within 
organisations consist of: agenda-setting, matching, redefining/restructuring, clarifying, 
and routinizing. Phase I consists of the first and second stages (namely agenda setting 
and matching), while Phase II comprises stages three, four, and five 
(redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing).
In d ep e n d e n t V ariables D e p e n d e n t V ariable
INDIVIDUAL (LEADER) CHARACTERISTICS
1. Attitude toward change (+) \
INTERNAL CHARACTERISES OF 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
1. Centralization (-)
2. Complexity (+) _
3. Formalization (-)
4. Interconnectedness (+)
5. Organisational slack (+)
6. Size (+)
EXTERNAL CHARATERISTICS OF 
THE ORGANISATION ^
1. System openness (+)
Figure 3.4.1 -  Independent Variables Related to Organisational Innovativeness (From Rogers
(2003))
Agenda setting takes place as the result of defining a general organisational 
problem and is a continuous process, existing in every system and determines the 
hierarchy of work within the system. Agenda setting “initiates the sequence of the 
innovation process, for it is here that the initial motivation to impel later steps in the 
innovation process” (Rogers 2003). Moreover, the agenda-setting stage, although 
initiating the innovation sequence, is not instantaneous; it is a time-dependent event that 
may involve several months or years.
Schroeder’s (1989) work in the Minnesota Innovation Research Program, from 
which much of the body of research on innovation in organisations derives, led him to 
conclude that “Innovations are not initiated on the spur of the moment, nor by a single 
dramatic incident, nor by a single entrepreneur”. Furthermore, the innovation process can
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ORGANISATIONAL
INNOVATIVENESS
be spurred by knowledge of a particular innovation, rather than the identification of a 
particular problem or need for a solution; as explained in the definition of the individual- 
level innovation-decision process, perceived need can initiate the innovation process in 
an organisation, and similarly, knowledge of an innovation fosters a desire for that 
innovation.
Matching is defined “as the stage in the innovation process at which a problem 
form the organisation’s agenda is fit with an innovation, and this match is planned and 
designed”, and done effectively, can contribute to successful sustainment of the idea over 
time. Fit is particular to the compatibility of the innovation as discussed in section 3.4. 
Fit imparts a hospitable environment for the innovation. Indeed, Goodman and Steckler 
(1992), in their research into innovation within a health organisation, determined that an 
innovation’s success in fitting a particular need was highly dependent on whether it 
“found a home”. Such is the need for this “domesticity” that the matching decision 
demarks the stage between initiation and implementation as illustrated in figure 3.4.2.
Redefining/Restructuring occurs in the implementation phase of the innovation, 
and defines the process wherein the innovation is re-invented to oblige organisational 
requirements, structures and other contextual needs more exactingly, as well as when the 
structure of the organisation is modified to fit the innovation. During re-invention and 
restructuring, the organisation and the innovation undergo change, albeit at varying rates 
within this stage; moreover, unlike the more time-intensive matching process, past work 
by Tyre and Orlikowski (1994) established that the opportunity for modification or re- 
invention of an innovation occurred only fleetingly, and once this window had passed, 
the innovation was swiftly entrenched in the organisation’s structure, processes or 
culture, with little or no further availability for modification.
Van de Ven (1986) showed that “Innovations not only adapt to existing 
organisational structures, but they also transform the structure and practice of those
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environments”. In some instances, such is the impact of an innovation that the entire 
organisational structure is altered to accommodate its adoption. Rogers (2003), in 
discussing the concept of innovation and organisational structures, states that 
“implementation of a technological innovation in an organisation amounts to a mutual 
adoption of the innovation and the organisation.
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Figure 3.4.2 -  Five Stages in the Innovation Process in Organisations (From Rogers(2003)
Typically, both change during the sub-process of implementation. This mutually
adaption occurs because the innovation almost never fits perfectly in the organisation
which it is to become embedded”. Furthermore, Rogers goes on to state that,
“The redefining/restructuring stage in the innovation process in an organisation 
amounts to social constructionism, in which perceptions of the organisation’s 
problem and the innovation come together and each are modified in the process. If 
the innovation comes from inside the organisation, individuals regard it as familiar 
and compatible and hence find it easier to give meaning to the new idea. When the 
innovation enters the organisation from external sources but the exact form that it 
takes is flexible and a good deal of re-invention occurs, the organisation’s 
participants perceive the new idea as being theirs” (Rogers 2003).
Innovations that generate a great deal of ambiguity in an organisation or create 
high levels of discomfort through their adoption can create resistance to the introduction
of a new technology. IT innovations in particular tend to cause such disruption which is
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then responsible for the unique difficulties experienced in their adoption. Rogers (2003) 
describes such “disruptive” or “discontinuous” innovations as radical innovations, 
defined as “such a major change that it represents a new paradigm for carrying out some 
task”. Walsh and Linton’s (2000) work showed that in a variety of instances, the radical 
nature of some inventions give rise to an entirely revolutionary technology development 
such as microchips or mobile phones. The “radicalness” of an innovation can be 
ascertained by gauging the level of organisational knowledge needed to effectively 
exploit the idea; the more an organisation needs to learn, the more radical the innovation. 
Subsequently, some innovations are so radical as to defy normal adoption norms, 
creating the need for completely unstructured implementation processes as traditional 
sets of ordered responses are non-existent (Mintzberg, Raisinghani et al. 1976).
Ettlie, Bridges et al. (1984) provide another view of the concept of radical 
innovation, in this case, radical versus incremental innovation, wherein incremental 
innovation is characterised by the progressive adoption of an innovation through stages, 
stating that:
“One of the theoretical typologies that has emerged in the literature on 
organisational innovation is the dichotomy of radical versus incremental innovation 
introduction and adoption. One aspect of this dimension appears to be whether or 
not the innovation incorporates technology that is a clear, risky departure from 
existing practice. (Duchesneau, Cohn et al. 1979; Hage 1980) If a technology is 
new to the adopting unit and new to the referent group of organisations (Becker 
and Daft 1978), or if it requires both throughput (process) as well as output 
(production or service) change (Hage 1980), perhaps the magnitude or cost of 
change required by the organisation is sufficient to warrant the designation of a 
rare and radical, as opposed to incremental, innovation.
The longer an innovation is in practice, the greater the understanding of context 
and applicability; this understanding is defined as clarity. Clear communication of 
the intent in adoption of an innovation, as well as the perceived benefits thereof can 
mitigate ambiguity; therefore, should adoption occur too rapidly at the clarity 
stage, the potential for less-than satisfactory adoption results is greatly increased. 
As with the redefining/restructuring stage, clarity is also a social construction. 
Rogers (2003) explains the construction of clarity through a variety of questions as 
well as the means by which they may be answered:
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“When a new idea is first implemented in an organisation, it has little meaning to 
the organisation’s members and is surrounded by uncertainty. How does it work? 
What does it do? Who in the organisation will be affected by it? Will it affect me? 
These are the typical questions that individuals seek in the clarifying stage. As 
people in an organisation talk about the innovation, they gradually gain a common 
understanding of it. Thus their meaning of the innovation in (sic) constructed over 
time through a social process of human interaction”.
Champions and other boundary spanners play a critical role in the clarity stage. 
They act as reliable sources for contextual understanding and social shaping of the idea 
that is favourable (Tushman 1977; Howell and Higgins 1990; Lawless and Price 1992).
Routinizing is the last stage of the implementation continuum. It is indicated by 
the incorporation of the innovation into the routine activities of the organisation as well 
as no longer being considered as a unique phenomenon. With the advent of routinization, 
the innovation process is completed, yet the opportunity for complications can arise. A 
supportive and closely related process to routinization is sustainability. The subject of 
much recent research, sustainability is described as “the degree to which an innovation 
continues to be used after initial efforts to secure adoption is (sic) completed” (Rogers 
2003).
In ascertaining the level that an organisation sustains an innovation, it is 
necessary to gauge the level of participation. Green (1986) defines participation as “the 
degree to which members of the organisation are involved in the innovation process”. 
Participation can be described by involvement in activities such as the design process, 
group discussions, and other efforts directed at implementation of an innovation, thus 
ensuring its sustainability over time. Given the level of group involvement, collective 
innovation-decisions normally exhibit greater sustainability than authority innovation- 
decisions.
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3.5 Critique o f Diffusion o f Innovation Theory
According to Fichman (2004), “the majority of prior research on IT innovation, 
and indeed on organisational innovation in general, had been done within what I will call 
the dominant paradigm. This paradigm is typified by the desire to explain innovation 
using economic-rationalistic models, whereby organisations that have a greater quantity 
of what might be called the ‘Right S tu ff (i.e., greater innovation-related needs and 
abilities) are expected to exhibit a greater quantity of innovation (i.e., greater frequency, 
earliness, or extent of adoption”. While these observations are homogeneous to Rogers’ 
structural characteristics and independent variables, relative to innovation in 
organisations, they serve to reinforce the existence of the pro-innovation bias in 
diffusion research.
Perhaps the most serious inadequacy of diffusion research, the pro-innovation 
bias infers that all members of a system should adopt an innovation, which should then 
be diffused as rapidly as the system allows; such perceptions overwhelmingly assume an 
innovation is “good” -  Fichman’s “Right Stuff’ -  and thus should be universally 
accepted. Moreover, given this universality, the innovation should not experience 
rejection or re-invention. While first identified by Rogers and Shoemaker as early as 
1971, the pro-innovation bias continues to represent an ongoing problem for diffusion 
scholars, particularly in the area of causality, a result of an overwhelming reliance on 
correlational analysis of survey data (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; Rogers 2003). The 
intellectual integrity of diffusion studies is potentially compromised with this oversight, 
as other rich diffusion research areas are ignored, such as why an innovation was not 
adopted or failed post-adoption, or was not subjected to re-invention. In some instances, 
the omission of these subjects may be a function of the available data. For instance, in 
the case of a successful diffusion effort, there is an extent rate o f adoption that can then
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be measured; in the case of failed diffusion, reconstruction is hampered by the lack of a 
visible or irregular audit path.
As a result of this lack of traceability, innovations that were initially adopted and 
later rejected, or simply rejected then become of little interest to diffusion researchers. 
Re-invention studies also pose their own unique challenges, given the variety of forms 
reinvention can assume, giving rise to methodological quandaries regarding classifying 
what is and is not “adoption”. Rogers states that the use of conventional methodologies 
by diffusion researchers, rather than struggling with taxonomic and/or methodological 
ambiguity, tended to focus their investigations on successful diffusion; thus, a pro­
innovation bias entered diffusion research (Rogers 2003).
Consistent with the unique dimension of time in diffusion, are the problems 
inherent with its measurement, problems Rogers (2003) identifies as “methodological 
curses”. As diffusion is a process that occurs over time, the exclusion of time is not 
possible; this dependence creates a weakness when using recall data from adopters such 
as research respondents, as it relates to contextualising adoption, for instance, 
remembering the date on which they adopted a particular innovation. According to 
Rogers, this process essential involves “looking over one’s shoulder” and trying to 
“mentally reconstruct” an individual’s past innovation experiences. Such reconstructions 
are understandably “not very accurate and undoubtedly varies on the basis of (1) the 
innovation’s salience to the respondents; (2) the length of time over which recall is 
requested; and (3) individual differences in education, mental ability, etc.” (Rogers 
1976).
Another critique involving bias is that of diffusion research siding with change 
agents, who promote a particular innovation, rather than those individuals considered 
potential adopters. Rogers (1976; 2003) categorises this shortcoming as source bias, and 
posits that this bias “is perhaps suggested by the words that we use to describe this field
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of research: ‘diffusion’ research might have been called something like ‘problem 
solving,’ ‘innovation seeking,’ or ‘evaluation of innovations’ had the audience originally 
been a stronger influencer on this research”.
Given the preponderance of diffusion research is sponsored by groups, (defined 
as pro-source), rather than individuals, this introduces further categorisation within the 
problem of source bias, that of individual blame versus system-blame. Individual blame 
perpetuates the belief that an individual is answerable for their problems instead of the 
system of which the individual is a part. As the overwhelming concentration is “on the 
individual as the unit of analysis in communication research (while largely ignoring the 
importance of communication relationships between sources and receivers)” assigning 
blame to individuals is understandable, and moreover, “is often due to the assumption 
that the individual, as the unit of response, must consequently be the unit of analysis 
(Coleman 1958-59)” (Rogers 1976).
A fourth criticism of diffusion theory also pertains to this monadic aspect of 
adopters, relative to the consequences of adoption, specifically the distribution of 
perceived socioeconomics benefits among individuals within the system. When 
investigated, this issue of equality has demonstrated that diffusion often exacerbates the 
existing socioeconomic gaps between higher and lower cohorts within a system. Such 
socioeconomic disparity can be found in any system under investigation, but 
predominate in studies undertaken in developing nations. Equality gaps in an 
organisational context could include computational advantages, funding, and other 
structural mechanisms, in addition to individual considerations such as training, formal 
education and gender.
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3.6 Secondary Theoretical Support -  theories o f technology use, adoption and 
effectiveness within organisations
Van de Ven et al. (1986) demonstrated that during the innovation process, ideas 
are transient; they proliferate “into divergent and parallel processes”. We have 
previously noted that an innovation can be changed by adopters through a process of re- 
invention, an activity normally occurring during the adoption and implementation 
processes (Rice and Rogers 1980; Rogers 1995; 2003). Comparably, other diffusion 
scholars such as Clark and Staunton (1989), have rejected notions of innovation as a 
static or isolated set of objects or practices; rather, they have emphasised examination of 
“complex innovation configurations and changes in an innovation’s features over time”. 
Such proliferation, change, and re-invention implies a degree of interactivity and 
subsequent modification of ideas within an organisation, resulting in “new organisational 
forms and management practices which tend to be embedded in social and historical 
contexts” (Slappendel 1996). Studies of technological innovation have consistently 
demonstrated that users or adopters continue to modify both technology and their 
understanding of technology far beyond its design and implementation.
In accepting this view of dynamic organisational behaviour, technological use
and adoption theory rejects the notion of organisational absolutism - the inflexibility of
Weber’s “iron cage”. An organisation’s ability to modify its form has resulted in a
postmodern, anti-Taylorist acknowledgment of the interrelation of organisation and
environment, rather than traditional memes of productivity and control. A survey of the
early literature on innovation in organisations documents a variety of theoretical
perspectives. One emergent perspective, as noted by Becker and Whisler (1967) was the
“humanistic approach,” posited by scholars desiring to “explain innovation behaviour in
terms of the personality characteristics of organisational participants, and a ‘structural
approach’ used by those seeking to explain innovative behaviour in terms of structural
differences” (Slappendel 1996). However, Pierce and Delbecq (1977) propose a third
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perspective: “Organisational innovation can thus been seen from three perspectives. The 
deterministic structural model has captured the most attention; i.e. structure and context 
cause innovation. Alternatively, member values and attributes can be cast as the primary 
rival causal force in determining organisational innovation; i.e., elite values favourable to 
change best predict organisational innovation. Finally, the relationship between 
organisation and innovation may be interactively influence by both structure and
membership”.
Individualist Structuralist Interactive process
Basic assumptions Individuals cause 
innovation
Innovation determined by 
structural characteristics
Innovation produced 
by the interaction of 
structural influences 
and the actions of 
individuals
Conceptualization of an 
innovation
Static and objectively 
defined objects or 
practices
Static and objectively 
defined objects or practices
Innovations are subject 
to reinvention and 
reconfiguration. 
Innovations are 
perceived.
Conceptualization of the 
innovation process 
Core concepts
Simple linear, with focus
on the adoption stage
Champion
Leaders
Entrepreneur
Simple linear, with focus on
the adoption stage
Environment
Size Complexity
Differentiation
Formalization
Centralization
Strategic type
Complex process
Shocks 
Proliferation 
Innovative capability 
Context
Research Methodology Cross-sectional survey Cross-sectional survey Case studies 
Case histories
Main authors Rogers
March and Simon
Zaltman et al. Van de Ven
Table 3.6.1 — Main Features of the Three Perspectives (from Slappendel (1996)
Table 3.6.1 provides an overview of these three perspectives, organised from left to
right according to their historical precedence. While the individualist and structuralist
perspectives have traditionally prevailed among most scholars of organisational
innovation, both are being increasingly challenged by the interactive innovation process
perspective (Slappendel 1996). In studying the organisational context of the AMLPT
artefact, we assume primarily a structuralist perspective, as well as drawing from the
interactive perspective in specific instances where applicable. The structurational
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perspective of technology is derived from Gidden’s (1979; 1984) work in social
constructivism, culminating in his theory of structuration. Structure in this context is
“understood as the set of rules and resources instantiated in recurrent social practice”.
While technology can “exist” in abstract terms, it is not until it is used in some
deliberate, repeated human activity that is then “structured” through this ongoing usage
process. Orlikowski (2000) states that:
“Existing structurational models of technology examine what people do with 
technologies in use, positing such use as an appropriation of the ‘structures’ 
inscribed in the technologies. Such appropriation occurs when ‘people actively 
select how technology structures are used’ (DeSanctis and Poole 1994).
Appropriation is an apt metaphor for describing the action that humans exhibit in 
shaping the situated use of technology; moreover, appropriation captures this human 
agency “in terms of interaction with the structures embedded within technology,” as well 
as the specific context of the technology structure” (Orlikowski 2000). As well as a 
method for the analysis of technology, structuration theory has also been adopted by a 
number of scholars in their research into organisational processes (Ransom, Hinings et 
al. 1980; Willmott 1981; Manning 1982; Riley 1983; Smith 1983; Spybey 1984; 
Pettigrew 1985; Roberts and Scapens 1985; Barley 1986). Their subsequent use of 
structuration resolves “the dilemma of choosing between subjective and objective 
conceptions of organisations, and allows them to embrace both (Willmott 1981; Dow 
1988; Van de Ven and Poole 1990)” (Orlikowski 1992). Technology recursively 
facilitates and emanates from human action; Orlikowski defines this recursion as the 
Duality o f  Technology, the first of two premises she puts forth regarding the relationship 
of human action and technology. The second premise, “a corollary of the first, is that 
technology is interpretively flexible, hence that the interaction of technology and 
organisations is a function of the different actors and socio-historical contexts implicated 
in its development and use” (Orlikowski 1992). To illustrate these various
interdependencies and relationships, Orlikowski developed the Structuration Model o f  
Technology, the syntax of which is uniquely applicable to attributes of diffusion of 
innovations. Such theoretical symmetry is useful in shaping the AMLPT social system 
and reification of behavioural attributes between diffusion and technology adoption and 
use. Significantly, the structuration model provides a richer taxonomic catalogue than 
that of Dol theory, providing the researcher with a more robust narrative and description 
vocabulary, particularly in regards to organisations (figure 3.6.1). The structuration 
model of technology consists of four discrete elements:
a. Human agents: technology designers, users, and decision makers
b. Technology: material artefacts mediation task execution in the workplace
c. Institutional properties of organisations: structure, business strategies, 
ideology, culture, control mechanisms, standard operating procedures, division of 
labour, expertise, communication patters, as well as environmental pressures such 
as government regulation, competitive forces, vendor strategies, professional 
norms, technological awareness and socioeconomic conditions
d. Influence of human use of technology on organisations: does the technology 
reinforce the (more often) or transform them (less often)
Using Orlikowski’s (1992) vocabulary, we can then summarize the influences of the 
aforementioned elements within the structuration model of technology, as well as 
explaining the relationships illustrated in Figure 3.6.1:
I. Technology is the product o f  human action (arrow a). As a human
artefact, technology only comes into existence through human action, and 
is sustained by human action through the ongoing maintenance and 
adaption of technology.
II. Technology is the medium o f human action (arrow b). Because 
technology is use by workers, it mediates their activities; that technology 
also constrains the performance by facilitating it in a particular manner is 
an important corollary of this.
III. Human action is situated within organisations and shaped by 
organisational contexts (arrow c). When designing, appropriating, 
modifying or resisting technology, human agents are influenced by the 
institutional properties of their setting.
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IV. The manner in which human action impacts the institutional properties o f 
an organisation (arrow d). Does the action reinforce the organisation or 
transform it. Weick (1979) states that “technology is an ‘enacted 
environment,”’ the construction of which is derived from organisational 
structures of “signification, domination, and legitimation”. The 
appropriation, indeed the adoption and implementation of technology 
tacitly suggests the change or reinforcement of signification, domination 
and legitimacy within a particular organisation or social system.
Institutional Properties
Technology
Human Agents
ARROW TYPE OF INFL UENCE NATURE OF INFLUENCE
a Technology as a Product of Human Action
Technology is an outcome of such human action as design, 
development, appropriation, and modification
b Technology as a  Medium of Human Action
Technology facilitates and constrains human action through the 
provision of interpretive schemes, facilities, and norms
c Institutional Conditions of Interaction with Technology
Institutional Properties influence humans in their interaction with 
technology, for example, intentions, professional norms, state of the art 
in materials and knowledge, design standards, and available resources 
(time, money, skills)
d Institutional Consequences of Interaction with Technology
Interaction with technology influences the institutional properties o f an 
organisation, through reinforcing or transforming structures of 
significance, domination, and legitimation.
Figure 3.6.1 -  Structuration Model of Technology (From Orlikowski (1992))
3.7 Applicability o f theories o f technology use, adoption and effectiveness within 
organisations
The rich body of organisational theory relative to the adoption and use of 
technology provides a collage of perspectives. In keeping with the diffusion-centric 
approach of this dissertation, applicable choices narrow appreciably, as in the majority of
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references surveyed, the predominate loci of research is the IT artefact itself, (i.e. 
individual approaches to MIS design and use (Culnan 1987; Prescott and Conger 1995)), 
rather than the organisation. As we seek an understanding of innovation as a means of 
gauging effectiveness within a social system, rather than simply a precursor to 
technocentrism, this “dominant paradigm” approach is severely limiting, unnecessarily 
restrictive and philosophically bereft.
The structuration model of technology seeks to extend contextual understanding 
beyond technological determinism (Orlikowski 2000). In shaping our understanding of 
the AMLPT artefact, its effectiveness, and diffusion within the AMLPT social system, 
structuration is realised as a dynamic process that is embedded historically and 
contextually. Contrasting with social models that related their components in a linear 
fashion, structuration compliments diffusion theory through its recursive interactions. As 
with the diffusion attributes of re-invention, discontinuance, and sustainability, the 
structuration model presumes that organisational elements may exhibit contrary 
behaviours and attributes, as well as undermining organisational or adoptive intent. A 
social system’s acknowledgement of these contradictions can enhance cognition of 
potential failure points, organisational dissonance, and instability, thus initiating the 
innovation-decision process (Orlikowski 1992).
The structuralist perspective, framed by the structuration model of technology, 
draws attention to the interrelation of organisation and environment and serves as a 
method to navigate complexity within the AMLPT compliance domain. Furthermore, 
this model allows the researcher to conceptualise and investigate the relationship 
between technology and a social system with diverse hierarchies, such as the individual 
MLRO, AML Group, and Bank-level compliance functions. This conceptualisation 
capability provides a method to surmount the problem of levels of analysis as identified 
by a number of organisational scholars (Rousseau 1985; Kling 1987; Leifer 1988;
114
Markus and Robey 1988), and more importantly, emphasises the benefit of
comprehending the diverse layers through which technology interacts with an
organisation or social system.
Significantly, “by moving across levels of analysis and boundaries of time and
space, the structuration model of technology affords an examination of technology
transfer among organisations” (Orlikowski 1992); such a lens further clarifies our
understanding of individual and in particular, heterophilous organisational adopters,
given the propensity for one organisation to adopt or reinvent another’s AMLPT
innovation. The expansive character of the structuration model o f technology mitigates
the probability of investigating only discrete diffusion relationships; for instance, how
technology influences adopters without investigating the innovation-decision process, or
completely excluding the social system.
Interest in the efficiency, effectiveness, productivity or “excellence” of an
organisation has spurred research amongst diverse fields such as economists, financial
analysts, management theorists, management philosophers, organisational behaviourists,
as well as countless papers in management schools. Yet, since Taylor’s pioneering work
in 1911, empirical research has done little in the way of contributing to a comprehensive
theory of organisational effectiveness (OE). However, in developing a means of
measuring the effectiveness of AMLPT, we draw on the work of Lewin and Minton
(1986), who, through extensive research into theories of organisational effectiveness
emergent in the last 30 years, suggest that indicators and measures of effectiveness can
be deduced from the literature. They state that:
“a number of authors have noted that when conducting or comparing 
organisational effectiveness studies it is important to specify whether it is the 
variables that predict effectiveness, or the variables that indicate effectiveness, that 
are of interest (e.g., Cameron (1986). In contrast, (table 3.7.1) illustrates a number 
of influential management and organisational philosophies all of which articulate 
(with the exception of the population ecology perspective) competing principles of 
management presumed to be causally related to the effectiveness of organisations,
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without distinguishing between prediction and indicator variables. Indeed, it is 
often not possible to make general statements about whether a variable is of one 
type or the other, as what is a predictor variable in one context may be an indicator 
variable in another context (just as what is a means in one context may be an end 
or goal in another context). Thus in (table 3.7.1), we have labelled the last column 
Typical Effectiveness Attributes, and intend for the word attributes to encompass 
in meaning both predictor and indicator variables” (Lewin and Minton 1986).
While these competing management principles all attempt to answer questions
such as: “What is effectiveness? What are its indicators? What are its predictors? Can it
be specified or measured? Can it be related to particular perspectives, environment,
behaviours or structures? Is it a constant or an ideal? Does it change with time and
organisational maturity? Can’t it be sought, gained, enhance, or lost? Why is one
organisation effective at one time and not another, or why is one organisation effective
and another not?” (Lewin and Minton 1986), there is no succinct path to an answer or
answers. Given this is but a sample of potential lines of inquiry, as well as fertile ground
for epistemological liberty, the lack of universal and resilient general theories of
organisational effectiveness caused Goodman, Atkin and Schoorman (1983) to observe
that “The general absence of strong theories has nurtured ad-hoc atheoretical and
noncumulative empirical studies of OE”. Somewhat pessimistically, they go on to state
that the potential for resolving this ad-hoc approach is “unlikely, and call for a
moratorium on further studies of organisational effectiveness” (Goodman, Atkin et al.
1983; Lewin and Minton 1986).
Indeed, this dearth of consistent rigor leads Van de Ven (1983), in his review of In
Search o f Excellence to state that “... current administrative theory does not explain or
incorporate the contradictions and trade-offs inherent in organisational life,” and
furthermore:
“Most administrative theories begin with or search for internal consistencies in the 
nature of man and organisations and relegate contradictions, as indicators o f either 
poor theory or anomalies, to an area outside the bounds of the theory. 
Correspondingly, most administrative theories are static and are rightly criticized
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for their inability to explain the dynamics of change and development in 
organisational form and individual behaviour. There is a growing realization that a 
dynamic theory that can explain both stability and change should begin with and 
directly address the tensions and conflicts inherent in human institutions. Peters 
and Waterman have begun in this way”.
In addressing this lack of theoretical universality and implied intellectual inertia,
Lewin and Minton (1986), argue:
“... the extent to which major components of a contingent behavioural theory of 
organisational effectiveness already exist, one incorporating the paradoxes and 
trade-offs inherent in real life organisations. We also propose in this paper an 
agenda for causal research on organisational effectiveness, and a research strategy 
involving the engineering of organisational effectiveness. This approach could lead 
to an inductive, applied, empirically-based theory of contingent organisation 
design. We stress the word "contingent” so as to express our belief in the futility of 
seeking a universal, overarching theory of effectiveness. In other words, we 
suggest that organisation designs can be distinguished in terms o f their 
effectiveness attributes, thus contributing to an increased rationality in the practice 
o f organisation adaptation and re-design; to a comparison o f organisations in 
terms o f their relative effectiveness; and to the facilitation o f on-going organisation 
self-evaluation and assessment”. (Author’s italics)
What emerges from a review of Lewin and Minton’s suggested organisational
designs and their inherent effectiveness attributes (see right hand column of table 3.7.2),
is the commensurate applicability of the attributes of diffusion and adoption of
innovation as an effectiveness measure.
Furthermore, structuralist notions of the relationships among the human actor,
environment and organisation, particularly in the work of Yuchtman and Seashore
(1967), and Lorsch and Morse (1974), provides further appropriate theoretical support in
evaluating the receptivity to innovation within the AMLPT social system. According to
Lewin and Minton (1986), Campbell (1977) provides another assessment of
organisational effectiveness literature, suggesting:
“how criterion measures of organisational effectiveness should be developed so 
that they can be used to compare organisations, evaluate the effects of 
organisational development efforts, and determine what characteristics of 
organisations are significantly associated with organisational effectiveness as a
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basic construct" (p. 13)”. ... “Campbell also presented a taxonomy of the various 
criteria he found being used in the literature, to account for "all variables that have 
been proposed seriously as indices of organisational effectiveness" (p. 36)”. 
....’’Campbell went on to suggest a relative lack of value in "objective" inquiry, 
arguing that the development of organisation-specific models based on clear, 
explicit assumptions would be generally more promising. Organisational 
effectiveness, then, would be the degree to which the organisation's 'end' objectives 
are accomplished subject to certain constraints”.
Further to Campbell’s observation on the need to evaluate organisational 
characteristics, a number of sub-theories of organisational innovation, (Bums and Stalker 
1961; Thompson 1965; Aiken and Hage 1971), have identified several of these 
characteristics, for instance, the tendency of decentralised and informal organisational 
structures to be more hospitable (Ciborra 1999c) to innovation; such flexibility and 
openness has been shown to encourage new ideas. According to Subramanian and 
Nilakanta (1996), “A common thread running through all these sub-theories is that all 
innovations are not similar, therefore organisational characteristics will have different 
impacts on different types of innovation”. However, compared to the larger body of 
research relative to organisational characteristics and innovativeness, Subramanian and 
Nilakanta found that “there are relatively few studies that have examined the impact of 
innovation of organisational effectiveness (performance)”. In some cases, strategic 
attributes and measures, such as those “low cost,” “high cost,” and “middle of the road,” 
as developed by Porter (1980), or Miles and Snow’s (1978) generic types of strategic 
orientation, (prospector, analyser, defender, and reactor), have been use to build 
categorical schemas or interval scales to conceptualise innovation as an integral 
dimension of organisational strategy. For example, Miles and Snow’s “prospectors” 
demonstrate aggressive and creative strategies that are indicative of high levels of 
innovativeness (Subramanian and Nilakanta 1996).
What emerges from Subramanian and Nilakanta’s work is that organisational 
performance and effectiveness has been measured “using a variety of measures, as there
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are no guidelines available to help researchers choose an appropriate measure of
organisational effectiveness and performance. Even when multiple measures of
organisational effectiveness have been used, their selection has been rather arbitrary and
without any basis in theory (see Lewin and Minton (1986))”.
Subsequently, “organisational performance or efficiency may be measured using
measures of efficiency and/or measures of effectiveness”. In establishing the
effectiveness of AMLPT in support of procedures used by MLROs and compliance
officers, we have chosen attributes of innovation as our measure. Innovation theorists
such as Damanpour, Szabat and Evans (1989), distinguish between two types of
innovation, sometimes referred to as the “dual core” typology of innovation, which
categorises the two types as either an administrative innovation or a technical
innovation, and exhibit the following characteristics:
“Administrative innovations are defined as those that occur in the administrative 
component and affect the social system of an organisation. The social system of an 
organisation consists of the organisational members and the relationships among 
them. It includes those rules, roles, procedures, and structures that are related 
to the communication and exchange between organisational members. Admin­
istrative innovations constitute the introduction of a new management system, 
administrative process, or staff development program. An administrative inno­
vation does not provide a new product or a new service, but it indirectly 
influences the introduction o f new products or services or the process of 
producing them.
Technical innovations are defined as those that occur in the operating component 
and affect the technical system of an organisation. The technical system consists 
of the equipment and methods of operations used to transform raw materials or 
information into products or services. A technical innovation, therefore, can be 
the adoption o f  a new idea pertaining to a new product or service, or the 
introduction of new elements in an organisation's production process or service 
operations” (Damanpour, Szabat et al. 1989).
In maintaining theoretical unity with Rogers, we reject Damanpour et al.’s
distinction of social and technical systems; innovation adoption and diffusion in this
study is measured within a social system inclusive of the technology system. This
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contention aside, the remaining distinctions provide a useful descriptive set in defining 
behavioural and process attributes when measuring effectiveness. In creating a 
categorical schema to measure organisational effectiveness of the AMLPT artefact, we 
have, up until this stage, primarily drawn on theoretical constructs.
While not ignoring practitioner contributions, such as those of Barnard, Sloan, 
Townsend and Peters and Waterman, much of their work is grounded in earlier theorists, 
such as Taylor, Fayol, and Trist and Bamforth. More so, particularly in the case of Sloan 
and Peters and Waterman, their case methods focused on too narrow a subject, 
concentrating more on management style than innovation. For instance, Townsend’s 
effectiveness philosophy of support for local entrepreneurship closely resembles Peters 
and Waterman’s effectiveness attributes of autonomy and entrepreneurship.
Table 3.7.1 compares samples from historical effectiveness attributes and 
Campbell’s taxonomy with those of Roger’s Dol theory, again illustrating the applicable 
of diffusion attributes with those of organisational effectiveness. We further develop 
these attributes as measures of effectiveness in Chapter 4’s discussion on research 
methodology.
Representative Effectiveness Attributes from  Historical 
Survey & Campbell Diffusion Attributes from  Rogers
Overall effectiveness Innovativeness
Flexibility/Adaption Compatibility
Fit Compatibility
Match
Environment Social System
Objectives/goals Relative advantage
Utilisation o f Environment Compatibility
Conflict/cohesion Complexity
Achievement emphasis Relative advantage
Managerial interpersonal skills Change agency & Champions
Control Degree o f Centralization
Size
Training & Development Emphasis Formalization
Degree o f specialization
Role & norm congruence Formalization
Degree o f specialization
Table 3.7.1 -  Sample set of compatible attributes between organisation effectiveness and
diffusion theories
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Management Orientation Representative Effectiveness Philosophy Typical Effectiveness
________________________________Thinker(s)________________ Highlights___________________ Attributes
Scientific Management Frederick Taylor (1911) Time and motion studies; 
importance of standards, 
planning, control and cooperation; 
functional organisation; “one best 
way”.
Production maximization, cost 
minimization, technical 
excellence; optimal use of 
resources; task specialization
Principles of Management Henri Foyle 
(1916/1925)
First ‘complete’ inductive 
management theory; based on 
rules or ‘principles’; views 
management as a teachable skill
Division o f Work; clear 
authority and discipline; unity 
of command and direction; 
order, equity, stability and 
initiative, esprit de corps
Human Relations Elton Mayo (1933) Importance of emotional factors; 
sociological concepts of group 
endeavour; satisfied workers are 
productive workers; need for 
managerial diagnostic and 
managerial skills.
Productivity through 
employee satisfaction; 
satisfaction through attention 
to worker’s physical and 
emotional needs
Decision Making and 
Information Management
Herbert Simon 
(1947)
Effectiveness subject to bounded 
rationality; input/output efficiency 
criterion; functionalization based 
on subsidiary objectives.
Resource savings through 
rational development o f goals; 
efficiency o f information 
processing.
Socio-technical E. L. Trist and K.W. 
Bamford (1951)
Joint resolution of social and 
technical organisational demands; 
social systems view of 
organisations; enterprise as open 
system.
Degree o f social/technological 
“fit” and congruence o f 
technical processes.
Strategic Management and 
Design
Alfred Chandler 
(1962)
Structure follows strategy; 
vertical and horizontal integration, 
and rationalisation of resource 
utilisation.
Structure/strategic 
congruence, manifested as 
organisational growth, 
competitive attainment, 
environmental control and 
flexibility/adaption.
Human Resources Douglas McGregor 
Rensis Likert
(1961, 1967)
Importance o f organisational 
needs vs. organisational demands; 
power equalisation; participative 
management concurrent 
satisfaction o f competing 
demands: ‘productive workers are 
happy workers.’
Employee satisfaction, 
productivity; cohesion, 
loyalty, open communication
Contingency Theory P. R. Lawrence and 
J. W. Lorsch (1967)
Organisation design based on 
environmental factors; ‘best way’ 
contingent on a variety of 
conditions and situations.
Differention error, integration 
error,
organisation/environment “fit”
Population Ecology M. T. Hannan and J. 
Freeman (1977)
Relative unimportance of 
management; environmental 
determinism
Survival
Practitioner Contributions
Chester Bernard 
(1938)
Orgs. Are cooperative Syst. Executive action & examples
Alfred P. Sloan Multi -  division structure/de­ Efficiency through economies
centralised admin./centralized of scale; ROI and MBO driven
(1963) review
Robert Townsend Decentralised, sppt. for local Profitability; staff accessibility
(1970)
entrepreneurship
Thomas Peters and “7-Ss” -  structure, strategy, Bias for action; customer-
Robert Waterman systems, skills, style & shared focussed; lean staff; flexible
(1983)
values structure
Table 3.7.2 -  The Historical Search for Organisational Effectiveness (from Lewin and Minton
(1986)
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3.8 Critique of theories o f technology use, adoption and effectiveness within 
organisations
The principle critique of theories of technology use, adoption and effectiveness 
within organisations is a reliance on the dominate paradigm, from both an innovation 
perspective -  the “Right Stuff’ -  and their concentration on the IT artefact at the expense 
of organisational and environmental factors. The use of the dominant paradigm furthers 
the problem of pre-innovation bias at the expense of other points of analysis relative to 
rejection or reinvention of an innovation. Recent research, such as that undertaken by 
Petter, DeLone et al. (2008), is beginning to address both the skew induced by these 
pervasive paradigmatic assumptions, as well as the resultant pro-innovation bias. 
Moreover, much of the preeminent research on IT innovation dates from the early 1990s, 
and is dominated by studies into the efficacy of dated technologies such as computer- 
aided software engineering (CASE) or enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems 
(Prescott and Conger 1995). There is a growing body of scholarship in the area of 
innovativeness in the adoption and use of internet-centric technologies and displays a 
high degree of technocentrism.
Though structuration theory provides many useful tools to understand the 
relationship of humans with their environment, it lacks certain strengths relative to 
organisational analysis. The structuration model of technology does not readily address 
organisational form, a property that is considered more institutionalised; subsequently 
there is the need for further analysis of the relationship between diverse organisational 
forms and their interaction with technology and human agency. While useful in 
providing insights into “the limitations and contributions of prior concepts of 
technology”, the structuration model tends towards the techno-centric in many instances, 
focusing more on the “how” than on the “why” (Orlikowski 1991).
While there is a rich tradition of research into organisational effectiveness as well
as defining a means o f measurement thereof, the lack of universal and resilient general
122
theories of organisational effectiveness has created an environment where, as we have 
previously noted, Goodman, Atkin and Schoorman (1983) observe that there is a 
“general absence of strong theories (which) has nurtured ad-hoc atheoretical and 
noncumulative empirical studies of OE”.
We have also described Van de Ven’s concerns as expressed in his 1983 review 
of In Search o f Excellence noted that current administrative theory does not explain 
or incorporate the contradictions and trade-offs inherent in organisational life”. As a 
result of these theoretical voids, the researcher is then faced with extensive investigations 
that may or may not result in a useful, applicable research lens. While much of the 
problem is one of investigative time and energy, it perhaps exposes a more significant 
epistemological problem in the organisational studies field. Lewin and Minton (1986), 
propose “an agenda for causal research on organisational effectiveness, and a research 
strategy involving the engineering of organisational effectiveness. This approach could 
lead to an inductive, applied, empirically-based theory of contingent organisation design. 
We stress the word "contingent" so as to express our belief in the futility of seeking a 
universal, overarching theory of effectiveness”.
Lewin and Minton ground their proposed theory in an engineering construct 
derived from the use of data envelope analysis (DEA), an unproven technique at the time 
of their research in OE analysis (Lewin and Minton 1986). This may only serve to add 
further complexities in understanding organisational effectiveness, due to the “problems 
inherent in specifying some joint preference function or in attempting to specify the 
weights in some multi-attribute effectiveness measure (Cyert and March 1963)“.
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Chapter 4. Research Methodology
In the following chapter, we outline the research methodological approach used 
in this dissertation. Section one presents our arguments for the use of a pluralist 
methodology, consisting of two background case studies and a survey, as the guiding 
research strategy. Section two outlines our data collection methods and tools. The 
chapter concludes with a reflection on the coherence of the approach presented and the 
goals of the dissertation.
4.1 Research Strategy
Comford and Smithson (1996) observe that the information systems discipline, 
with its antecedents grounded in “the traditions of computer sciences, and the social 
science traditions of management and organisational studies, calls upon other numerous 
scholarly disciplines, such as those of psychology for understanding issues of human- 
computer interaction (Card 1983), economics in determining the business value of a 
company’s investments in information systems (Parker, Benson et al. 1988) or 
geography in exploring the effects of new telecommunications infrastructure on patterns 
of urban growth (Castells 1989)”. This multidisciplinary and diverse nature has, as we 
noted in Chapter 3, has caused much consternation among researchers both external and 
internal to the IS research discipline due primarily to the absence of a “general theory” of 
IS. Yet Robey (1996), who posits that the “threat” this diversity represents to the 
“tyranny of elites”, those monistic theoreticians who according to Pfeffer (1982) would 
ensure that “conformity and control are the price a field must be willing to pay in order 
to receive the price of political power and institutional legitimacy”; therefore, these 
monistic theoreticians are absent the benefits such diversity entails. In his retort to these 
elites, Robey states there are four key advantages of diversity that emerge from the IS 
discipline:
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• “First, diversity in IS expands the foundation upon which knowledge claims in the 
field  are based. For example, claims to knowledge about the use of groupware 
technologies may arise from both a controlled laboratory study and an 
interpretive field study.
• Second, diversity attracts good people to the field o f IS, where they can address 
applied problems that interest them. [For example], the founders of IS all earned 
their degrees in other fields, and IS continues to attract scholars from related 
disciplines.
• Third, diversity fosters creativity. In fields with unified paradigms, shifts in 
thinking rarely occur because the mainstream thinking is rarely challenged.
• Finally, diversity advances the valued principle o f  academic freedom. If 
academia stands for anything, it stands for the freedom to pursue problems and 
exploit opportunities for expanding knowledge. Knowledge creation is admittedly 
not an efficient process, and academic institutions are usually designed to be 
fertile sanctuaries for individual researchers, any one of whom could produce 
breakthrough findings.”
However, acceptance of Robey’s “diversity manifesto” is predicated on two 
essential obligations, the first of which is the researcher imposing discipline on their 
choice of theoretical frameworks. According to Robey, this disciplinary obligation stems 
“from Landry and Banville’s (1992) application of Laudan’s (1984) essay on science and 
values”, which calls for the avoidance of the “unregulated, anything goes” theoretical 
status quo of early IS research. Robey’s second obligation “pertains to our commitment 
to the ideal of collaboration within the IS field” (Robey 1996). Further to Landry and 
Banville’s position, the diversity in the IS field calls for a disciplined methodological 
pluralism, a stance favouring “...a diversity of methods, theories, even philosophies, in 
scientific inquiry” (Landry and Banville 1992). Other diversity adherents include Kaplan 
and Duchon (1988), Lee (1991), and Gable (1994), all of whom have urged both the use 
of pluralist research methodologies, but also the extending of the pluralist position
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beyond that of methodology, to include both positivist and interpretivist research
paradigms. Mingers (1997; 2001; 2001) has written extensively on the desirability of
methodological pluralism, deriving much of his perspective from the work of Bhaskar
(1994), Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), as well as Habermas (1979; 1984; 1987; 1993).
He presents two main arguments, the first of which is:
“...that the real world is ontologically stratified and differentiated, consisting of a 
plurality of structures that generate the events that occur (and do not occur). 
Different paradigms each focus attention on different aspects of the situation, and 
so multimethod research is necessary to deal effectively with the full richness of 
the real world. The second argument is that a research study is not usually a 
single, discrete event but a process that typically proceeds through a number of 
phases...” (Mingers 2001).
Mingers identifies further support for multimethod research in the work of 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), which includes, in a variation of Laudan’s Research 
Justification Triad (see figure 4.1.2), the concept of “(1) triangulation -  seeking to 
validate data and results from combining a range of data sources, methods, or observers, 
(2) creativity -  discovering fresh or paradoxical factors that stimulate further work, (3) 
expansion -  widening the scope of study to take in wider aspects of the situation 
(Mingers 2001)”.
The triad metaphor is a useful description for conceptualizing the multimethod
philosophy suggested by Mingers, Landry and Banville, (as derived from Laudan), as
illustrated in figure 4.1.3. Further to the triad metaphor, is Minger’s visual adaption of
Bhaskar’s stratified and differentiated worldview, or in Minger’s term, “the
multidimensional world” (figure 4.1.1). From this adaptation, using tenants of
Habermas’s theory of communicative action, Mingers presents a categorisation of
research methods based on the relationship to three worlds: the material world, the social
world, and the personal world.
“Each domain has different modes of existence and different epistemological 
possibilities. The material world is outside and independent of human beings. It
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existed before us and would exist whether or not we did. We can shape it through 
our actions, but are subject to its constraints. Our relationship to this world is one 
of observation (rather than participation or experience), but such observations are 
always theory and subject dependent. We can characterise this world as objective 
in the sense that it is independent of the observer, although clearly our 
observations and descriptions of it are not.
From this material world, through processes of evolution, linguistically endowed 
humans have developed, capable of communication and self-reflection. This has 
led to the social and personal worlds. The personal world is the world of our own 
individual thoughts, emotions, experiences, and belief. We do not observe it, but 
experience it. This world is subjective in that it is generated by, and only 
accessible to, the individual subject. We can aim to express our subjectivity to 
others and, in turn, appreciate theirs. Finally there is the social world that we (as 
members of particular social systems) share and participate in. Our relation to it 
is one of intersubjectivity because it is, on the one hand, a human construction, 
and on the other, it goes beyond and preexists any particular individual. It 
consists of a complex multilayering of language, meaning, social practices, rules, 
and resources that both enables and constrains our actions and is reproduced 
through them. One of its primary dimensions is that of power (Mingers 1992)” 
(Mingers 2001).
The Material World
Objectivity 
Observation
Our Social World
Intersubjectivity 
Participation
Reproduce
Languagirtg
Enables &Constrains Constrains
Appreciates Expresses
Emotioning
Mv Personal World
Subjectivity 
Experience
Figure 4.1.1 —Minger’s (2001)Three Worlds Relevant to Research Methods (framework
developed from work by Habermas)
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R esearch  Aim
Theoretical
Foundation
Research
Methods
Figure 4.1.2 -  Laudan's (1984) triad of justification; according to this representation, theoretical 
foundations for research and specific research methods are justified by research aims, or purposes. 
They should not be chosen because they conform to a dominant paradigm or because the researcher 
believes in their intrinsic value. Rather, theories and methods are justified on pragmatic grounds as 
appropriate tools for accomplishing research aims. Such discipline requires that researchers be clear 
about their aims, that they justify their choices of theory and method, and that they maintain a 
balance among the three positions on the triad (From Robey (1996).
Methods
^ . AimsTheories
Must harmonise
Figure 4.1.3 -  Landry & Banville’s Model for Implementing Laudan ’s Model
1. Theories - Are the theoretical foundations of the proposition adequately expressed? How is the 
proposition related to the present “theoretical corpus” of MIS? To what active fragments of this 
“fragmented adhocracy” is it more precisely linked? To what extent is it an original proposition as far 
as theory is concerned? Can it be identified with any of the MIS reference disciplines?
2. Methods - Does the proposition include a methodological part? Is it complete? Elaborated enough? 
Does it seem realistic? Is it viable? Does the proposition refer to orthodox methods?
3. Aims - What are the explicit or implicit aims of the proposition? Are there tensions between the 
implicit and explicit values? Who are the stakeholders to be considered for this research (managers? 
practitioners? academics?)
4. Theories constrain methods (1 vs. 2) - What general constraints does the theory put on methods? Is 
the method adapted to the nature of the theory?
5. Theories must harmonize with aims and aims must harmonize with theories (1 vs. 3 and 3 vs. 1) -
Relative to the stated aims, how can progress be defined? Does the theory support the stated aims, and 
are the stated aims congruent with the theory?
6. Methods must exhibit realizability o f aims (2 vs. 3) - Is the method well adapted to the aim(s)? Can 
the method assess the viability of the aim(s)? Would another method be more appropriate to the aims?
7. Methods justify theories (2 vs. 1) -Is the theory “in line” with the method? Can the theory be 
verified through this method? Can this method be complemented?
8. Aims justify methods (3 vs. 2) - Do we need a new method? Is the method a way of attaining the 
goals?
Using these principles, researchers in IS can justify their use of many individual paradigms and 
research methods. If a particular method cannot be justified, it should not be selected (Landry and 
Banville 1992)
128
Culnan (1987), using the results of her study of bibliographic citations, has 
recognised five sub-disciplines within information systems scholarship, arguing “that 
while MIS is still pre-paradigmatic, it has made progress, if one accepts the argument 
that MIS, like all social sciences, is a multiple paradigm discipline”. Culnan’s categories 
comprise research foundations, organisational approaches to information systems, 
individual approaches to information systems, information systems management, and 
information systems curriculum. The research methodology of this dissertation is in 
keeping with Culnan’s categorisations, in that it rests upon a research foundation within 
the interpretive tradition and seeks understanding of both the individual and 
organisational approaches to information systems use. Subsequently, the adoption of a 
pluralist multimethod research approach supports our use of the interpretivist paradigm 
in subjectively investigating the efficacy of AMLPT.
We choose to use Rogers’ work, as it is grounded in the sociology of 
communication and also Minger’s Habermas-inspired framework, as both are useful for 
categorising the interrelations of the social system under investigation. While the 
AMLPT artefact is a combination of several discrete technologies, it is nevertheless 
embedded in the social context of a compliance organisation and influenced by myriad 
factors therein, and therefore assumes the understood characteristics of an information 
system; it is not an isolated, self-perpetuating entity. Angell and Smithson (1991) make 
this distinction clear: “Information systems are social systems whose behaviour is 
heavily influenced by the goals, values and beliefs of individuals and groups, as well as 
the performance of the technology. As such, the behaviour of information systems is not 
deterministic and does not fit into any formal algorithmic representation (author’s 
italics)”.
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4.2 Paradigmatic Foundations -  grounded within interpretivist tradition
From a meta-theoretical perspective, we further develop our choice of the 
interpretivist paradigm through a brief discussion of differences between positivism and 
interpretivism, utilising the work of Weber (2004), Becker and Niehaves (2007), 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) Chen and Hirschheim (2004), and Walsham (1995; 
2006).
Positivism is “characterised epistemologies which seek to explain and predict 
what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and casual relationships 
between its constituent elements. Positivist epistemology is in essence based upon the 
traditional approaches which dominate the natural sciences” (Burrell and Morgan 1979). 
Convention categorises the differences between the two paradigms as those of 
epistemological, methodological, and ontological distinctions (Orlikowski and Baroudi 
1991; Chen and Hirschheim 2004).
Epistemologically, positivists seek to build knowledge of reality beyond that of 
the human mind; epistemological assumptions “concern the criteria by which valid 
knowledge about a phenomenon may be constructed and evaluated. For example, the 
positivist world view asserts that a theory is true only of it is repeatedly not falsified by 
empirical events (Chua 1986; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991)”; positivists are “concerned 
with the hypothetic-deductive testability of theories. Scientific knowledge should allow 
verification or falsification (Chen and Hirschheim 2004)”. Essential to positivist 
ontology is the belief that “the empirical world is assumed to be objective and hence 
independent of humans; reality exists objectively and independent from human 
experiences (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Chen and Hirschheim 2004)”. Weber argues 
that the perceived ontological and epistemological paradigmatic differences are 
“spurious” for the most part. The substantive differences between positivists and 
interpretivists can be identified through the type of investigation and means of inquiry;
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the classification methods used to communicate the results of those investigations, as 
well as the degree of the researcher’s involvement, such as individual biases, hypothesis 
and assumptions, or other personal considerations as explicitly documented in their 
findings (Weber 2004).
Methodology is the significant delineator between the two paradigms. 
Positivism’s emphasis on research approaches grounded in the scientific method is 
identified by the use of significant volumes of empirical data as well as diversity in its 
collection, and the use of methods such as laboratory experimentation and surveys. Such 
techniques are in marked contrast to interpretivism’s use of case studies, phenomenology 
and other discrete methods. Yet even with such clear philosophical distinctions, selective 
paradigmatic adoption and pluralism is evident. As noted by Weber (2004), positivists 
may deploy interpretivist tools such as case study methods in their research, and 
conversely interpretivists may call upon the use of inferential statistics, surveys or other 
positivist methods in quantifying a particular behaviour. Further to Weber’s (2004) 
observations, as well as those of Robey (1996), Mingers (2001; 2003), Landry and 
Banville (1992), Becker and Niehaves (2007), we present a similar view, arguing that 
bias towards “accepted” information systems’ research paradigms, (the “traditional” or 
dominant paradigms (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991)) and distinct research techniques, 
are grounded more in historicised conversations than on rational processes.
The ontological perspective of this research is concerned with developing an 
understanding of AMLPT. Furthermore, our interpretive perspective enables a means of 
comprehending individual behaviours and shared meanings among system members, (as 
well as those perceptions, social constructs and norms, created through formal and 
informal categorisation and communication), resultant from their systemic interactions 
(Kaplan and Duchon 1988; Walsham 1995). Orlikowski and Baroudi state that the 
interpretivist researcher presupposes “that people create their own subjective and
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intersubjective meanings as they interact with the world around them. Interpretive 
researchers thus attempt to understand phenomenon through accessing the meanings that 
participants assign to them (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991)”, furthering Burrell and 
Morgan’s assertion that individuals create their reality from a series “of assumptions and 
intersubjectively shared meanings” (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Through study of these 
social actions and their context, our interpretive research methods should result in “an 
understanding of the context of the information system, and the process whereby the 
information system influences and is influenced by the context” (Walsham 1993). 
Furthermore, this contextual understanding serves to further illuminate the connotations 
and social behaviours of the participating actors in a social setting (Hirschheim and 
Smithson 1986).
Research into Information Systems through the use of interpretive methods is 
well established. The acceptance of interpretive research in information systems has been 
steadily growing, as is evident in the early work of Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), as 
well as Culnan (1986; 1986; 1987), and later that of Mingers (1997; 2003) and Walsham 
(1993; 1995). During the early-to-mid 1980s, an introspective discourse began among 
prominent information systems researchers, regarding the stature of information systems 
research relative to norms more emblematic of established scientific disciplines, 
primarily as they related to the existence of a dominant paradigm (Keen 1980; Hamilton 
and Ives 1982; Klein and Welke 1982; Benbasat 1984; Weber 1984; Mumford, 
Hirschheim et al. 1985; Culnan 1986; Culnan and Swanson 1986; Culnan 1987; Lyytinen 
1987; Banville and Landry 1989; Hirschheim and Klein 1989).
Orlikowski and Baroudi, in their analysis of the evolution of the information 
systems discipline, further established that the nascent interpretivist perspective within 
published information systems research was taking hold against the prevailing positivist 
tradition. Mingers’ later work illustrated this development, as between 1993 and 2000,
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approximately 17% of the subject matter of papers accepted for publication in six well- 
known US and European-based journals assumed an interpretivist position. Later 
research by Walsham (2006) offered further evidence of this growth trend, as several 
journals have devoted entire “special issues” to interpretivist-based research.
The philosophical antecedents of interpretivism are found in the work of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1803) and influenced more recently by the work of Dilthey, 
Husserl and Weber (Burrell and Morgan 1979). As one of the first philosophers to 
espouse the essential ontological and epistemological basis of interpretivism, Kant put 
forth the idea that a priori understanding must proceed any cognisance of the sense data 
of the empirical experience (Burrell and Morgan 1979).
Within the interpretive paradigm, two significant branches of interpretive 
philosophy are also relative to our use of interpretivist methods in the interpretation of 
information systems: hermeneutics and phenomenology. Grounding their theories in the 
early work of Dilthey and his notion of verstehen (Dilthey 1976; Burrell and Morgan 
1979), Gadamer (1975; 1976) and Ricoeur (1974; 1976) are the preeminent exponents of 
this school, which espouse the belief that “we come to understand a complex whole from 
preconceptions about the meanings of its parts and their interrelationships” (Klein and 
Myers 1999). The exploration of the part relative to the whole and vis-a-vis is described 
as the principle of the hermeneutic circle and is foundational to any form of interpretive 
research.
Using an example from Gadamer (1976), in which he uses the example of 
translating the meaning of sentence into a foreign language, Klein and Myers (1999) 
further elaborate: “The process of interpretation moves from a precursory understanding 
of the parts to the whole and from a global understanding of the whole context back to an 
improved understanding of each part, i.e., the meanings of the words. The sentence as a 
whole in turn is part of some larger context”. Subsequently, interpretive researchers do
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not accept an objective, positivist, single reality; rather, they attempt to explain the 
phenomena by acknowledging the variety of meanings, norms, and beliefs of the social 
system (Keen 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991).
Phenomenology, as articulated in the work of Heidegger (1962) and Husserl 
(1970; 1982), involves a level of interpretation at a far greater micro level, and attempts 
to:
“...articulate the essence (the most basic characteristics) of the human condition 
in terms of a number of elementary categories. Examples of such categories 
which have been used in information systems research are ‘embodiment,’ or 
‘breakdown’ (Madsen 1989). What is important here is the recognition that these 
types of concepts were extracted from common, everyday experiences such as 
hammering, or misunderstandings in everyday language (breakdowns). 
Therefore, intrinsic to interpretive research is the attempt to relate particulars as 
may be described under the principle of contextualisation to very abstract 
categories; unique instances can be related to ideas and concepts that apply to 
multiple situations” (Klein and Myers 1999).
To maintain scholarly legitimacy as well as ensuring the future applicability of 
the research, it is important that theoretical abstractions and generalisations experienced 
and/or collected by the researcher, are carefully correlated to the pertinent details of the 
field work as closely as possible. Conceptually, abstraction supports the argument by 
Walsham that “the validity of the inferences drawn from one or more research method 
does not depend on the representativeness of the research methods used in a statistical 
sense”; more so “on the plausibility and cogency of the logical reason used in describing 
the results from the research, and drawing conclusions from them” (Walsham 1993). By 
adopting interpretive methods, we acknowledge that domain access to the research 
subjects is a result of social constructions such as language, consciousness, and shared 
meanings; subsequently, we assume the perspective of an “insider” within the research 
domain, observing and interpreting their communication and behaviour through a 
hermeneutic means within both an individual, immediate context as well as that of the 
larger social system (Trauth and Jessup 2000).
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In shaping the research strategy and methodological framework, we acknowledge 
that our work is shaped by our a priori experiences, understandings and thus influences 
the way we formulate our understanding of the research subject (Butler 1998; Becker and 
Niehaves 2007). Indeed, such multi-perspective complexities compelled Walsham to 
observe that:
“[ijnterpretive researchers are attempting the difficult task of accessing other 
people’s interpretations, filtering them through their own conceptual apparatus, 
and feeding a version of events back to others, including, in some cases, both 
interviewees and other audiences. In carrying-out this work it is important that 
interpretive researchers have a view of their own role in this complex process” 
(Walsham 1995).
Orlikowski and Baroudi acknowledge this complex relationship between theory
and practice, noting that “the researcher can never assume a value-neutral stance, and is
always implicated in the phenomenon being investigated”. The extent of this implication
has led to adopting constructivism theory as a means to gauge the extent of a researcher’s
role within the research domain. Using concepts of “weak” and “strong” constructionist
views, both variants “recognize that human actors enact their physical and social reality
and that they come to share a set of meanings around this reality” (Weick 1984).
Orlikowski and Baroudi describe the two views thusly:
“In the "weak" constructionist view, the researcher attempts, through various data 
collection techniques, to understand the existing meaning systems shared by the 
actors, and thereby interprets their action and events in her recounting. As Fay
(1987) puts it, "the social scientist is re-describing an act or experience by setting 
it into progressively larger contexts of purpose and intelligibility,.. .  [and] reveals 
what the agents are doing by seeing what they are up to and how and why they 
would be up to that."
In the "strong" constructionist view, however, the researcher is not merely 
presumed to describe a phenomenon in the words and categories of the actors, but 
is presumed to enact the social reality she is studying. Retelling the actors' story 
is never fully possible, as the interpretive schemes of the researcher always 
intervene, and hence the researcher in part creates the reality she is studying 
through the constructs used to view the world. Astley (1985) writes:
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The world of practice has its own "objective" reality, but since as 
scientists, our only recourse to that world is through what we see and do, 
our knowledge is unavoidably subjective in nature. The "facts" 
constituting our knowledge, are necessarily theory-dependent, since we 
can perceive nothing except through the knowledge structure in which 
perception is embedded... There is no direct access to reality unmediated 
by language and preconceptions.”
The descriptive use of “weak” and “strong” imply a position based on a 
researcher’s choice of principles relative to their perception of involvement, subjective 
measures that include, for example, those of hermeneutic contextual analysis, as they 
relate to the level of interaction among subjects. In the view of some positivists, such 
subjective measures may lessen the rigor of the research.
Klein and Myers (1999), in their discussion of formalised principles, counter that 
a use of a particular set of principles does not necessarily compromise the emergent 
nature of interpretivist-based research; however, they further state that what is incumbent 
on researchers is that they do not display unquestioned allegiance to such principles. The 
researcher should use principles as a means of validating the applicability and legitimacy 
of a position. Klein and Myers further affirm that using principles in interpretive research 
ensures that all the dimensions of a particular phenomenon have been explicitly 
considered, along with a means of evaluating the completed research in the future. The 
research approach in this dissertation assumes a weak constructivist approach, as our a 
priori understanding of the effectiveness of AMLPT is subjective, based on the historical 
context discussed in Chapter 2. We subjectively look to understand the rate o f adoption 
as a measure of effectiveness of the AMLPT artefact in support of compliance officers 
and MLROs through interpreting a variety of qualitative measures.
4.3 Strategy o f Inquiry: Structured and Unstructured Interviews and Survey
The research approach was initially to have been a case study of the first vendor
to market with a viable AMLPT offering. What became apparent, after several
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discussions with not only the initial research subject, but also other firms of a similar 
nature, was that a case study approach would be inappropriate, particularly in regards to 
the timing in initiating the research project.
The historical context of the research was comprised of several innovators with 
considerable financial opportunity at hand, combined with a narrow window of 
opportunity to seize market leadership. Subsequently, in investigating the suitability of 
our primary subject for case study research, their reticence, in allowing access to not 
only their intellectual property, but also to their overall operational methods, along with 
their sensitivity to market perceptions, resulted in the belief that such restrictions would 
have severely hampered the author’s ability to collect meaningful data. Further 
complicating the situation was the ongoing effort from not only the primary research 
subject, but also secondary nominees, to recruit the author into their organisation, given 
the author’s background. Furthermore, it was clear that commercial and intellectual 
property considerations would be an ongoing concern, when approaching the AMLPT 
artefact from a supplier/vendor perspective.
The author’s later attendance at a gathering of AML-CFT professionals provided 
an opportunity to discuss possible research opportunities with members of the entire 
AML-CFT domain, to include practitioners, such as compliance officers and MLROs, 
(from within and external to the financial domain), as well as regulators, consultants, and 
other technology providers ancillary to those providing behavioural profiling technology. 
What was evident from these discussions was that the number of both users and 
providers of AMLPT, had increased exponentially since the author first approached the 
topic in 2004; moreover, interest in the rate o f  adoption of these technologies would not 
be served through use of case study methodologies. This research aims to assess the 
adoption and use of AMLPT as a measure of effectiveness in support of compliance 
officers and MLROs. In doing so, we seek a representative sample of organisational
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types in the form of retail, commercial, and investment banks, and individual adopters
therein, across that sample. Given the breadth of the research subject, the author
concluded that a mixed methodology of structured and unstructured interviews to
compliment and augment a survey-based approach would be more appropriate.
The use of interviews in qualitative research can be described as an “attempt to
understand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’
experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations” (Patton 1987;
Patton 1990). So extensive is the use of interviewing to acquire knowledge and
information that some have posited “that we live in an interview society (Atkinson and
Silverman 1977; Silverman 1993)”. Walsham argues that interviews:
“...are the primary data source, since it is through this method that the researcher 
can best access the interpretations that participants have regarding the actions and 
events which have or are taking place, and the views and aspirations of 
themselves and other participants. Even in the case of interpretive case studies 
being carried out as a participant observer or action researcher, it can be argued 
that interviews are still an important data source, since they enable researchers to 
step back and examine the interpretations of their fellow participants in some 
detail” (Walsham 1995).
Critical to the success of the interview process is the role assumed by the 
researcher, as well as their presentation style. For instance, Zuboff (1988) likens her 
interview technique to that of a “non-judgemental form of listening”; her technique 
compliments the interview approach of the author as well. Moreover, the author’s 
previous consultancy work involved the extensive use of interviews, document reviews, 
and analysis of a variety of organisational artifacts. This past experience was a key 
contributing factor to the author’s resultant choice of methodology.
The use of interviews provides a method to enhance the accuracy and strength of 
data gathered through questionnaires. The conversational nature of the interview process 
allows both researcher and respondent the opportunity to expound on topics to a greater 
extent than the limited scope of a constrained survey answer, as well as providing further
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contextual insight as to the respondent’s environment and perceptions of the research 
domain. The immediacy of the conversational medium between the researcher and the 
interviewee, allow for an expeditious method of further validating survey responses, 
addressing any potential or perceived ambiguities, as well as resolving 
misunderstandings or contextual omissions (Comford and Smithson 1996).
The author’s past experience in interrogative data gathering was enhanced by 
maintaining a high level of situational awareness. This awareness proved fruitful in 
exposing physiological forms of communication that appeared contrary to spoken 
responses. When observing such a response, a particular line of questioning could be re­
phrased instantaneously, omitted, or adjusted to reflect any noticeable discomfort or 
apparent attempts to avoid a particular line of inquiry. Comford and Smithson go on to 
state that this ability, to adjust one’s line of questioning in an interview, allows the 
researcher the ability to “deal with much more complex topics than questionnaires and 
deal with topics for which different people may have very different perspectives” 
(Comford and Smithson 1996).
These perspectives can also be shaped to some extent, as the researcher can 
impose structure on the way the interview instrument is configured, and in some 
instances, use different structural parameters on the same subject. Such parameters are 
categorised as structured or unstructured interviews. Furthermore, structural parameters 
can range from:
“...the totally unstructured interview, where the interviewer merely provides the 
topic and the conversation proceeds without any planning, to the totally 
structured, where the interviewer asks only pre-prepared questions in a pre­
planned sequence, without divergence and with the minimum of explanation. 
This kind of interview may also be based on the completion of a questionnaire” 
(Comford and Smithson 1996).
There are a variety of difficulties and deficiencies inherent in the interview 
method. From a practical perspective, many are primarily logistical. Depending on the
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size and geographic distribution of the research subject, reaching interviewees can take
considerable time and effort to organise. Hierarchy plays an important part, as access to
executive level managers may be problematic due to their views on the validity of the
interview as well as time constraints. Use of a sponsor within the organisation can
mitigate both problems, as 1) they can arrange for a central location in which to conduct
interviews, and 2) provide introductions to and intercession with interviewees who
ordinarily would not speak with individuals outside the organisation, as well as providing
insight as to who may or may not be an appropriate subject. The interview process
requires considerable preparation prior to actually meeting the subject. Travel
considerations aside, there is the exponential factors of both the number of interviewees
and the number of questions the researcher intends to ask; time considerations increase
proportionately to the size of the interview sample. Lastly, there is topicality. Comford
and Smithson observe that “some interviewees may not fully understand what
information you require and, as a result, the interview rambles off into the realms of the
irrelevant”. Moreover, particularly in regards to managers and executives,
“it can be very difficult to redirect the conversation back to your intended area, 
especially if the interviewee is a senior manager.. .often, especially with busy 
managers, the interview is subject to constant interruptions, from either telephone 
calls or colleagues” (Comford and Smithson 1996).
While interviews are a useful and effective instrument in information systems 
research, we cannot, as Walsham states, “judge people’s views or attitudes solely by 
what they scry” (Walsham 2006). The data collected from the interview and questionnaire 
will be used to create a survey, which constitutes the second element of our pluralist 
approach. According to Kraemer and Dutton (1991) “survey research is both the most 
widely used and most widely questioned method in the management information systems 
(MIS) field” (Vogel and Wetherbe 1984). The use of a survey is consistent with the 
group of methods that emphasize quantitative analysis, utilising collecting mechanisms
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such as mail questionnaires, telephone interviews, or published statistics, to gather data 
for a large number of organisations, that are subsequently analysed using statistical 
techniques (Gable 1994). The goal of representative sampling is to discover relational 
commonality across organisations, thus providing grounds for reasoned assumptions 
germane to the research subject. The main advantage in the use of a survey is the ability 
to acquire opinions or data from a variety of organisations or individuals in a limited 
duration. They lend themselves well to a variety of means of distribution, such as email, 
the post, and by hand. As with interview methods, surveys also exhibit limitations and 
deficiencies, many similar in nature to those of the interview method.
For instance, there are the same considerations of time and effort. Designing an 
effective survey may involve considerable iterations, pilots and user feedback before the 
instrument can be deployed in a research setting. As with interviews, topicality is an 
issue with surveys, although different, in that surveys are predominately narrow in focus, 
and address a very clear line of inquiry, and leave little room for interpretation by the 
respondent. Sample size and subsequent poor response rates, often the result of poor 
survey design, can mitigate the effectiveness of surveys. Another is bias, which can 
result from variances, from enthusiasm to apathy, in respondents’ efforts in completing a 
survey. Surveys involving the use of a particular technology are particularly prone to 
motivational bias, as those respondents with a high degree of affinity for the technology 
being survey may respond in disproportionately higher numbers than those less disposed 
to that technology (Comford and Smithson 1996). Surveys provide no little or no 
longitudinal context to the research, and, according to Gable (1994) “often the survey 
approach provides only a "snapshot" of the situation at a certain point in time, yielding 
little information on the underlying meaning of the data. Moreover, some variables of 
interest to a researcher may not be measurable by this method (e.g. cross-sectional 
studies offer weak evidence of cause and effect)”.
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4.4 Research perspective -  the neutral, outside observer
According to Walsham, the perspective of the researcher changes over time,
assuming a spectrum of levels of involvement, as well as the different roles of inside and
outside observer. Walsham discusses this at length, observing that “an interpretivist
views these [roles] not as objective reportage, as the data collection involves the
researcher’s own subjectivity” (Walsham 2002). At one end of Walsham’s spectrum we
find the “neutral” observer, but “neutrality is not necessarily indicative of an unbiased
observer. Bias results from our own history, our contexts, our own knowledge and
prejudices in how we perceived phenomenon in certain ways, to see things in certain
ways and not others”. In this sense, Walsham takes neutral to mean:
“that the people in the field situation do not perceive the researcher as being 
aligned with a particular individual or group within the organisation, or being 
concerned with making money as consultants are for example, or having strong 
prior views of specific people, systems or processes based on previous work in 
the organisation”.
The “full action” researcher occupies the other end of the involvement spectrum 
and tries “consciously and explicitly to change things in the way that they feel best” 
(Walsham 2006). Throughout the research project, the author sought to maintain a 
neutral stance, restating to the research subjects, throughout the project’s duration, that 
the purpose of the interview and survey methods were to gather data for academic and 
not commercial purposes. Since the completion of the study, several of those previously 
interviewed as bank employees have moved to firms that market AMLPT and are 
actively seeking the author’s data for marketing purposes; such advances have been 
politely discouraged.
4.5 Data Presentation and Analysis
According to Moore and Benbasat (1991), “the measurement of potential
adopters’ perceptions of innovations has been described as a ‘classic issue in the
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innovation literature’ and a ‘potential key’ for integrating findings within diffusion 
research” (Tomatzky and Klein 1982). Rogers developed several data categorisation and 
modelling tools that will be of use in the analysis, organisation and presentation of the 
research data and findings.
Using the work of Mustonon-Ollila and Lyytinen (2003), who have developed a 
series of useful models of discrete innovation behaviour, and using those models later in 
Chapter 5, we incorporate, for comparison purposes, micro-levels of individual 
innovation into a broader description of the social system’s perceptions of relative 
advantage, as well as creating metrics for evaluating effectiveness. We return to the 
relationship of our main evaluative model, which uses determinates in the rate o f 
adoption as shown in figure 4.5.1, and associated measures of effectiveness as shown in 
table 4.5.1. Using the combined categories and attributes of diffusion of innovation and 
organisational effectiveness theories, we then created the first research instrument, the 
interview questionnaire. Further to this initial data gathering exercise, was the use of a 
general control questionnaire, which captured demographic and professional contextual 
information, such as years in banking, compliance, and education level. Both Rogers 
and Campbell are comprehensive in their categorisation schemas; Rogers, in identifying 
the attributes of innovation, and Campbell, those of organisational effectiveness. 
However, what is more difficult to discern, are the self-perceptions and psychological 
categories, relative to innovation and organisational effectiveness, entertained by the 
individual actors (Bowker and Star 1999; Star 2002; Andersen 2004). Andersen (2004) 
makes further note of the methodological challenges of “getting inside someone’s head”, 
as there is no way to independently validate what someone is thinking relative to the 
accuracy of what they articulate. The author constantly looked for subtle and instinctual 
patterns of behaviour and communication, particularly in power relationships: i.e. 
compliance manager versus an analyst. Further to this challenge, in analyzing the
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interview narratives, as well as the subject’s over-all behaviour during the research
project, (an activity Potter (1996) categorises as “talk and texts interaction”).
Variables Determining the Dependent Variable
Rate o f Adoption That is Explained
L Perceived Attributes of Innovation
1. Relative Advantage 
2  Compatibility
3. Complexity
4. Trial ability
5. Observability
IL Type of Innovation Decision
►  RATE OF ADOPTION 
OF INNOVATIONS
/. Optional
2. Collective
3. Authority
Communication Channels (e.g., mass 
media or interpersonal)
IV. Nature of the Social System 
(e.g., its norms, degree o f  network 
interconnectedness, etc.)
V. Extent of Change Agents’ Promotion Efforts
Figure 4.5.1 -  Determinates in the rate of adoption
Representative Effectiveness Attributes from  Historical 
Survey & Campbell Diffusion Attributes from  Rogers
Overall effectiveness Innovativeness
Flexibility/Adaption Compatibility
Fit Compatibility
Match
Environment Social System
Objectives/goals Relative advantage
Utilisation of Environment Compatibility
Conflict/cohesion Complexity
Achievement emphasis Relative advantage
Managerial interpersonal skills Change agency & Champions
Control Degree of Centralization
Size
Training & Development Emphasis Formalization
Degree o f specialization
Role & norm congruence Formalization
Degree o f specialization
Table 4.5.1 -  Measures of Effectiveness
This aided in ascertaining and interpreting any additional tacit categorisation or 
meanings not articulated in the interviews, as well as identifying behavioural norms
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counter to the answers given on the questionnaire (Maitlis and Lawrence 2003; Balogun 
and Johnson 2004; Maitlis 2005).
4.6 Unit o f Analysis -  Compliance Officers and MLROs in the City o f London
The interviews and survey were conducted across a sample of 3 Large Scale
Retail Banks (LSRB), 3 Medium Scale Retail Banks (MSRB), 1 Large Scale
Commercial Bank (LSCB), 1 Large Scale Investment Bank (LSIB), and 1 Foreign
Exchange House (FOREX). While bankers and other financial professionals possess
their own unique culture on a macro level, (even more so at the micro-level, depending
on their particular expertise), they all are discrete entities within an organisational social
system. Organisations are polymorphic abstractions, and pose unique challenges in
interpreting their composition, norms and other meanings.
Furthermore, depending on the discipline, they can be described in a variety of
ways, further complicating the choice(s) of methodology in their study (Moore and
Benbasat 1991; Orlikowski 2000; Mingers 2001). To ensure theoretical continuity, we
refer again to Rogers (1995; 2003) definition of an organisation as a:
“...stable system of individuals who work together to achieve common goals 
through a hierarchy of ranks and a division of labour. Organisations are created to 
handle large-scale routine takes through a pattern of regularized human 
relationships. Their efficiency as a means of orchestrating human endeavours is 
in part due to this stability, which stems from the relatively high degree of 
structure that is imposed on communication patterns”.
From an organisational standpoint, the research domain is shaped by the 
compliance group (cohort), or in some instances, the anti-money laundering (AML) 
enforcement unit or group; for purposes of consistency, we will use the social system 
categorisation of compliance group (the “organisation”) when referring to the AML-CFT 
function within the larger institutional context (the “institution”). Depending on the size 
of the compliance group, there may be several levels of compliance officer, but in all 
cases, there is a single Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO), and all are
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typically supported by a team of analysts, technical and systems specialists. Compliance 
duties were similar in all instances across the survey sample, with minor differences 
accounted for within both AML regulatory requirements and standard compliance 
practice and grounded in commercial considerations.
For instance, in the case of the Large Scale Investment Bank, they maintain a 
private client banking practice, and subsequently, use personalised “know your 
customer” due diligence procedures at the individual banker level, rather than largely 
automating the process as is the case in the Large Scale Retail Bank (LSRB). We did not 
include branch or sub-unit compliance functions, as 1) several banks insisted in vetting 
the author at each branch and sub-unit, which is a time-intensive process that would have 
prolonged the research project; 2) the exponential size in the survey sample that would 
have resulted from branch and sub-units, given that the LSRB in the sample had several 
hundred branch offices in the greater London area alone. Two of the research subjects 
required vetting of the author, and all mandated anonymity. The subject’s request for 
anonymity may be counter to ideas of academic freedom (Robey 1996), but this was 
understandable, given the highly sensitive nature of compliance work, such as the 
handling and security of large volumes of customer and commercial data, and the 
relationship with legal and national security authorities. The author received a great deal 
of cooperation in the execution of this project, due much in part to relationships forged at 
several conferences and professional meetings.
4.7 Data Collection
The data collection methods in this project employed a combination of structured 
and unstructured interviews and a questionnaire, from which a survey on innovation 
adoption and effectiveness attributes was developed. As previously discussed, 
interpretive research may utilise quantitative or qualitative methods, or even a
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combination of both, as argued by a variety of scholars, such as Mingers (2001; 2003), 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991; 2000), as well as Kaplan and Duchon (1988).
The two methods differ not only regarding the collection tools used, but also 
regarding the type of analysis that they enable. This research project utilises qualitative 
data collection tools that, given the complexities within compliance organisations and the 
AMLPT artefact itself, are particularly suited for research requiring behavioural 
interpretation and understanding of the phenomenon holistically. This results in detailed 
descriptions of the individual members of the social system and their environment 
(Creswell 1998; 2003).
The primary data sources comprise the interview, questionnaire and survey. 
Lastly, as mentioned in the dissertation’s introduction, the data collection phase of the 
project, and subsequent documentation of the findings, spanned a longer-than expected 
timeframe. The field work was accomplished from December of 2004 to August o f2006; 
the completed dissertation was submitted in April of 2010.
4.7.1 Secondary Data Collection
Secondary data sources draw on two literature-based case studies for contextual 
understanding, as well as documents and other domain artefacts such as data schemas 
and internal process documents. Therefore, given the breadth of material drawn from 
both sources, the author is confident that the data therein reflects a thorough examination 
of the subject phenomenon (Eisenhardt 1989).
In Chapter 2, we discussed the historical trajectory of the legal and socio- 
institutional motivations responsible for the rapid adoption of AMLPT. We further 
examined the subsequent expansion of regulatory oversight, through the threefold 
hierarchy of trans-national, national, and local regulatory bodies and organisations 
(Angell and Demetis 2005). We provided two case studies, the first of which addresses
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the complexities and inconsistencies inherent within the trans-national compliance 
regime, through a study of the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) imposition of 
sanctions on The Cayman Islands, for “non-compliance,” relative to the FATF’s Forty 
Recommendations.
The second case study described the phenomenon of money laundering, through 
an examination of the Brinks-Mat gold theft in 1986. The Brinks-Mat case illustrates the 
complexity of a sophisticated laundering operation, as well as the various roles of those 
involved and included a typological comparison of the stages that comprise a money 
laundering cycle, as determined by practitioners and law enforcement. Lastly, given that 
the Brinks-Mat case was exposed primarily through human investigation rather than any 
automation, the case study raises a variety of questions as to the necessity of the use of 
sophisticated and costly AMLPT.
Further secondary data sources included AML-CFT policy and procedure 
documents, graphical user interface representations of AMLPT schemas and profile 
monitoring, as well as training and support materials. Analysis of these materials 
provided significant contextual understanding of the process and workflow norms of 
day-to-day affairs within the compliance groups under study, as well as a means to 
compare processes and techniques across the cohort (Saunders, Thornhill et al. 2007). 
Specific insights from secondary data analysis illuminated categorical attributes for 
refining innovativeness and effectiveness attributes, as well as comprehension of the 
automation of AMLPT processes beyond those of behavioural profiling.
A cross section of secondary data sources is provided in table 4.7.1.1. Several 
scholars of research methods have stated that a bias may occur in the initial stages of 
data collection, primarily a result of the way it is prepared and coded (Stewart and 
Kamins 1993; Saunders, Thornhill et al. 2007). Given the intent of this research, and the 
need to contextualise the meaning and use of a variety of compliance phenomenon, as
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well the paucity of domain knowledge in the literature at the time of the study, we accept 
the risk of bias. In acknowledging the potential for bias, we further submit that 
documentary evidence is not necessarily evidence of MLRO and compliance 
organisation practice. The next stage of the data collection process was incorporating the 
analysis of the secondary data sources with that of the data collected through the primary 
data collection process.
Sou rce A rtefa ct T yp e
Physical
•  AML-CFT Compliance Policies & Procedures Manual
•  KYC-SAR Reporting Procedures
• Suspicious Activity Reporting form (minor variances per firm)
•  Check-lists and abbreviated references for team members
• Desktop AML references for tellers, brokers & customer service
• Training materials for Compliance team and customer service
Electronic Screen-shot
• User-interface schemas for AML-KYC process monitoring
• Politically exposed person (“PEP ”) monitoring
•  Desktop KYC data capture for new accounts
•  Profile data capture (proprietary and vendor generated)
•  Sample profiling process and “dashboard" use
Table 4.7.1.1 -  Secondary Data Collection Sources
4.7.2 Primary data collection tools
The primary data collection process involved two stages. Stage one consisted of 
two discrete parts: the first of which consisted of formalising the analysis of the 
secondary data sources and creating a sub-set of questions that were then incorporated 
into a comprehensive questionnaire. This process was then followed by a series of 
unstructured interviews. It should be noted here that, given the amount of time that had 
elapsed between the initial research proposal to the start of formal data collection, the 
author had developed several collegial relationships among those receptive to the study. 
These relationships facilitated a series of ongoing conversations topical to the research
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subject matter, and this a priori knowledge significantly enhanced the content and 
contextual understanding of the author’s structured and unstructured interviews.
Following methods suggested by Bell (2005), the questionnaire was piloted 
through several iterations, using the study sample of compliance professionals. 
Participant feedback from the pilot included reducing the number of questions to 
improve the response rate (DeVaus 2002; Edwards, Roberts et al. 2002), along with 
improving the coherence of the questions (Fink 2003; Saunders, Thornhill et al. 2007), 
so as to avoid antagonizing participants in general (Walsham 2006). The pilot 
questionnaire was then formalized for use in part two, the structured interview process. 
The semi-structured interviews comprised a generalised catalogue of topics and specific 
lines of inquiry depending on the context of interviewee’s role.
Using a style of open-ended questioning developed by the author from past 
consulting work, the semi-structured interviews provided a relaxed means of rich data 
collection, as well as providing the subject an opportunity to further develop their 
responses. Once completed, the voice recordings, (where applicable), from both sets of 
interviews were then transcribed. The data collection benefits aside, the process of 
refining the questionnaire was helpful in reducing the time in preparing the formal 
survey instrument; table 4.7.2.1 illustrates the breakdown of the interview participants:
Role Project Participants Unstructured Structured
Head of Compliance 6 4 2
Compliance Officer 2 2 2
MLROs 6 6 6
AML Analyst 7 3 4
Audit & Compliance 3 - 3
Multi-role 2 - 2
Table 4.7.2.1 -  Breakdown of Interview participants by role and interview type
It should be noted that semi-structured interviews incur a higher chance of 
reliability issues, given the probability of different researchers drawing different
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conclusions from the same interview data (Moore and Benbasat 1991; Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe et al. 2002). Furthermore, there is the reluctance of an interviewee to provide 
further data or to appear ignorant of the subject matter, as well as articulating subtle, off- 
topic biases about the topic (Comford and Smithson 1996; Saunders, Thornhill et al. 
2007). Yin (2003) notes that the researcher should be aware that semi-structured 
interviews pose difficulties in attempting to draw generalisations from general 
population data. This is also the case in this study, as the entire interview sample is far 
less than the population of compliance officers in the City of London. Subsequently, 
while it is not possible to generalise from this study to compliance officers in the City of 
London in general, we may still make generalisations from the research sample.
The structured interviews comprised an interviewer-administered questionnaire, 
based on questions refined from the pilot, using identical content for all the subjects. The 
literature identifies the main disadvantage of interviewer-administered, rather than self­
administered questionnaires, as that respondents may be inclined to select a response 
more to the liking of the interviewer rather than the correct answer (Fink 2003). The 
author, given his existing relationships with the many of the subjects, believed the 
immediacy of an interviewer-administered questionnaire mitigated this concern, and as 
Saunders, Lewis et al. (2007) state, interviewer-administered questionnaires are a 
“suitable method [of interviewing] due to the increased response rate of this method and 
the ability to route different subgroups of respondents”. This method also accounts for 
the inevitable requirement to simplify obtuse or ambiguous questions (Oppenheim 2002). 
The survey questions were drawn from the secondary data collection exercise, and 
extrapolate certain productive lines of inquiry identified in the structured interviews, as 
well as utilising new questions.
In addition to the secondary data sources, the survey questions of AMLPT 
effectiveness emerged from the research foundation described in the previous chapter.
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This foundation enabled further understanding of the cause and effect relationships 
between the respondents’ stated perceptions of innovation attributes such as relative 
advantage and their applicability in measuring AMLPT effectiveness, in support of the 
compliance function. Investigating this link between opinions and behaviours is also in 
line with Ciborra’s (1999c; 2001) entreaty for researchers to scrutinize perceptions, 
moods and emotions among individual members of a social system.
Rather than attempt a large-scale survey, the author felt it more practical to 
approach compliance colleagues, which were primarily senior managers or heads of 
compliance, whose responsibilities included an AML-CFT component. From these initial 
contacts, the author selected a small sample from a variety of financial institutions, 
following a non-probabilistic sampling method: purposive sampling. Given the small 
sample size, and our interest in understanding specific phenomenon in great detail, 
purposive sampling is suitable for survey-based studies (Saunders, Thornhill et al. 2007). 
To enhance the rigor of the survey, we called on several of Patton’s survey axioms, the 
first of which is that 1) the selection of specific units for the exercise is dependent on the 
research’s objectives; 2) the researcher should strive for maximum variation within a 
homogeneous sample; and 3), while the survey sample in our case is unlikely 
representative of compliance officers and MLROs in general, the survey data should 
assist the researcher in documenting uniqueness and emerging themes (Patton 1990).
The survey was divided into three parts. Part one consisted of 15 questions, based 
on a 5-point Likert scale (Judd, Smith et al. 1991; Corbetta 2003). Each question defined 
a particularly characteristic of AMLPT innovation, as well as measuring individual 
perceptions of innovativeness and receptivity to adoption of AMLPT. Part two consisted 
of 10, 5-point Likert scale-based questions, addressing measures of organisational 
effectiveness as a result of the adoption of AMLPT. Part three consisted of 5 questions 
regarding job category and demographic information from the survey respondents. The
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survey was distributed both in person and electronically, via a centralised web-based 
interactive form.
The author was fortunate to have achieved a 100% response rate, with no 
question left unanswered. When coupled with the author’s past experiences in 
consultancy, which is highly dependent on participative and interpretive methods, the 
survey and secondary sources provided a rich, in-depth understanding of innovativeness 
and organisational effectiveness among the compliance organisations surveyed. While 
not exclusively utilising the “insider” perspective (Walsham 1995; 2006), the project 
called upon the researcher’s skills of observation, as well as the systematic recording of 
descriptions and narratives, to interpret and analyse the behaviour and norms of the 
survey sample. The use of observation throughout the research process provided clarity 
as to the differences in what activities individuals actually undertake (Stewart and 
Kamins 1993) rather than their articulated perceptions of action. Additionally, 
observational acuity allows the researcher additional familiarity as to the respondents’ 
context (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007).
4.8 Conclusion
We undertook this research to measure the effectiveness of AMLPT in supporting 
the roles of compliance manager and MLRO in a banking context. A variety of scholars 
in fields such diffusion research, organisational effectiveness, and information systems 
have all acknowledged the inherent difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of 
technology. Instead, we chose to attempt to measure effectiveness through the lens of 
Roger’s attributes of innovation, which can be quantified through indicators derived 
from theory.
Therefore, the primary theoretical grounding of this dissertation is Diffusion o f  
Innovation theory, (with its antecedents in communication theory), as expounded by
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Everett M. Rogers (1962; 1983; 1995; 2003). We chose diffusion of innovation theory 
for several important reasons:
• The theory’s use of individual and organisational behavioural categories, as well 
as a means to classify and identify the communication of those behaviours;
• The author’s experience within a variety of contexts involving technology 
adoption and use by individuals and organisations in general;
• The unique dimension of time as a core theoretical element in diffusion of 
innovation theory. While banks have used some form of automated SAR 
processing for some years, the rapid adoption of AMLPT, and the concurrent 
expansion of legal and regulatory requirements, necessitated a method to quantify 
this accelerated rate of adoption and the subsequent impact on the extent 
compliance environment;
• The theoretical alignment with organisational effectiveness theory, our secondary 
theoretical foundation.
The use of organisational effectiveness theory, with its roots in organisation 
theory, provided a further means of understanding how environment and the composition 
of an organisation influence an organisation’s relationship with technology, as well as 
the norms, behaviours and processes it may develop in mediating that relationship.
Specific to the use of organisational effectiveness theory, was the linear 
emergence of effectiveness criteria, particularly through the work of Lewin and Minton 
(1986), Campbell (1977), Cameron (Cameron and Whetten 1981; 1986; 1986; 1986), as 
well as derivative work by Orlikowski (Orlikowski and Robey 1991a; 1992; 2000), that 
addresses the relationship between organisations and technology. While both theories 
have their origins in different fields, both theoretical lenses provide not only 
complementary but also compatible methods and techniques to evaluate the 
phenomenon. Lastly, the descriptive, and therefore subjective nature of both theoretical 
fields, accommodates a hermeneutic method in analysing the phenomenon under study.
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Chapter 5. Fieldwork
This chapter describes the result of analysing responses to questions concerning 
the effectiveness of AMLPT in supporting the compliance function within a small 
sample of banks in the City of London. The sample cohort was drawn from a variety of 
compliance professionals: heads of compliance, compliance officers, money laundering 
reporting officers, money laundering analysts, audit and compliance personnel, and 
systems and technical members of staff (“multi-role” employees). All members of the 
cohort had a minimum level of three years or more in their role, and represent 
compliance organisations in large-scale retail banking (LSRB), medium-scale retail 
banking (MSRB), large-scale commercial banking (LSCB), large-scale investment 
banking (LSIB), and foreign-exchange banking (FOREX).
The following sections present the data collected in the survey. The first section 
is a representative synopsis of the typical money laundering detection processes evident 
among the cohort. The remaining sections present the data as collected per the 
methodology outlined in Chapter 4, as well as summarising the salient empirical findings 
as to the efficacy of AMLPT in support of compliance professionals.
5.1 Money Laundering Detection in Banks in the City o f London
This section discusses the typical cohort compliance organisation’s processes, 
procedures and tools used in the detection of money laundering. For purposes of 
analysis, cohort compliance organisations may also be referred to simply as an 
“organisation” or “organisations”; the use of “institution” represents the bank as a whole, 
unless otherwise noted. Organisations represented by the cohort exhibited some 
differences in their approach to detection, usually in the reporting hierarchy or technical 
methods deployed; however, given the legal and regulatory reporting structures required 
by the Financial Services Authority, the basic output from AMLPT, in the form of
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suspicious activity reporting, watch list maintenance, and other responses to “flagged” 
accounts or other detected anomalies, was relatively uniform across the cohort. Except 
for the LSIB and FOREX, the remaining institutions all maintain extensive branch-level 
reporting structures that then roll-up to the compliance organisation at the headquarters 
level.
The level of products and services provided by the cohort varied based on the 
institution’s respective market niche. The LSRB and MSRB’s services typically 
involved, at a minimum, provision for current accounts, savings, automated teller 
machines (ATM), personal and mortgage loans, and pension-related products. They also 
engage with other third-party providers of credit-cards, insurance and brokerage 
products. The LSCB’s services included the provision of consumer and business credit as 
well as intermediary functions such as payment clearance. LSIB services included 
traditional financial advisory services such as mergers & acquisition advice, securities 
underwriting and asset management. The FOREX house in the cohort specialises in 
currency conversion and international payments and settlements.
5.2 Description o f the AML Compliance Function
Within the organisations represented in the cohort, the AML function is found 
within the compliance group, usually directed by a money laundering reporting officer 
(MLRO), supported by money laundering analysts, and technical and systems support 
personnel. The 1986 Financial Services Act established “compliance” officer as a unique 
role relative to the specific policing of, at that time, irregularities in shares trading. The 
creation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 1997, included one of its four 
stated aims as “tackling money laundering”, and as a result, formalised the AML 
function in financial institutions, and also further clarified the role of MLRO. The events 
of 9/11 subsequently broadened the AML remit, to also include countering the financing
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of terrorism (CFT). Given the volume of transactions now falling into the review 
process, the introduction of automated behavioural profiling systems was spurred by the 
need to more accurately identify suspicious transactions beyond those identified through 
manual SAR processes. Prior to 9/11, cohort organisations maintained a relatively 
relaxed approach to countering money laundering, which reflected the over-all 
ambivalence towards the subject among financial institutions across the United 
Kingdom. This relaxed approach is reflected in the following comments by a head of 
compliance:
“I ’ve been doing this [compliance] since 1994. Back then, “AM L” as a term 
didn’t really exist in my vocabulary, we just talked about “money laundering, ” 
and even then, it was just something on the list o f  things to look for in our 
compliance list - really nothing more than one more box to tick until the FSA 
came into the picture... When we did get audited, the FSA would use their list, 
and as long as their list looked to match ours, we were ok. So basically, our job  
in compliance was to make sure we met the FSA requirements more so than 
anything having to do with catching a money launderer. ” [Head of Compliance, 
LSRB]
The post-9/11 compliance environment reflected a concerted effort by the FSA to 
enforce money laundering regulations more rigorously. Between December of 2002 and 
September of 2004, the FSA issued £5,345,750.00 in fines to 5 top-tier banks:
Financial Institution Fine Amount Date
Abbey National Companies £2,320,000 10 Dec 2003
Bank of Ireland $375,000 2 Sept 2004
Bank of Scotland Pic. £1,250,000 15 Jan 2004
Northern Bank £1,250,000 7 Aug 2003
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich $150,000 6 Apr 2004
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) Pic. $350,000 17 Dec 2002
Table 5.1.1 -  Early regime fines to institutions (FSA 2003)
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These fines significantly altered the priorities of compliance groups throughout 
the industry, as much from the negative media exposure as the regulatory ramifications; 
indeed, the media attention would be somewhat quantified as “reputational risk,” as 
mentioned in section 2.7’s discussion of risk-based compliance. One of the survey 
participants, an MLRO, was at a bank that received one of the more substantial fines, 
stating that:
“We were in shock really; I  mean, pretty much all o f us in the group thought o f  
the FSA process as being a paper exercise, and as long as we could show we had 
a manual, and someone who could talk intelligently about the thing [AML], we 
were sorted; we didn’t really have a whole lot o f  staff assigned to AML duties, 
when I  think about it. My head o f staff got the chop, and then the next head o f 
department made sure it became all about the fine. Everything we did from there 
on out was to avoid a fine, rather than anything that could be described as 
proactively trying to prevent dodgy money coming in. ” [MLRO, MSRB]
The entire cohort expressed the same problems with resourcing the AML
department, as well as observing a general inclination towards “working to the
regulation”, rather than purposely going above and beyond those measures required by
existing SAR and KYC procedures. A common theme in the interviews was the ongoing
fear resulting from the FSA’s punitive approach to regulatory enforcement, as well as the
exponential volume of SARs being generated in response in fear of FSA sanctions, rather
than actual money laundering.
23 of the 26 survey respondents cited these fears as their firm’s motivation for
purchasing AMLPT or developing it in house. A money laundering analyst from the
LSRB sums up this common motivation:
“We did some analysis in, I  think, late 2003, or early 2004, and our SAR filings 
had increased by 650%. As we basically used a manual process, it was almost 
impossible to try and extract any kind o f meaningful data from them, and the FSA 
was getting more demanding about their content -  what the SARs were telling us. 
I f  we didn't automate the process, we’d  soon get to the point where all we were 
doing is processing SARs at the expense o f our other duties. ” [ML Analyst 
LSRB]
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The adoption of innovation in the survey cohort exhibited varying rates o f  
adoption, and was primarily incremental in nature. However, given the oft-expressed 
FSA-induced motivation for the adoption of AMLPT, it may also be categorised as 
preventive innovation. Roger’s describes preventative innovation as a “new idea that an 
individual adopts now in order to lower the probability of some unwanted future event” 
(Rogers 2003). In this case, the unwanted future event is twofold in nature: 1) that the 
organisation fails to identify a laundering transaction; and 2) FSA sanctions. As the 
organisations went through the trial period of adopting AMLPT, it was clear to the 
cohort that the probability of detection would soon increase, while fear of FSA sanctions 
would be alleviated to some extent. As AMLPT champions emerged during the trial 
period, competence in cohort organisations increased commensurately, as observability 
and homophily among the compliance organisation highlighted AMLPT’s potential. 
Moreover, the high level of homophily allowed for greater clarity and routinization in the 
use of AMLPT’s, once the trial was complete.
The innovation matching process among cohort organisations, varied based on 
the size of the organisation, as well as the perceived need to implement dedicated 
resources in support of AMLPT. At the beginning of the research project, the entire 
cohort had some form of automated compliance process in place, such as Politically 
Exposed Person (“PEP”) watch lists, SAR transaction reporting and monitoring, and in 
the case of the LSRB, MSRB, and LSCB, some rudimentary automated profiling tools.
The ability of larger organisations to adopt first-generation forms of behavioural
profiling tools was more a function of the existence of large IT support organisations and
large data stores, than any dogmatic philosophical belief. The need to introduce
automation, the result of an ever-increasing workload, as well as the emergence of the
need for dedicated AML-CFT staff, caused the entire survey cohort to re-organise their
respective compliance groups to maximise resources and expertise. In the majority of
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cases, this involved simply assigning new titles or responsibility, or changes in reporting 
line. The typical compliance organisation is represented in figure 5.2.1:
ML Analyst ML Analyst
Legal-Regulatory Audit Operations
ML Analyst
IT/Systems
Support
Head of 
Compliance
Compliance MLRO
Figure 5.2.1 -  Typical survey cohort compliance organisation reporting structure.
As expertise in the AML process improved through the process of routinization,
cohort respondents indicated that informal relationships among other banks became more
formalised. While detection expertise remained relatively static, AML process
improvements spurred inter and intra-institutional communication, resulting in increased
exchanges of practice knowledge, as well as improved relationships with not only the
FSA, but also other regulators and law enforcement agencies, such as the National
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Furthermore, financial intelligence units (FIUs)
within the banking community, and also at the national level, became more intrinsically
interconnected as a result of the improved analysis afforded the cohort through the
deployment of AMLPT. One MLRO observed:
“Before we automated, everything was very serial. We’d  get a SAR from some 
external source, like the NCIS, or internally, from a branch, or those w e’d  
generate, and we would investigate it, act on it, and just forward it on; we never 
did this simultaneously, as we didn’t have the manpower or a process in place. 
The nice thing about using [AMLPT] is it centralises things for us, and we can
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then also be proactive back to the authorities, the FSA -  whoever -  about a 
particular client, or localised behaviour. ” [MLRO MSRB]
Internal communication improved as well per the cohort. Heterophilous diffusion 
of AMLPT began within the compliance group. For instance, a fraud investigator might 
detect behaviour indicative of money laundering, and rather than simply file a SAR, they 
would now actively forward the SAR with contextual information based on their original 
suspicion of fraud. In the instance of LSRB, LSIB, and MSRB, the analytical capability 
of AMLPT was used to mine existing marketing databases, from which a variety of 
demographic information could be derived as to transaction patterns, or customer locale 
relative to higher rates of SAR generation, all of which can be mined to create a profile 
of a customer’s financial behaviour. Cohort members also stated they derived a relative 
advantage in status. Marketing staff and investment product managers from within 
cohort banks actively sought out cohort staff, to inquire as to the legality and compliance 
of new service offerings, rather than expose their organisations to potential adverse 
effects from ill-conceived product launches. Prior to the use of AMLPT and other 
automated methods, cohort members stated that such was the nature of the volume of 
manually processed SAR and KYC information, that they could never have entertained 
such cross-organisational relationships.
5.3 Innovation within the Compliance Organisation
While line-of-business responsibility for AML-CFT compliance procedures fell
under the aegis of the Head of Compliance, primary responsibility lay with the MLRO
unit, headed by the money laundering reporting officer. In the case of the LSIB and
FOREX organisation, the titular role was that of compliance officer, with the primary
duty of MLRO. Figure 5.3.1 represents the staff and role configuration identified in the
structured interviews; the column on the far left identifies the cohort, and then reading
from left to right, the staffing level and responsibilities. The top level organisational
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matrix frames the over-all reporting structure of the typical cohort MLRO unit. Over the
course of the study, the FOREX cohort experienced some disruption within their MLRO
unit, as their business was being acquired by a larger foreign exchange company. This
resulted in the consolidation of roles among the audit, training, and FIU liaison functions
reflected in figure 5.3.1; this consolidation was a frustrating process, as is evident in the
quote from one of their money laundering analysts:
“Our work load was incredible. The FSA had just released new guidelines on 
MSBs [money service bureaus], where a good deal o f  our business takes place. 
Not only were we having to learn how (...) ran compliance, we had to re-jig our 
whole KYC game for the MSB regulations and prepare for a &***** FSA 
audit... they always seem to drop in at the wrong time. ” [ML Analyst FOREX]
The average MLRO unit consisted of 14 staff, spread across the various functions
as determined by the cohort institution’s business needs. The policy units tend to be
staffed more than other areas, primarily a result of the ever-changing regulatory climate,
especially in the early days of the post-9/11AML-CFT regime:
“It seemed like we got a new ruling on the most silliest o f things sometimes two, 
three times a day. My staff were swamped for while, just keeping up on all the 
p u ff the FSA and the Americans were churning out, almost as a matter o f  course, 
rather than anything o f use. I  saw amendments to one particular regulation 
appear something like 5 times in 3 days. It was all just so silly — bonkers really; 
we just pressed on ...” [MLRO LSIB]
The MLRO is responsible for setting the “tone” or culture of the compliance 
organisation, and serves as champion for new ideas. The MLRO in all cohorts was 
identified as an early adopter of AMLPT, and in one case, an innovator, as he had a 
technical background and had developed a rudimentary profiling application in 1998 
(Cohort adoption categories are further detailed in section 6.3). The MLRO serves as a 
communication channel in the diffusion of AMLPT innovation, both within and external 
to the compliance social system. The MLRO participates in steering committees, 
professional organisations, and other policy-setting bodies, and may serve as a change 
agent to other compliance or audit functions external to their organisation.
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This change agent role is particularly important, as given the high profile of 
AML post-9/11, mitigating the reputational risk of the entire institutional social system is 
a holistic responsibility of all the institution’s members, not just those in the compliance 
organisation.
MLRO
IT/Systems
Support
LSRB
MSRB
LSCB
LSIB
FOREX
Wholesale LOB 
Policy 
4 Staff
Retail LOB 
Policy 
5 Staff
Analysis & 
Intelligence 
7 Staff
Audit& Training 
3 Staff
FIU & Regulatory 
Liaison 
1 Staff
W holesale LOB 
Policy 
2 Staff
Retail LOB 
Policy 
3 Staff
Analysis & 
Intelligence 
4 Staff
Audit& Training 
2 Staff
FIU a  Regulatory 
Liaison 
1 Staff
Commercial LOB 
Policy 
8 Staff
Loan Syndication; 
Intermediary LOB 
Policy 
6 Staff
Analysis a  
Intelligence 
8 Staff
Audit a Training 
4 Staff
FIU a  Regulatory 
Liaison 
1 Staff
M a A, Risk; Private 
Client LOB Policy 
6 Staff
institutional 
Intermediary LOB 
Policy 
7 Staff
Analysis a 
Intelligence 
5 Staff
Audit a  Training 
3 Staff
FIU a Regulatory 
Liaison 
1 Staff
Payment 
Processing LOB 
Policy 
3 Staff
Currency/MSB LOB 
Policy 
4  Staff
Analysis a  
Intelligence 
1 Staff
Audit, Training, FIU 
Liaison 
1 Staff
Figure 5.3.1 -  Roles and staff levels in cohort organisations.
To those members of the social system not familiar with the nuances of money 
laundering, it is usually perceived more as fraud-related activity, given the potential 
financial losses the institution incurs from money laundering, fraud and fines; 
subsequently, the MLRO is tasked with shaping the nature of the social system as to its 
receptivity of AML-CFT as a discrete phenomenon and not simply fraud by another 
name.
In analysing the MLRO social system, the top-down nature of the social system’s 
structure results in predominance of authority innovation-decisions, and given the 
homophilous nature of the social system’s goals and values, authority innovation-
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decisions are normally met favourably. Figure 5.3.1 shows that, while roles may change,
the social system’s structure remains constant. In the case of the LSRB and MSRB,
which maintain a higher proportion of consumer banking services, the policy unit reflects
this retail-focussed reality. Conversely, the LSCB and LSIB, with their emphasis on
commercial and institutional banking, reflect this in their staffing considerations in risk,
mergers and acquisitions, and other market-specific policy areas.
Role specialisation was high among the cohort, in not only profiling, but also in
monitoring new and amended regulations and advisories, and a logical response to need
for regulation and policy dissemination internally and externally to the social system.
Along with MLROs, the audit and training staff act both as change agents and
champions. They are tasked with maintaining organisational efficiency through
education and professional development, and also undertake internal auditing and
monitoring of the compliance organisation; subsequently, they are also in a position to
advocate for the MLRO, for example, in the adoption of new work practices, along with
influencing the innovation-decision process, as is evident in the following observation by
a cohort compliance manager:
“My group was a bit in the dumps early days, as we were just swamped with 
audits, rule making and visits by higher-ups, all worried that w e’d  get one o f  
those huge fines w e’d been hearing about. I  rallied the training staff and got them 
to help me sell my plans for automation through shifting my team’s perception o f 
the IT. They ’d  always thought it [IT] was a way to keep tabs on them, rather than 
make their job easier. I  also implemented a bonus structure that partially was 
tied to IT  competency, and that really made acceptance o f the behavioural stuff 
[AMLPT], when we first piloted it, a non-issue. ” [Compliance manager MSRB]
The use of training, throughout cohort organisations, was crucial in the
persuasion phase of adopting AMLPT, as well as increasing its over-all rate o f adoption.
Moreover, the use of face-to-face training, in supplementing computer-based training
(CBT), was another significant factor, as it allowed for a more favourable AMLPT
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piloting process for early adopters. Analysts, much like the MLRO, are not only early
adopters, but also re-innovators.
As the analysts are the primary users of AMLPT, they are responsible for
AMLPT’s sustainability and routinization, and for re-inventing the technology to meet
external innovation in the form of new money laundering methods and behaviours. They
are the boundary spanners within the social system, as well as another communication
channel to those external to the social system’.
“The more we understood how profiling works, the more we embraced it. The 
data analysis options were pretty limitless, as the MLRO could come see me, 
explain some certain behaviour the fraud staff had identified, and I ’d  just run-up 
a quick piece o f SQL code and see what it [AMLPT] told us... it was brilliant. 
When we started cross-mining [pulling data in from other bank data sources, such 
as marketing and investment customers] we got really good at predicting what 
branches would be more susceptible to a particular type o f laundering or card 
scam or whatever. ” [ML Analyst LSRB]
5.4 The Money Laundering Detection Process within the Survey Cohort
Given the pervasive regulatory oversight of the compliance social system, it is not 
surprising that the techniques, processes, and organisational norms demonstrated by the 
cohort organisations were all similar in nature, differing only in measures specific to 
their market segments. The application of regulations to practice, is through adherence to 
guidance from the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) (Herridge 2007), a 
consortia formed from members of the British Banker’s Association (BBA)11, whose 
extensive guidelines comprise the baseline performance standard demanded by the FSA 
(FSA 2008). At the heart of the JMLSG guidelines, a result of The Money Laundering 
Regulations 2007 is the entry into law of the risk-based approach, as discussed in detail 
in section 2.7. Subsequently, cohort AML-CFT efforts were focussed on the monitoring
11 The JMLSG has been producing Money Laundering Guidance for the financial sector since 1990, 
initially in conjunction with the Bank o f  England, and latterly to provide regularly updated guidance on the 
various Money Laundering Regulations in force - those laid in 1993, 2001 and 2003 (from 
www.jmlsg.org.uk).
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and detection of suspicious behaviour through automated risk analysis in the form of 
behavioural profiling. While the risk-based approach had been somewhat formalised 
since 2005, and conceptually even earlier by some early adopters, the formalisation of 
the risk-based approach provided consistent measures that alleviated some of the FSA’s 
past penchant for arbitrary auditing measures and subsequent disciplinary action.
Relative to using the risk-based approach, what emerges from the structured 
interviews is the sense that adoption of AMLPT is no longer a defensive measure; rather, 
the ability to be more analytical, and therefore more selective in defining suspicious 
transactions, has improved the probability of detecting actual money laundering. This is 
in contrast to the previous methods used by the majority of cohort MLROs, wherein the 
lack of any formal analytical process often resulted in the need to flag every transaction 
that even hinted at impropriety.
Understanding the broader nature of what constitutes suspicious behaviour, now 
allows an analyst a means to focus on individual innovation, which can then be directed 
at uncovering more subtle, discrete behavioural norms that, when individually analysed 
prior to the introduction of AMLPT, may not have spurred further analysis. Now, with 
the ability to mine additional logical links and assumptions, a richer picture of suspect 
behaviour can be gleaned more readily from seemingly unrelated behavioural factors. 
This is significant, as the social system includes not only internal innovation, but also 
external innovation in the form of new techniques and avenues employed by money 
launderers themselves. It is a classic situation of on-going re-invention and consequence 
throughout the social system, inclusive of both legitimate and illegitimate adoption 
behaviour. The following discussion illustrates the common methods used in the 
monitoring and reporting process within cohort organisations, to a level of detail that is 
germane to defining and categorising AMLPT innovation in the social system.
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5.4.1 The Monitoring Process
Monitoring refers to the process undertaken to identify suspicious behaviour 
within customer transactions across the entire institution. Those transactions that appear 
as unusual are then routed to the MLRO unit for further scrutiny. The MLRO is 
responsible for analysing every transaction alert, and, should an analyst determine a 
transaction is indeed possibly illegitimate, a suspicious activity report is generated and 
forwarded on to the national financial intelligence unit (FIU); the cohort monitoring 
process typically follows the sequence illustrated in figure 5.4.1.1. While there are 
differing actions within the monitoring process across the cohort, monitoring sequences 
within the transaction workflow remains relatively constant among cohort organisations. 
Factors such as turn-around time may vary, based on the amount of unusual transactions 
under scrutiny at any given time. For instance, external requests from the FIU, law 
enforcement, or other interested party; other determinates include normal staff absences 
due to illness and holidays, all of which create variances in processing time.
1 1IUI f 1 ' J ' ' •— '
•Customer transaction behaviour
•Type o f deposit, location, etc.
mm
- - - - - - -
•Unusual or suspicious behaviour
•Amount? Structured?
•Alert
• MLRO unit, LOB, other department (Fraud, Credit card, etc.)
}
•Suspicious behaviour validated
•SAR ppnpratpH forwarded to  national FIU
Figure 5.4.1.1 -  Monitoring process fo r  flagged  transaction
The MLRO unit constantly assesses transaction volume among the bank’s 
various business units, branches, and partners for indicators of money laundering and
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terrorist financing. Essentially a proactive task, the monitoring function is also
supplemented by external contributions from law enforcement and other compliance
organisations external to the MLRO unit. Law enforcement at both the local and national
level will irregularly report back on a successful prosecution resulting from an MLRO-
supplied SAR. The FIU’s confirmation of a SAR as genuine, although sporadic, serves to
improve not only the relationship with the authorities, but also in further refining the
pool of behavioural attributes used in developing SAR profiles. Additionally, the SAR
feedback from the FIU is one of the few clearly defined linkages between the compliance
process and actual money laundering.
Given the speculative nature of defining what is indeed suspicious, much of the
contextual understanding of criminal intent is derived from public sources, such as the
media. Several cohort members mentioned the fact they had independently investigated
potential laundering activity, for example, as a result of a news item in the press or on
television; the use of such secondary sources is described by the FOREX MLRO in an
unstructured interview:
‘77/ be on the couch watching telly, and there 7/ be a news item on some unusual 
card skimming scam at the local petrol station, and i t ’s typically through some 
method w e’ve not yet seen or that the fraud guys haven 7 yet passed-on to us. The 
geezers are always trying something new, and i t’s rare we first hear about it from  
the FSA or the coppers. ” [MLRO FOREX]
5.4.2 Developing the Behavioural Profile for use in AMLPT
In measuring the effectiveness of AMLPT in support of MLROs and compliance 
officers, a brief discussion of the monitoring process as it relates to developing the actual 
profile with AMLPT is helpful. In the last section we described the process by which a 
suspicion is transformed into a SAR, and passed on to the FIU; the analysis of those 
suspicions is where behavioural profiling becomes of use. In understanding what defines 
a suspicious or unusual transaction, versus a normal or routine movement of money, the
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context of the transaction becomes the key delineator. In section 2.5, we discussed the
problem of defining money laundering versus the legitimate movement of capital for tax
avoidance versus terrorist finance. In essence, it is a subjective dilemma, given the
infinite manifestations of criminal conduct; therefore, there is no way to operationalise
intent - the modus operandi of a launderer.
Subsequently, the abnormal profile is defined in terms of “normal”, with a
normal profile representing the typical behaviour of, for instance, a current account
customer in a retail bank. Rules are then developed from this normalised behaviour,
whereby abnormal behaviour can be contrasted or profiled, such as large withdrawals
from a newly opened account over a short period of time (referred to as “defunding”), or
the repeated use of small payments, (“structuring”) to a business in an area known for
drugs dealing or benefit fraud. Behaviour can be profiled but not consistently quantified,
for instance, in the case of legitimate flight capital; moreover, there are no models that
compliance professionals can call upon, to ensure 100% accuracy when analysing an
account’s behavioural profile against known attributes.
Thus, the main function of the MLRO unit, the analysts in particular, was to
constantly “massage” the data, re-structuring and re-defining known abnormal
behaviours against the incoming flow of newly suspect behavioural indicators:
“The hardest part o f my job is interpreting what other members o f the team see 
as suspect; while we o f course have a set o f what we call baseline indicators, 
everyone interprets them slightly differently. Using the software, I  compare and 
contrast again and again against our known suspect profiles until Ifind  the mean 
behaviour, and that’s what generates the SAR. ” [ML Analyst LSRB]
He then goes on to observe that:
“Reconciling all the different reporting vectors [groups external to the MLRO 
unit] can be horrid. We do a great job o f drilling KYC into the counter staff, so 
they ’re always the largest contributor to my work load. But, and i t’s a big but, 
there is a huge difference based on geography and ethnic mix, so counter staff in 
some areas just submit more SARs to cover their a*** so to speak. It can really 
skew my analysis, especially when benefits get paid, or around the holidays,
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when w e p ro c e ss  lo ts  o ffo re ig n  rem ittances fro m  p la c e s  like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
an d  other p la c e s  w ith  known terrorist connections. The fr a u d  team  up their inputs 
arou n d  benefits tim e too, so  i t ’s  a  huge lo t to  sort through. ” [ML Analyst LSRB]
Monitoring and profile development, when categorised as adoption behaviours, 
primarily involved the adoption attributes o f re-invention  at the individual level, and re ­
defin ing  and re-structuring  at the organisational level. Survey respondents indicated an 
immediate recognition o f  re la tive  advan tage  though the deployment o f AMLPT, and 
were able to identify significant subsequent improvements in effectiveness, details o f 
which are reviewed in the analysis contained in Chapter 6. What is further evident is that 
the so c ia l system  supports adoption o f  AMLPT, but also considers the AMLPT artefact 
as two discrete entities: the profile and resultant SAR, along with the embedded analysis 
activity throughout the entire profiling process:
“O ur ‘products, ’ i f  y o u  can ca ll them that, are the p ro file  an d  the SAR. M y  
existence is  b a se d  on ensuring that we p ro v id e  v a lid  d a ta  to  the authorities, so  we  
constan tly  analyse it, never rea lly  stopping. The SAR in a  w ay is so r t o f  a  liv in g  
th ing to us, a s  is the p ro filin g  d a ta  that kicks one out, so  the da ta  is never s ta tic  in 
the da ta  mart. We are  a lw ays m assaging it; our w ork  is an ongoing conversation  
o f  “w hat ifs?  ” [MLRO LSCB]
Figure 5.4.2.1 -  AM LPTas locus o f
Further to this observation, is the sense that the AMLPT artefact serves as a locus  
o f  innovation  (Prescott and Conger 1995), in both process and technical innovation, as 
well as in the adoption o f new organisational methods. For instance, the intelligence role
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undertaken by cohort money laundering analysts involves collating incoming data from a 
variety o f  internal and external sources; the analysts must then constantly re-invent 
different analytical methods depending on the data source and contents o f the data; figure
5.4.2.1 illustrates the locus model and its interdependencies.
Figure 5.4.2.2 represents the typical steps in the creation o f a profile as identified 
by the survey cohort. This data includes third-parties, such as brokerage houses, or in the 
case o f the foreign exchange house, money service bureaux. Retail and commercial bank 
data includes account information, customer demographics, such as occupation, age, and 
locale, as well as risk underwriting data, and other quantifiable measures that can then be 
contrasted with subjective criteria, such as perceived intent. Figure 5.4.2.3 illustrates the 
workflow o f the profile, as well as the illustrating the relationship o f certain steps to their 
discrete components. The AMLPT artefact attempts to replicate human behaviour 
through translating an algorithmic manipulation o f human or “fuzzy” behaviour into 
structured query language (SQL) calls on a catalogue o f behavioural attributes resident in 
a centralised database.
Suspicious/
Unusual
Behaviour
Filter:
Type of A ccount 
• “Personal’
Filter:
Amount 
Location 
Time span Filter.
Additional
Demographics:
• Age
•  Sex
Fulham
F alse 
Positive -
recalibrate
John  Doe 
38, The ParX 
Figure 5.4.2.2 -  Filtration sequence in profile development
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Sub-routines:
•  Watch list-PEP filtering
• Risk-based due diligence
• Automated alerts
•  FlU/NCIS/Custom data
/
1. Institutional Meta Data
Structured & Unstructured Meta 
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Processes
BATCH or REAL-TIME 
Processing
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MANAGEMENTPROFILING CASE
MANAGEMENT
REGULATORY
REPORTINGDETECTION INVESTIGATION
Analysis Module
AML Data S tore
FIU
Figure 5.4.2.3 -  Transaction monitoring workflow and discrete components (adoptedfrom
Norkom (2009)
The multi-role analyst works closely with the money laundering analyst, using 
standardised statistical and data mining techniques, to construct the relative fields within 
the data tables, which are then processed by AM LPT’s analytical “engine”.
The survey cohort identified the analytical engine as an area o f  observability, and 
it was in turn the subject o f varying levels o f re-invention, re-defining and re-structuring 
by members o f the social system. External re-innovation was usually the result o f 
vendor-supplied AMLPT being upgraded through service level agreements, as well as 
improvements in technical functionality; vendor-supplied AMLPT accounted for 4 o f the 
5 installations among cohort organisations. The FOREX cohort uses an in-house 
developed system and commercially-obtained watch-list and due diligence software.
Relative to re-invention and re-structuring o f AM LPT’s configuration, the cohort
identified the principle reason for these behaviours as staff familiarity with data mining
and expert/Al-based technology that provides AM LPT’s core analytical function. These
technologies follow the natural progression o f database development that has occurred
over the last 10 years, and is derived from advances in the business intelligence (“BI”),
172
data warehousing, and knowledge management (“KM”) disciplines. Further to 
developments in these three areas, some vendors have exploited parallel developments in 
complementary applications such as data mining, and the more AML-relevant knowledge 
discovery in databases (“KDD”) method, using modules for specific customer needs. 
These data mining technologies have converged within the market, to provide a variety 
of data repository and analysis products for use by analysts and data specialists in 
developing behavioural profiles.
In further re-structuring the profile itself, evaluative rules and behavioural 
attributes are consistently monitored for effectiveness, and discarded if they generate too 
many false positives, or fail to produce alerts altogether. However, they are not 
necessarily completely eliminated, as they can be utilised as a control in the development 
of new behavioural rules and profiling attributes. The survey cohort identified a variety 
of cognitive, routine, and evaluative norms used in constructing unique profiles through 
specific, rather than general attributes; the use of an entire or general range of available 
attributes would have proved problematic in generating meaningful data. Profiles are 
created to identify specific, rather than generalised behaviour and therefore, the profile is 
constantly subjected to a process of re-definition or re-structuring.
For instance, formalised profiling norms have evolved from data obtained from 
external sources, such as marketing or customer service, and may include an account 
holder’s occupation, marital status or specific event data, such as the date a customer 
began a relationship with the institution. Once all the data elements are collated and 
incorporated into the SQL instructions, the AMLPT engine is engaged, and a report 
generated as to the findings. From this report, the money laundering analyst than 
extrapolates any anomalies for further analysis, or generates a SAR for distribution to 
external authorities such as the FIU. The cohort group’s monitoring processes also
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includes the use of watch lists12, which are databases of known money launderers and 
politically exposed persons (PEPs). This is perhaps the least sophisticated of monitoring 
measures deployed by the cohort, and all cohort organisations use a subscription-based, 
vendor-supplied database. Connectivity of these databases with the AMLPT system is 
simple, and watch-list filtering is included in all profiling exercises.
5.5 Social System  Attributes: fo rm a l and inform al behaviours
Embedded formal norms within the cohort organisations originate from a variety
of policies, procedures and documents, as well as training methods. At the institutional
level, cohort members, except for the FOREX house, provide all newly hired employees
with guidance on identifying money laundering, as well as a reference handbook.
Counter staff receives further instruction in KYC procedures, as well as basic fraud
awareness training. The FOREX staff received individualised role-specific training,
although the FOREX MLRO acknowledge this was not as thorough as necessary, given
staffing shortages. Table 4.7.1.1 illustrates a reflective sample of the hard-copy and
electronically-sourced documents reviewed in this dissertation.
Among the cohort, content of AML-CFT awareness and policy guidelines and
publications were derived from JMLSG and FSA sources, typically in template format,
and were uniform in their content across the cohort. Electronic references were available
throughout cohort organisations, and used a single upgrade and revising process
controlled by the MRLO unit. However, it could be problematic to ensure all externally
generated regulatory guidelines were current:
“I  have eleven people assigned to policy, audit, training, and liaison (with the 
FIU), as well as my MLRO, and we still have a problem keeping up the flood o f  
FSA rules. They change all the time, especially at the end o f  the year. I  wish they 
would do a better job o f organising the rules online, as i t ’s really time consuming
12 Watch lists are dynamic lists o f  suspected launderers, terrorists, or other “persons o f  interest”, supplied 
to financial institutions by FIUs and national intelligence agencies. These lists can be updated daily in 
some instances, and the volume o f updates is proportionate to increases in regulatory demands.
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for my team to reference a particular ruling in most instances, and then, god 
forbid, i f  you’ve missed something and they audit you, you’re in for some g r ie f” 
[Head of Compliance LSRB]
The profiling process in each cohort organisation is extensively documented, and
provides a cognitive framework for developing profiles and determining appropriate
attributes, as well as guidelines for SQL query creation. Internal documents supplement
the vendor-supplied user manuals, which the cohort found to be less-than satisfactory,
and in one case, felt the vendor’s delivery of poor user documentation was deliberate:
“O f the eight analysts we have on staff, 7 have over 10 years o f database 
experience; they can write a SQL query. Yet when we were negotiating the 
contract fo r our system, the vendor was trying to sell me consulting that cost 
twice as much as the system! We said “no ” at first, but when we saw how poor 
the documentation was, we almost agreed. Then during the pilot it became real 
clear to us that we could figure it out, once the implementation techs from the 
vendor had sorted-out the network gremlins and the like. We’ve not had them 
back since... ’’ [ML Analyst, LSCB]
Documents also function to impart meaning and a sense of cohesiveness and
purpose in the MLRO unit. They emphasise the need for discretion when dealing with
customers that may be under scrutiny, as well as stressing the vital role of compliance in
maintaining the institution’s reputation, as well as that of the UK’s financial markets.
This is further reinforced by the abundance of stem warnings on internal documents,
reiterating the penalties for money laundering itself, as well as the failure to report
evidence of such activity, let alone assisting in its perpetration. All cohort members
detailed the extensive vetting procedures for compliance employment, as well as the
penalties for even the appearance of impropriety. These policies, as well as the volume
of supporting documentation used in defining formal norms, provide organisational
structure through a variety of meanings; however, informal norms contribute as well,
shaping the social system and its receptivity to innovation.
The insular nature of the compliance function, coupled with its internal
regulatory remit, all contribute to a perception of institutional isolation among
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individuals with the cohort. Throughout cohort trial periods, AMLPT’s observability and 
relative advantage heightened the perception of value of the compliance function at the 
institutional level. However, all cohort respondents indicated an atmosphere of “us 
versus them” in their external communications with the larger institutional social system, 
despite communicating the relative advantages of AMLPT. This was primarily a result 
of authority innovation-decisions in the early adoption phase of AMLPT in 3 of the 5 
cohort organisations that mandated AMLPT use (see section 3.4).
The other two cohort organisations were early majority adopters, and conflicts 
with the institution were mitigated through the use of change agency and AMLPTs 
observability, as well as compatibility with the extant goals and values of the institution’s 
social system. The author observed individual innovation through a variety of methods 
and meanings evident in the actions of cohort members, primarily in their re-invention, 
re-defining and re-structuring of individual tasks within the monitoring process, 
encompassing those of both a technical and administrative nature.
“After we had understood the place o f transaction monitoring software in our 
daily lives, we were able to recapture a lot o f time w e’d lost on managing 
documents and manual SAR reporting. It allowed us to combine and streamline 
all the duplicate advice from the regulators into one set o f  policies and 
procedures, greatly simplifying our references, as well as training new staff ” 
[MLRO MSRBJ
Informal homophilous communication was mediated through discussions on 
technique and practice, and occurs throughout cohort organisations, most often through 
training sessions, group meetings, and external participation in professional 
organisations. Several individual cohort members mentioned the value of professional 
associations in contributing to re-structuring, primarily in interpreting FSA regulations 
and reconciling them to practice. Regulators and law enforcement engage in re-invention 
on a consistent basis, formally and informally communicating newly observed methods 
of money laundering, as well as successful countermeasures. Conferences such as those
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organised by the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists, 
(ACAMS), were cited as particularly beneficial.
5.6 Effectiveness behaviours
Relative to organisational effectiveness, all cohort members stated that AMLPT
had contributed in three key areas: detection rates, turn-around time, and over-all
efficiencies in process management. Furthermore, AMLPT f i t  within the scope of the
organisations’ objectives and goals, and did not limiting organisational adaption and
flexibility. Cohort members expressed a great deal of satisfaction with these last two
effectiveness attributes in particular, stating that:
“At the time o f the 2005 London bombings, we were hit with a huge influx o f  SAR 
review requests, as all our counter-staff were paranoid about ‘Middle Eastern- 
looking people ’ with large cash deposits. We needed to tighten-up our trigger 
criteria, such as what really was ‘large, ’ and before, it would have taken months 
in Excel; with [vendor’s name], it took the process down to hours, as well as 
allowing ‘on the f l y ' modelling. We could adapt it to any situation the teller staff 
could throw at us. ” [MLRO MSRB]
As a measure of organisational effectiveness, AMLPT’s f i t  was manifest in 
several ways within the existing environment, both from a technical and organisational 
perspective. This was especially the case in the larger organisations within the cohort, as 
a result of the extent of the existing information systems infrastructure. Fit allowed a 
high degree of environmental utilisation as a further indicator of organisational 
effectiveness. The introduction of AMLPT required a minimum amount of configuration, 
along with some vendor-supplied consulting, and no hardware installation, except in the 
case of the FOREX house. In terms of complexity and cohesion, the trialability of 
AMLPT provided ample time to address the complexity of both its introduction and 
potential deployment. Cohort members stated that the complexity of AMLPT lay not in 
its technology, but more so in organising the vast amounts of data it provided and the 
resultant analytic permutations therein.
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Complexity was addressed by process modifications and training; mitigation o f 
complexity was further realised through increasing familiarity with AMLPT over time. 
M easuring effectiveness through the OE attribute o f emphasis o f achievements was 
derived from indicators obtained from the amount o f  SARs processed, detection rates, 
and other non-compliance specific indicators, such as system up-time, reliability and 
technical proficiency. Improvements in detection rates, a result o f improvements in the 
accuracy o f  SARs reporting, were the main effectiveness indicators across cohort 
organisations, as well as the most readily quantifiable (see figure 5.6.1). The OE 
effectiveness attributes o f role and norm congruence directly contributed to 
improvements in detection rates and reporting accuracy as a result o f well-developed 
training and personnel development across cohort organisations.
Org. Effectivness measures and Detection rates
Overall
effectiveness
Role & norm
Flexib & Adapt
congruen<
Training & 
Development.
1 Detection rates
Environment
Objectives/goalsControl
Utilization of
Environment
inflict/cohesion
M a n a g er ia l/ ^
interpersonal...
Achiev Emphas
Figure 5.6.1 -  Organisational effectiveness attributes as measures o f  effectiveness in improving
detection rates.
The FOREX house was lacking in formalised training, but due to staff longevity,
still enjoyed acceptable detection rates. Role and norm congruence stem from
formalised role and job descriptions that are further refined through testing and
professional certification. Furthermore, given the time involved in vetting compliance
178
personnel, there is limited staff turn-over and high job satisfaction among the cohort, 
even though there is a great deal of control exercised throughout all levels of the 
organisation, at both procedural and physical security levels.
5.7 Key Findings
Through structured and unstructured interviews, document analysis, observed 
behaviour, and survey results, three key conclusions emerge from the study. The first is 
that, while innovation is a constant theme within the use of AMLPT, it does not mitigate 
the inherent ambiguity of the behavioural profiling exercise. Profiles are rarely derived 
from empirical sources, nor is there a uniform definition of money laundering across 
cohort organisations, or for that matter the banking industry as a whole. What can be 
construed as “definitions” are relational, rather than exacting and thus qualitatively 
measured; subsequently, innovation occurs in response to these ambiguities and attempts 
to bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative processes and subsequent 
measures of effectiveness.
Second, all manner of innovation behaviours and attributes manifested 
themselves, primarily those of re-invention at the individual level, and re-defining and 
re-structuring at the organisational level. Furthermore, the organisational adoption 
process of AMLPT, as well as that of the five states of the innovation-decision process, 
followed Rogers’ continuums with some examples of linear deviation. Moreover, the 
AMLPT artefact serves as a catalyst, a locus of innovation, in both technical and 
administrative functions within the social system. Third, AMLPT improved 
organisational effectiveness throughout the social system at both individual and 
organisational levels, as defined by the combined organisational effectiveness and 
innovation criteria outlined in section 4.5. Sections 5.7.1 to 5.7.3 describe these findings 
in detail.
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5. 7.1 AMLPT does not mitigate the inherent ambiguity in identifying money 
laundering
No uniform exact definition of money laundering exists either within cohort 
organisations, or the banking industry as a whole. Money Laundering can be identified 
by certain attributes in a holistic fashion, but not quantified. Therefore, the nexus of 
cohort deterrence efforts are cash transactions within a customer account and associated 
behaviours. Account behaviours have been refined and quantified within existing 
meanings, to define what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable transaction norms.
Definitions of “money laundering” varied among the cohort, from very specific 
descriptions of laundering activity, to a generalist conceptual description of money 
laundering and the larger domain. Analysts within the cohort maintained the most 
consistent descriptive narrative of money laundering behaviour, as well as understanding 
the ambiguity in defining a suspect transaction. They viewed the profiling exercise 
holistically, acknowledging AMLPT’s significant role, but only as one of several factors 
that contributed to the monitoring process. Other considerations included the source of 
the data when determining how unusual a transaction is versus the source’s suspicions, 
as well as the current intelligence from the FIU and other intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies.
Moreover, the regulatory social system, while demanding that banks and other
financial institutions monitor their customers’ account behaviour, as well as reporting
any suspicious activity to the FIU, provides no definitive understand of what is indeed
“suspicious.” While the secrecy inherent in criminal enterprise may account for some of
this ambiguity, a large part of problem is due to the lack of a closed-loop in the SAR
reporting process. Once a SAR is passed on to the FIU, there is no consistent method to
resolve the disposition of a SAR between the compliance organisation and the FIU;
closing this loop would allow compliance organisations the ability to calibrate their
profiles accordingly, based on either a negative or positive confirmation of their
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suspicions of laundering activity. Essentially, all cohort organisations operate through a 
process of “deliberate speculation” in ascertaining the identity and behaviour of money 
launderers; subsequently, many of the attributes and definitions utilised by cohort 
organisations are not necessarily reflective of recognised norms of launderer behaviour.
Furthermore, these behavioural conjectures and suppositions may involve a value 
judgment, such as a customer’s economic and demographic circumstances, relative to 
their legitimate use of cash. For example, a customer’s attempts to use different branches 
to deposit small amounts on a regular basis may appear to be structuring; alternatively, it 
could be simply matter of convenience, based on where they work in proximity to where 
they live, or the type of services a particular branch may offer.
5.7.2 AM LPT spurred innovation in cohort technical and administrative functions
The survey, as well as the author’s observations, confirmed the existence of a 
variety of innovation behaviours. As AMLPT diffused throughout cohort organisations, 
favourable innovation adoption decisions occurred at individual and organisational 
levels. Adoption rates were incremental, and varied, from that of individual early 
adopters (MLROs), to early majority adopters at the organisational level. Among the 
cohort, in the early adoption stage of AMLPT, the primary attribute was that of 
preventive adoption, give the external regulatory threat. The MLRO demonstrated 
individual adopter attributes in the context of the innovation-decision process. MLROs 
across the cohort were tasked with piloting AMLPT, and served as champions and 
change agents within the compliance organisation. Once adopted, AMLPT’s diffusion 
maintained the trajectory of Rogers’ innovation process in organisations, particularly in 
the re-defining and re-structuring stages, as defined within the implementation phase of 
the process of organisational innovation. AMLPT’s trialability in certain cohort 
organisations, resulted in several vendor pilot projects, demonstrating varying levels of
success within these pilot projects; all pilots eventually resulted in the adoption of 
AMLPT. Lastly, AMLPT primarily supported the technical component of the profiling 
process, primarily in the areas of speed, flexibility and scale.
Re-invention within administrative processes improved the execution of reporting 
and other daily tasks. Furthermore, the variety of data generated by AMLPT, as well as 
AMLPT’s ability to model suspect behaviour, exposed cognitive variances within cohort 
compliance organisations. These variances were due to factors such as dissimilar role 
and skill levels, professional background, or technical mastery. Cohort organisations 
used training to eliminate these variances as much as possible, for instance, incorporating 
AMLPT into training cycles, to create scenarios and simulations of suspect behaviour. 
Additionally, scenarios could then be matched to regulatory procedures, providing 
analysts an understanding of money laundering behaviour from the regulator’s 
perspective, as well as testing the correlation between practice and theory.
5.7.3 AMPT and organisational effectiveness throughout the social system
AMLPT contributed to organisational effectiveness in three key areas: detection 
rates, turn-around time, and over-all efficiencies in process management, a result of its 
high degree offit within the scope of the organisation’s objectives and goals, as well as 
AMLPT’s furtherance o f organisational adaption and flexibility. AMLPT’s ability to 
model suspicious behaviour resulted in improvements in detection rates; moreover, 
modelling also improved the cognitive abilities of analysts, enhancing their ability to 
quickly verify a suspicion, thus shortening SAR turn-around time. Aside from the 
profiling process, the centrality of AMLPT enabled cohort organisations to realise 
addition efficiencies in data processing, reporting, and general work flow.
Furthermore, AMLPT’s reporting and analysis capabilities were used to enhance 
training, as well as providing a uniform cognitive device for communicative action
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among all members of the compliance organisation. The use of AMLPT contributed to 
formalising a variety of compliance processes and procedures, and enabled the constant 
reinforcement of the value of uniformity in roles and norms, which was critical for 
MLROs in maintaining organisational effectiveness.
Prior to the introduction of AMLPT, the analysts tended to manage AML 
knowledge, meanings, and norms at the expense of performing other supporting roles 
within the organisation. The use of AMLPT reduced the primacy of analysts as 
knowledge managers, facilitating communication of shared meanings, common 
knowledge, and information across formal and informal boundaries between the 
compliance organisation and other social systems.
5.8 Concluding remarks
Chapter 5 described the profiling process and AMLPT innovation as a measure of 
organisational effectiveness. The data collected from the fieldwork provided additional 
context to the role AMLPT plays in the social system beyond that of a technology 
artefact. Furthermore, the ambiguity that surrounds money laundering, as well as the 
vagaries of human behaviour, in the form of criminal intent, ensures the speculative 
essence of profiling will prevail for some time.
The circumstances described in chapter 5 demonstrate that innovation correlates 
to organisational effectiveness, as specified in the main research question as presented in 
section 2.9. This dissertation aims to determine if computerised AMLPT profiling tools 
are effective in support of AML procedures, as required by MLROs and compliance 
officers in a banking context. The results of the field work, as discussed in chapter 5, 
established that using innovativeness as a measure, AMLPT is effective in supporting 
compliance professionals. Furthermore, the detection of money laundering is an inexact, 
subjective process; just as subjective are the measures used to determine the
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effectiveness of the profiling process. In Chapter 6, an analysis is provided as to 
innovation behaviour and organisational effectiveness and the use of AMLPT.
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Chapter 6. Analysis
What is clear from the research findings described in chapter 5 is that innovation 
adoption behaviour, in support of AMLPT innovation, is as much a response to the 
regulatory milieu as it is to the ambiguity inherent in the process of detecting money 
laundering. Moreover, the role of the social system in sustaining innovation is more 
critical to the adoption process than first thought at the outset of the research. The 
analysis provided in this chapter addresses the effectiveness of AMLPT as measured 
through an analysis of innovation adoption attributes identified in chapter 5.
Furthermore, we present an understanding of the various forms of innovation 
evident among the cohort, as well as the non-AMLPT artifacts, behaviours, and other 
traits that shape and define the innovation process. In addition to an analysis of 
innovation behaviour, we further examine the various forms of ordering, meaning, and 
structure used in cohort compliance organisations in support of AMLPT, through the 
work of Bowker and Star (Bowker and Star 1999; Star 2002) and Suchman (1987; 1993).
Rogers states that the adoption of an innovation may be due the actions of an 
individual, a change agent, or champion, as much as from a perceived need. The 
research identified several instances, where individual compliance officers attempted to 
implement AMLPT without executive sponsorship; such action is emblematic of classic 
early-adaptor behaviour, as well as that of a change agent, both critical in the diffusion 
of innovation. In most cases, the champion or change agent role was assumed by a 
MLRO, compliance officer or a senior analyst, and was normally the result of an 
authority innovation-decision in 3 of the 5 cohort organisations.
In the remaining two cohort organisations, AMLPT adoption resulted from 
collective innovation-decisions within the compliance group(s). The decision process, as 
noted in chapter 5, was more a response to the FSA’s punitive approach to regulatory
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enforcement, rather than to the exponential volume o f SARs being generated as a 
response to fear o f FSA sanctions.
a  PrevFines
■  RepRisk 
AML
MLRO
Figure 6.0.1 -  Managerial motives fo r  authority innovative-decisions
■  MLRO
RepRiskPrevFines
Figure 6.0.2 -  Managerial motives fo r  collective innovative-decisions
In analysing the response data, and given that the primary adoption impetus was 
predominantly authority driven, a discrete analysis o f management perception o f 
adoption (see figure 6.0.1) reveals more a concern with structure than with process;
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regulatory ramifications such as preventing fines, (“PrevFines”) and reputational risk 
(“RepRisk”), are the main concern, more so than detecting money laundering (“AML”).
Management roles are consistent with cohort roles of head of compliance 
(“HoC”), compliance officer or MLRO (“MLRO”), and analysts (“Analy”). While 
analysts were typically subordinate to compliance officers or MLROs, their seniority and 
supervisorial role across the cohort was considered a valid metric for gauging the 
foundational motivations in adoption of AMLPT.
Figure 6.0.2 represents the foundational motivations for the collective innovation- 
decisions for AMLPT adoption among the 2 cohort members who were early majority 
adopters. Additionally, the difference in adoption criteria is a function of several formal 
and informal factors (see table 6.0.1). As the authority-driven organisations (ADO) were 
early adopters, they already had some experience with formalised AML processes as a 
response to pre-9/11 UK anti-money laundering regulations.
Type o f  
Innovation 
Decision
Formal Informal
Authority
• Regulatory Remit
• AML processes in place pre- 
9/11
• Semi-Automated SARs 
processing
• Rudimentary in-house profiling 
tools
• Low initial financial risk due to 
existing IT infrastructure
• Resource-heavy
• Vendor incentives
• Peer status
•  Market analysts
C o llective
Regulatory Remit
Limited AML processes pre-
9/11
Institutional-focus (LSIB)
Bias towards in-house AMLPT 
Investment banking culture hostile to 
AML regulations 
Cost (FOREX house)
Table 6.0.1 -  Formal and informal stimuli for types o f innovation decisions among cohort
organisations
Moreover, from an informal perspective, the ADO’s existing IT infrastructure
allowed for a relatively inexpensive trial period for these organisations. It was clear also,
based on the author’s experience that early adopter organisations took advantage of
formal roles and organisational norms that were structured around SARs and KYC
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processes; lastly, the eventual SAR reports were then archived. This historical data, post- 
9/11, would comprise the source data for later rudimentary profiling exercises, prior to 
the introduction of AMLPT and other formalised automated methods
AMLPT vendors, who themselves were early market innovators, were able to 
gain favourable pricing, under the guise of “beta” testing. A high level of AMLPT 
critical mass resulted from this convergence of competing vendor offerings with vaguely 
quantified, regulatory-inspired need, resulting in peer-level derived opinion leadership.
While Rogers’ defines opinion leadership as mostly an individual innovation 
attribute, (closely allied with that of change agency), this function was assumed by 
financial technology analysts aligned with the social system of compliance technology 
providers, more so than the micro system of compliance professionals. Further analysis 
shows this was the result of these analysts’ adopting one particular vendor’s espousal of 
“artificial intelligence”, as a means of behavioural profiling, more than any consensus 
among the compliance professionals’ social system as to a clear relative advantage. 
Indeed, early adopter behaviour was as much “management fad” (Abrahamson 1996; 
Swan, Scarbrough et al. 1999) as that of a calculated assessment of relative advantage.
The collective decision organisational adopters (CDO), as early majority 
adopters, while ahead of industry peers, were more deliberate in their adoption decision 
process. This was a result of not only ignoring the bias of industry analysts supporting 
acquisition of “sophisticated” AMLPT, but also that the FSA had not mandated use of 
automation, only just the requirement to consistently report SAR traffic. CDO adopters 
recognised the relative advantage of AMLPT in practical matters, such as automating 
and centralising both the SAR and monitoring processes, as well as facilitating improved 
reporting capabilities to the FIU and other regulatory bodies. Analysis shows that much 
of the momentum around the use of automation, not just in profiling, but all aspects of 
compliance, was due to the anticipated increase in the volume of SAR reporting that the
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post-9/11 regulatory environment mandated; subsequently, innovation emerges as a
means to handle these increases and other monitoring requirements.
An innovation’s rate o f  adoption is relative to the receptivity of a given social
system, and while much of the following analysis addresses the social system’s effects on
rate o f  adoption, this analysis will also argue that AMLPT remains a technical artifact as
much as a catalyst for innovation. Therefore, AMLPT must also be conceptualised as an
IT system, a system that is the product of, and medium for, human action, and is also the
result of influence from institutional conditions and consequence (Orlikowski 1992).
Furthermore, AMLPT may be discretely categorised as to its role, using the work of
Markus and Robey (1988) and Orlikowski and Iacono (2001). Markus and Robey
articulated a number of distinct ways of analysing and conceptualising the relationship
between organisational change and technology, theorising that technology can assume a
variety of roles, such as those of “an independent variable, a dependent variable, or as
one of a number of players in an emergent process of change (where the outcomes are
indeterminate because they are situationally and dynamically contingent)” (Orlikowski
and Iacono 2001). Orlikowski and Iacono, using Markus and Robey’s work, have
identified 14 conceptualisations of technology,
“...looking for commonalities and differences, and found we could cluster them 
into five broad metacategories, each representing a common set of assumptions 
about and treatments of information technology in IS research. Our labels for 
these metacategories signal the primary conceptualization of technology that 
distinguishes each category: the tool view, the proxy view, the ensemble view, the 
computational view, and the nominal view” (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001).
Orlikowski and Iacono’s categorisation provides an elegant structure of meaning, 
yet AMLPT does not fit well in any specific category. The results from chapter 5 
demonstrate AMLPT’s ability to assume a variety of roles, but primarily as a medium for 
action. A variety of meanings and roles are embedded in the AMLPT artifact at any one 
time, resulting in dynamic influences throughout the compliance organisation. Indeed, in
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rejecting a distinct vision of AMLPT as either a tool or proxy, (while all valid
categorisations), we argue such categorisations do not adequately describe the effects of
AMLPT within the social system. As noted previously, the AMLPT artifact is certainly a
tool as much as an IT system, but the tool metacategory provides excessively static
descriptive categorisations of AMLPT’s dynamic, multi-variant computational form.
While Orlikowski and Iacono’s proxy view is grounded, to a great extent, in
Rogers’ 1983 work, they emphasise the techno-centric view of diffusion; they say
nothing of the consequences of innovation on the larger social system as a whole, nor on
the distinct forms of individual versus organisational innovation. Therefore, a more
appropriate understanding of AMLPT’s centrality in the social system is found in the
ensemble or “package” view of technology. This analysis is further supported by
Orlikowski and Iacono’s observation that:
“Over the years, a number of researchers have been dissatisfied with the tool and 
proxy views of technology. Kling and Dutton (1982) point back to a key insight 
of Ivan Illich (1973) who argued that while the technical artifact may be a central 
element in how we conceive of technology, it is only one element in a ‘package,’ 
which also includes the components required to apply that technical artifact to 
some socio-economic activity. Kling and Scacchi (1982) further developed this 
insight into what they called the ‘web of computing,’ which includes the 
commitments, additional resources such as training, skilled staff, and support 
services, and the development of organisational arrangements, policies, and 
incentives to enable the effective management and use of new technologies” 
(Orlikowski and Iacono 2001).
Kline and Scacchi’s (1982) observation of the importance of “additional 
resources such as training, skilled staff, and support services, and (...) policies, and 
incentives” was very much a factor in the rate o f adoption of AMLPT as determined in 
this research. For instance, the author’s past experiences with a variety of technology 
firms reinforced the prevailing view of the limited value most companies place on 
training; this was not the case in cohort organisations. Rather, the cohesive nature of 
cohort compliance organisations was significant in informal knowledge exchange, which
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was then formalised through training, specialisation, and role normalisation. Training 
methods included real-world examples of profiling exercises rather than scenarios, which 
imparted a sense of urgency and purpose instead of theory-based classroom work. 
Furthermore, it was clear across the cohort that AMLPT was embraced as a package of 
technologies and processes, to be opened, tinkered with, and refined, rather than Latour’s 
“black box” (Latour 1987) and therefore, a position in compliance was inclusive of a 
variety of roles beyond simply transaction monitoring.
6.1 How Innovation Adoption Emerges
Chapter 5’s fieldwork catalogued extensive evidence of a variety of adoption 
behaviours, attributes, and roles. The survey data, as well as the author’s observations, 
confirm that, while Rogers’ linear models of individual and organisational innovation 
typically indicate a linear continuum, this was not demonstrated by the data. The 
following analysis demonstrates innovation adoption among the cohort was linear in 
some respects and initially preventive; it then became progressively iterative, then 
reflexive at times. Furthermore, rate o f adoption was consistently incremental 
throughout the social system; behaviour Rogers does not acknowledge. Moreover, 
certain behaviour was regressive or interpolated and therefore, subject to discontinuance 
or outright rejection; for instance, in the re-structuring or re-defining of the parameters 
or specific attributes of a suspicious transaction. However, cohort discontinuance 
behaviour ran counter to Rogers’ description, in that, while Rogers’ states that 
discontinuance imparts rejection of an adoption, cohort members never outright rejected 
AMLPT. Rather, re-structuring and re-defining were used to modify AMLPT’s profiling 
output and other characteristics to match the needs of the social system. Furthermore, 
Rogers’ makes no mention of incremental rates of adoption; instead, he uses “stages” as 
a metaphor for what is essentially a chronological phenomenon. Indeed, the stages, or
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increments, in which the rate o f  adoption occurs, provides a useful benchmark for 
understanding organisational effectiveness, as derived from the use of AMLPT, and was 
used throughout the research.
Gatignon, Tushman, et al. define incremental innovations as “those that improve 
price/performance advances at a rate consistent with the technical trajectory” (Gatignon, 
Tushman et al. 2002). As illustrated in Chapter 5, this is one appropriate description 
AMLPT innovation, as, despite vendor claims to the contrary, AMLPT is derived from 
existing forms of data mining, knowledge management, and business intelligence 
gathering. While proprietary algorithms may provide perceived speed or accuracy 
improvements, those cohort organisations that developed in-house technology enjoyed 
similar performance to those deploying vendor-supplied AMLPT. Thus, AMLPT is an 
incremental, and not a radical innovation, as its composition is consistent within the 
current technology trajectory of data mining and other similar applications.
In returning to the analysis of how adoption emerges, the findings in chapter 5 
illustrated that preventive innovation was the initial impetus for the adoption of AMLPT, 
at first a result of the threat of FSA discipline, and later, in combination with the 
JMLSG’s formalisation of reputational risk. What also emerges from this preventative 
posture, a consistent theme throughout the research project, is that AMLPT is deployed 
as a hedge against the regulator. Such behaviour is exemplified through cohort efforts 
directed at constantly refining monitoring methods and the quality of reporting, all under 
the rubric of “best practice”. This preventive posture has been informally 
institutionalised across the cohort and, while not openly advocated, represents a 
substantial informal foundation of the compliance function across the cohort.
As an incremental innovation, cohort member use of bricolage or “tinkering” 
(Ciborra 1992a; Louridas 1999) was consistently evident in furtherance of re-invention, 
re-structuring and re-defining of AMLPT’s place in the social system. Thus, the resultant
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effectiveness of AMLPT in supporting MLROs and compliance officers varied in some 
instances, based on how adept the social system was in balancing these distinct systemic 
actions. Indeed, metaphorically, these actions assume a Borromean dependency (Angell 
2009), in that innovation, re-invention and tinkering appear as separate yet 
interdependent actions and attributes throughout the cohort; these actions and attributes 
further organisational effectiveness through this interdependence, effectiveness which is 
absent from the AMLPT artifact as a situated, stand-alone entity.
6.2 Countering the inherent ambiguity in identifying money laundering
The findings in chapter 5 served to illustrate that compliance efforts, while 
formalised and highly structured, are still significantly dependent on subjective analysis 
in defining behaviour indicative of money laundering; moreover, this is further 
complicated by the lack of a universal description of what is indeed “suspicious”. 
Significantly, what emerges from the survey responses, as well as observed behaviour, is 
that the cohort categorises this subjective analysis as a process akin to “deliberate 
speculation”, as to the identity and behaviour of money launderers. Subsequently, many 
of the attributes and definitions of money laundering utilised by cohort organisations are 
not necessarily compatible with recognised norms of launderer behaviour; rather, they 
are indicative of the individual organisation’s perception of those behaviours, relative to 
a regulatory standard.
The empirical findings in chapter 5 further demonstrate that the adoption and use 
of AMLPT innovation in cohort institutions, is primarily a response to regulatory 
requirements for deterring money laundering as much as one of mitigating reputational 
risk or, for that matter, emblematic of keen interest in deterring money laundering. 
However, as the cohort became more versed in AMLPT use, as well as with the nuances
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of regulation, mitigation of reputational risk soon became the raison d ’etre of the 
compliance group.
Subsequently, effectiveness is measured through qualitative and subjective values 
such as detection rates, SAR processing time, and improvements in process efficiency in 
pursuit of regulatory compliance; thus, the innovation-decision process is derived from 
efforts to improve cohort organisational effectiveness, through identification of a variety 
of individual and organisational stimuli comparable with innovation attributes. This 
section analyses AMLPT innovation as a response to this ambiguity, and the 
commensurate innovation behaviours identified among the cohort; identification of those 
of individual and organisational stimuli comparable with innovation attributes, and the 
resultant measure of effectiveness, is analysed in section 6.2.5.
6.2.1 A Context for Innovation
Aside from occasional subtly expressed scepticism regarding the regulatory 
regime, cohort organisations demonstrated professionalism, dedication, and a high level 
of role and norm congruence relative to the task at hand. The MLRO or compliance 
officer role, throughout the cohort, is instrumental in creating not only a localised 
organisational culture, but also in interpreting the formative context of the social system 
as a whole, and while at times demonstrating procedural and technological determinism, 
typifies innovativeness and flexibility as well (Ciborra and Lanzara 1994f). From the 
findings in chapter 5, the individual innovativeness and adopter behaviours of MLRO 
and compliance officers are ranked as to their frequency, and at what level the behaviour 
is most prevalent, as illustrated in figure 6.2.1.
The MLRO and compliance officers benefited, conversely, from a high level of 
homophily within their organisations. While Rogers’ states that heterophilous 
communication among a social system is more conducive to diffusion of innovation, the
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findings in chapter 5 do not support this. Rather, what the findings determined was a 
high level o f hom ophilous  communication, supporting receptivity to AMLPT and its rate  
o f  adoption  and sustainability . AMLPT’s o bservab ility  complimented the institutional 
goal o f fraud avoidance and risk mitigation.
Individual
■  Organisational
Figure 6.2.1 -  Distribution, frequency, and level o f  MLRO/Compliance officer behaviours 
Organisations that would have been traditionally heterophilous  to those o f the 
compliance function, such as those o f marketing and customer support, evidenced 
hom ophily  through the use o f boundary spanning individuals (Tushman 1977; Tushman 
and Scanlan 1981), and change agents. H om ophilous and heterophilous  behaviours were 
demonstrated across the cohort organisations, as well as at the institutional level, and 
included the following attributes and behaviours as illustrated in table 6.2.1. Also 
emergent from the findings is the critical role o f the change agen t in organisational 
innovation. While individual members, such as analysts and supporting staff displayed 
innovativeness at the task and routine level, the MLRO or compliance officer created the 
environ Their interpretation o f the formative context, particularly in regards to 
regulation, as well as their grasp o f social perceptions o f fraud, risk and terrorism, was
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significant in embedding a sense of purpose (Ciborra and Lanzara 1994f). ment within 
which innovation could evolve.
Heterophilous attribute/behaviour Homophilous attribute/behaviour
Customer focus Fraud avoidance/risk mitigation
Tradition Data sharing
Hierarchy Innovativeness
Structure Collegial
Table 6.2.1 -  Homophilous and heterophilous behaviours across the cohort compliance
organisations & institutions
Given that compliance was a neglected function prior to 9/11, such 
cosmopolitanism was important in expediting AMLPT’s rate o f adoption among the 
cohort. Given chapter 5’s findings that AMLPT is a locus of innovation, it is appropriate 
that the focus of cohort adoption and innovation is found in the monitoring process and 
resultant SAR generation. The next sections provide an analysis of innovation within 
both these activities.
6.2.3 Innovation, deliberate speculation, and behavioural profiling
Chapter 5 demonstrated that transaction monitoring, inclusive of profiling, is an
exercise in deliberative speculation. Deliberate, as it comprises a conscientious series of
steps and analysis; and speculative, as it is grounded in conjecture as to the nature of
profile subject. Analysts’ are essentially attempting to operationalise a guess at intent or
motive; therefore, the context of the transaction becomes the key delineator as to its
legitimacy. Nonetheless, cohort organisations, in attempting to operationalise a
conjecture, do operate from a variety of known variables, a result of pervasive regulatory
guidance and legislative requirements. However, that which is pervasive is not
necessarily indicative o f efficiency. As chapter 2 illustrated, legislators, through use of
anti-money laundering laws, are trying to mitigate a highly dynamic and increasingly
complex phenomenon with static measures, measures that are ineffective in many cases.
Moreover, the economics of compliance are ceteris paribus’, the more extensive the
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regulatory environment, the higher the cost of compliance, in the form of staff and 
technology. A detailed analysis of compliance costs, relative to chapter 5’s findings, is 
included in section 6.3.1 of this chapter’s discussion on innovation and organisational 
effectiveness.
While many of the processes, procedures, and organisational behaviours in 
support of AMLPT adoption were consistent with the linear trajectory of innovation 
diffusion and adoption, innovativeness assumes an incremental and non-linear form 
within the AMLPT artifact itself. Significantly, analysis of the findings illustrates that 
innovativeness assumes both an internal and external influence, which Rogers typifies as 
interactive innovation consistent with critical mass. Critical mass defines the point at 
which enough individuals in a system have adopted an innovation, so that the 
innovation’s rate o f adoption becomes self-sustaining (Rogers 2003). Critical mass 
resembles routinization in many ways, yet Rogers (2003) includes critical mass in his 
discussion of diffusion networks, specifically as means of defining communication 
among adopters in a social system. As chapter 5’s findings illustrate, interactivity is more 
a task and role-specific series of actions, rather than one of communicative action; we 
argue, that given the findings from chapter 5, this is a rather narrow definition. 
Furthermore, the findings show that interactive innovation is as much a function of 
innovation within a single social system, as within a “network”.
Moreover, although a means to foster communication, interactive innovation 
appears more aligned with re-invention, re-definition, and re-structuring, (all of which 
are specific individual and organisational adoption attributes), rather than those of an 
entire social system or diffusion network. This also raises another ontological issue with 
Rogers, in that a social system implies an almost limitless form, yet diffusion network 
implies that a network could include numerous social systems, or vice-versa; he makes 
no distinction. Moreover, he makes no mention of interactive-innovation in an
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organisational context, which is inconsistent, given that re-invention and re-structure 
semantically imply a level of interactive, reflexive, and reciprocal behaviours.
While Roger’s linear models provide a sound structure for analysis, they are by 
no means absolute. Specifically, they inadequately account for the dynamic, as well as 
the incremental nature of innovation, adoption and interplay within AMLPT innovation 
and its social system. Moreover, Rogers’ categorisations make no accommodation for the 
multiplicity of roles and attributes an individual may assume at any one point along the 
continuum, as well as their relevance; furthermore, he makes no accommodation for 
measuring incidences of the recurrence of a specific adopter attribute as exhibited within 
a discreet stage along the continuum. This omission was evident within an incremental- 
type process, such as the re-defining, re-structuring and normalising stages of the 
implementation phase of the organisational innovation process. An innovation is said to 
lose its “identity” in the normalizing stage of the implementation phase of the innovation 
process within an organisation.
However, analysis of chapter 5’s findings establishes that AMLPT never lost its 
“identity” within the MLRO unit, given how deeply it is embedded within cohort 
organisations. Rogers’ makes no accommodation for levels of normalization or what 
constitutes identity; it is assumed that once the innovation becomes “an ongoing element 
in the organisation’s activities,” it becomes “invisible.” Perhaps Rogers is tacitly 
acknowledging that normalization, and subsequently, an innovation’s “loss” of identity, 
imply transcendence from defined role to ubiquity; innovation then assumes the mantle 
of infrastructure - something that, according to Star (2002), things “run on”. This notion 
of infrastructure is an appropriate metaphor for the duality of AMLPT, as it is both 
ubiquitous and invisible to some extent, as well as being imbued with “status,” as a locus 
of innovation within cohort MLRO units.
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In returning to the analysis of the AMLPT artifact and its locus position, figure
6.2.3.1 illustrates the various external and internal stimuli evident from chapter 5’s 
findings, relative to re-inventing (RI), re-structuring (RS), and re-defining (RD) both 
monitoring and SAR reporting:
As AMLPT use escalated among the cohort, heterophily gave way to homophily 
and, in keeping with its locus position, AMLPT mediated data exchange and 
communication among homophilous members of the social system. Internal stimuli was 
in response to technical demands for capabilities such as improved processing speed, 
along with data configuration demands for use in refining profiling attributes and other 
performance enhancements. External stimuli were in the form of information and data 
exchange from organisations within the institution, but external to the MLRO unit, such 
as fraud detection or marketing, as well as regulatory authorities. Other external stimuli 
were in response to market innovation, or the result of vendor-supplied upgrades through 
service level agreements, as well as practitioner process improvements to match those of 
upgraded technology.
In analysing MLRO innovation within the profiling exercise, as described in 
chapter 5, three distinct levels emerge. These levels are closely aligned with those of the 
technical-formal-informal (TFI) framework, as articulated by Liebenau and Backhouse
Internal Innovation Stimuli External Innovation Stimuli
• Algorithms -  RI
• Data structures -  RS
• Data processing -  RS
P ro cesses  -  RD 
Org. Norms/roles -  RD, RS 
Homophily with institution -  RD 
V endor innovation -  RI 
Institutional SAR reporting - RS• SQL Q ueries -  RS
• Profile attributes -  RS
• Suspicion triggers - RD
(Batch or Real time) 0
Figure 6.2.3.1 -  Internal and external AMLPT innovation stimuli
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(1990), as well as Stamper, Liu et al. (2000) and others. The TFI model defines an 
information system through these three distinct, yet interrelated levels, in much the same 
manner as the Borromean dependency describes the relationship among the attributes of 
innovation, re-invention and tinkering as separate, yet interdependent behaviours 
embedded within the AMLPT artifact. The findings from chapter 5 indicate that AMLPT 
facilitated the technical component of the profiling process, primarily in the areas of 
speed, flexibility and scale.
We previously noted that profiling efforts involve deliberate speculation, as to the 
nature of a suspicious transaction within a typical banking transaction. In further 
analysing chapter 5’s findings, it is clear that innovation can be construed as a series of 
actions to address perceived analytical inefficiencies within transactional data, in support 
of attempts to identify attributes of illegitimacy therein; suspicion is established through 
linkages with a discreet set of behavioural variables, rather than distinct affinities.
However, further analysis demonstrates that attempts to re-dejine and re­
structure behavioural attributes and other linkage factors, given the relatively limitless 
permutations therein are problematic. Thus profiling can never fully identify which 
transaction patterns indicate money laundering or other suspect activity, and therefore, 
will always be inherently ambiguous. MLRO units attempt to resolve this ambiguity 
through both external and internal innovation stimuli, especially through utilising a 
variety of data sources, given that analysis from chapter 5 suggests that the activity of 
behavioural profiling is essentially one of ongoing data mining. Furthermore, the 
findings indicate that the ability to harness a breadth of data sources, not only 
quantitative data alone but also qualitative data, substantively support an analysts’ 
probability of identifying a suspect transaction, given this broader perspective of 
customer behaviour. However, this perspective is limited in several ways.
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First, while all the institutions surveyed required universal reporting of suspected 
money laundering or other illegitimate behaviour when discovered, it is reported and 
disseminated in a restricted manner. Staff members are not allowed to discuss their 
suspicions with anyone except the MLRO unit, nor are they allowed to alert a customer 
involved in a suspect transaction. Second, as the MLRO analysts only react to suspicion 
reported from external sources, they cannot proactively deter money laundering; they can 
only further qualify their assumptions, which can then only assume meaning from actual 
external stimuli. Conversely, the AMLPT innovation is quantitatively data-driven, and 
can only “think” in very set parameters and therefore is of limited value in money 
laundering detection. The analysis demonstrates that, given such limitations in the 
current manifestations of AMLPT, innovation is driven by a desire to mitigate these 
technical limitations as well as furthering regulatory compliance. In addition to 
comprising a variety of data sources, such as marketing or customer data, external 
innovation stimuli is inclusive of processes within the institution that may benefit the 
compliance organisation, as well as vendor-supplied training on their respective AMLPT 
system. Vendors provided other forms of stimuli, through improvements in areas such as 
algorithmic logic and transaction processing capacity. Therefore, the presence of a 
variety of technical and organisational factors that enable the use of AMLPT infers that 
technology cannot be evaluated in isolation (Backhouse 2005; Halperin 2006).
6.2.4 Innovation and formal norms within the MLRO-compliance organisation
The analysis in section 6.2.3 illustrated that innovation is driven by a desire to 
mitigate a variety of technical limitations within AMLPT, as well as furthering over-all 
regulatory compliance. These intentions are also embedded in the formal norms within 
cohort organisations, and as illustrated in table 6.1.1 and originate from a variety of 
policies, procedures, and documents, as well as training methods.
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What is immediately apparent from chapter 5’s findings is the generalist nature of 
formal money laundering policies, procedures, and guidance among cohort 
organisations. The findings note that much, if not all of the source documentation for 
employee AML-CFT policies and procedures were verbatim representations of 
regulations and guidance issued by the FSA and JMLSG. However, further analysis 
reveals exceptions to the verbatim use of documents sourced from regulators and 
professional bodies. These exceptions were in documents specific to institutional practice 
for reporting suspicions of money laundering, as well as supporting processes such as 
KYC and PEP due diligence. It was previously noted in chapter 5, that many of these 
specifics were based on an institution’s market segment.
Institution New Account KYC Vetting Requirements
Medium-scale Retail Bank (MSRB) One-page application form and KYC vetting through electronic verification via the electoral roll.
Large-scale Commercial Bank (LSCB)
Photocopy of VAT registration, personal utility bill and a 
passport or photo driving licence of person opening 
commercial account/applying for loan.
Large-scale Retail Bank (LSRB) Photocopy of utility bill and passport certified by a solicitor, doctor, postmaster or justice of the peace.
Large-scale Investment Bank (LSIB)
Four-page application form, inclusive of details of 
employment (salary, benefits, pensions), investments and 
other income; original copies of passport or photo driving 
licence -  or - Photocopy of VAT registration, personal 
utility bill and a passport or photo driving licence of 
person opening commercial account/applying for loan.
FOREX House (requirements for MSB 
branches)
de minimis transaction limit of £1,500. This is a limit 
above which customer identification must be verified, and 
below which a risk-assessment is made before deciding 
whether or not verification in the form of driving licence 
or passport is required.
Table 6.2.4.1 -  Cohort institutionally-mandated New Account KYC Vetting Requirements 
Moreover, further differentiations among processes and procedures are evident, 
such as the importance each MLRO unit assigned to a specific behavioural attribute, or 
to steps in the due diligence process. For instance, there are significant disparities among
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cohort institutions as to the documentation necessary to open a savings or current 
account as noted in table 6.2.4.1. Some institutions collected information on employment 
or professional affiliations, though not required by the FSA for new customer KYC, 
while others requested simple proof of identity and residency in the form of a utility bill 
and photo identification.
Despite these disparate requirements, proof of UK residency and photographic 
identification was the uniform minimal KYC requirement across the cohort. Counter 
staff, as well as other customer-facing employees, were provided guidelines for 
evaluating customer behaviour or transaction attributes that could indicate potential 
money laundering. Evaluative parameters included nervousness or furtive behaviour, the 
size or frequency of deposits or withdrawals, based on historical account data displayed 
on a teller’s workstation, as well as identification documents. Cohort institutes all used 
similar guidelines, although with different weighting criteria for each specific behaviour, 
attribute, or transaction type.
Interpreting what triggers a SAR was a source of contention within some cohort 
MLRO units. While formalised methods of assessing a suspicious transaction narrowed 
the potential for interpretive flexibility, nevertheless, some analysts were stricter than 
others in respect to the importance of certain behaviours, usually from experience. For 
example, younger analysts tended to adhere to guidelines more closely than analysts with 
five or more years in the role. Counter staff maintained an absolutist approach to 
suspicious transaction reporting, leaving the interpretation of a particular customer’s 
behaviour to the MLRO unit. At the institutional level, training constantly reiterated the 
need to report suspicious activity, as well as ensuring that absolute discretion was 
followed throughout the process.
Training within cohort compliance organisations, in addition to extensive use of 
real-world data and scenarios, also constantly stressed the need to maintain vigilance and
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awareness of emerging threats and trends in launderer behaviour. Analysis from the 
informal interviews highlighted the fact that training with real-world branch-supplied 
data, often led to more effective analysis of externally-supplied SAR reports. Often a 
branch would report a series of suspicious transaction patterns that would then emerge in 
another branch’s service area; the MLRO, having already created a profile from the first 
branch’s data, could then expedite analysis of the other branch’s suspicions, as well as 
hastening the disposition of the original SAR. While this type of information exchange 
was formalised at institutional level, inter-institutional SAR data exchange, while 
informal, was just as useful, if not more so. Indeed, while formal norms provide a sound, 
quasi-positivist foundation for cognising the MLRO’s mandate of deterring money 
laundering, informal norms provide an interpretive lens as to the beliefs, politics, culture, 
and other socio-institutional considerations embedded within AMLPT innovation and the 
compliance social system.
6.2.5 Innovation and informal norms within the MLRO-compliance organisation
What is clear from the informal interviews, and subtly emerges from analysis of 
the structured interviews, is a general sense of scepticism as to the purpose of the 
MLRO’s activities, as well as to the AML-CFT regime on the whole. Ontologically, 
there is a distinct perceptual difference as to effectiveness when measured through the 
constituent attributes of “informality” as it relates to the TFI framework, and formal 
indicators of effectiveness as an outcome of the research question. The present 
discussion addresses informal systems through analysis of those informal perceptions 
and meanings within the social system, as they relate to AMLPT as an IT artifact and its 
environment. Therefore, effectiveness, as it relates to informal considerations within the 
TFI framework, is understood as a completely subjective measure of not only AMLPT, 
but other socio-institutional factors as well.
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Analysis from the findings illustrates that, with few exceptions, the more 
intimately involved a respondent in the deterrence of money laundering, the more they 
negatively perceive the factors of AMLPT, regulation, and the AML-CFT regime in 
general. Figure 6.2.5.1 rates perceived satisfaction with these factors on a scale of -1.5 
(negative perception) to +1.5 (positive perception). For instance, the majority of heads of 
compliance (“HC”), whose remit also covers fraud, financial, and criminal risk 
mitigation, along with other non-AML-CFT responsibilities, expressed an overall high 
degree of satisfaction with regime status quo.
Regim e 
■  Tools 
^  Regs
5
Figure 6.2.5.1 -  Cohort perceptions o f  AML-CFT regime, tools, and regulations.
However, MLROs and analysts, (“MO” and “ML,” respectively), expressed 
either no opinion, or a less-than favourable option of all but the regulatory sta tu s quo. 
Satisfaction levels also correlated with experience as indicted in figure 6.2.5.2 (scale  
in creased  to im prove leg ib ility ; therefore -0 .5  rather than -1 .5  f o r  negative percep tion ;  
y e a rs  in role equ ates to  2 0 -yea r  sca le  on X  axis). Institutional perceptions of AML-CFT 
varied among the cohort, and exerted some influence on perceptions within the MLRO 
and compliance functions.
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Within the investment and commercial banks, given their commercial, business, 
and institutional focus, AML-CFT was perceived as an “inconvenience” -  part of the 
“cost of doing business”. Board level opinion, as ascertained by cohort respondents 
within these institutions, was that “companies do not engage in money laundering, only 
criminals and terrorists” -  i.e. individuals, rather than “entities”.
2  Regs P erctp
■  Tool Perctp  
-  Regim e
■  Y ears in Role
Figure 6 .2 .5 .2- Correlations in perceived effectiveness o f  AML-CFT elements, relevant to
experience
This perception was due in great part to the infrequent level of SAR activity in 
these institutions, and the general philosophy, as to the relationship between investment 
and commercial bankers and their customers, that operations were conducted by 
“gentleman’s agreement” rather than anything driven by regulatory requirement.
Furthermore, there was a subtle hostility to the compliance process in general,
and subsequently, AML-CFT efforts within respondent organisations often adhered to
the minimum acceptable standard. Among the retail banks, AML-CFT enjoyed a
somewhat better reputation, and was perceived as helping to ensure that not only were
the institution’s fiscal and regulatory responsibilities being met, but also as an
acknowledgement of the threat terrorist financing represented to national security.
Among the cohort, such a stance was one of the few incidences of an articulated ethical
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and moral causality for support of the MLRO function. Further analysis and informal 
interviews confirmed though, that the primary motivation was reputational risk more so 
than any other consideration. Both retail banks in the survey were among the oldest and 
largest in the City, and were very keen to ensure they were not the subject of any 
regulatory action. In the LSRB, the head of compliance was a board-level position, and 
contributed to the positive perception of the MLRO unit’s efforts within that institution, 
as well as to AMLPT’s observability.
Consequently, this unit had the largest AML-CFT budget of any cohort member, 
along with the largest staff. This funding advantage did not necessarily translate into 
more effective detection rates; indeed, this organisation had been an early adopter of 
AMLPT, and had continued to spend a significant amount on ever-increasingly 
sophisticated tools. Yet, in analysing the data from chapter 5, they realised no greater 
relative advantage than that of the MSRB in terms of detection rates and processing 
improvements in SAR volume. In general, analysis of the informal systems surrounding 
the AMLPT IT artifact is illustrative of an over-all neutral or negative perception of 
value, with few clear benefits demonstrated relative to individual, organisational, and 
institutional needs. Utilising the analysis of chapter 5’s findings, as discussed through 
use of the TFI framework, we now turn to an analysis of the effectiveness of AMLPT as 
measured through innovation attributes.
6.3 AMLPT innovation, organisational effectiveness, and the AML-CFT 
Regime
The findings from chapter 5 indicate AMLPT contributed to organisational 
effectiveness in three key areas: detection rates, turn-around time, and over-all 
efficiencies in process management. However, before undertaking an analysis of chapter 
5’s findings as to innovation as a measure of effectiveness, a discussion of the larger
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understanding of effectiveness, within the greater compliance domain, provides valuable 
additional context for interpreting the findings.
6.3.1 The AML-CFT regime and measures of regulatory effectiveness
The previous analysis of AMLPT’s informal systems acknowledged a general 
dissatisfaction with the extant compliance regime, as well as the tools and regulations 
used to ensure institutional adherence to FSA fiat. However, despite this dissatisfaction, 
compliance organisations, in order to ensure reputational integrity, maintained an 
organisational dedication to AML-CFT practice, and worked to specific, quantifiable 
measures relative to FSA guidelines. “Success” is not measured in this research, given 
that there are no officially published results as to deterrence rates. The FSA publishes 
statistics that highlight SAR activity, but this only indicates the amount of potentially 
illegal activity identified across the regime; it does not quantify the volume of ongoing 
money laundering activity in the United Kingdom at any one time. The findings illustrate 
that, much of the scepticism voiced by cohort members is grounded in what many 
described as a “numbers game”.
For instance, AMLPT’s parameters can be set at any threshold, to identify 
whatever behaviours the analyst deems appropriate, such as, for CFT purposes, certain 
geographically-unique activities, or to create a deliberate increase in SAR inquiries at a 
particular time, often when the organisation is aware of the likelihood of an FSA audit. 
Such warnings are a result of the informal inter-institutional communication channels 
among larger MLRO units within the City. While not indicative of unlawful or unethical 
behaviour, such measures indicate the interpretive elasticity that is the result of the 
FSA’s ever-changing requirements. When coupled with the inherent ambiguity of the 
phenomenon of money laundering itself, it is understandable that MLRO units 
experience the occasional crisis of confidence. Moreover, there is the monotony of the
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exercise; during the timeline of the research project, a total of only 6 SAR reports issued 
by the entire cohort, from among the 115 processed in a two-year span, resulted in 
additional investigation by the FIU.
To put cohort SARs reporting in context, in 2005, the year of the London transit 
system bombings, only 195,000 SARs were reported across the entire UK reporting 
regime; less than 1% (2,100) were judged to be of interest to counter-terrorism 
authorities (SOCA 2006). These low reporting volumes were typical when compared to 
industry standards as surveyed by KPMG (2007), a leading consultancy, and reflect one 
of the primary contentions among cohort members: the costs of compliance do not justify 
the insignificant returns, aside from those of reputational assurance and avoiding fines. 
Section 2.5’s discussion, of the difficulty in quantifying the extent of global money 
laundering, also exposes the SAR reporting process to the same charges of quantitative 
incoherence, only more in terms of return on investment. In 2005, the SAR regime was 
expected to cost the private sector approximately £60 million (KPMG 2004; SOCA 
2006), with some estimates ranging from a low of £29 million, to as high as £96 million 
(Harvey 2005).
Harvey has done significant work on the issue of SARs return on investment, and 
using a base average of £26 million for associated compliance costs for key agencies, 
NCIS and FSA (SOCA had not yet been created), she then extrapolates the total cost 
using an average derived from conservative projections of private sector costs, coupled 
with key agency costs, and comes up with a range of £52 - £116 million per year in 
compliance costs. For 2005, the FSA’s goal for confiscation orders, a successful 
prosecution resulting from a SAR, was £60 million. Using her base yearly SAR average 
of 65,000, compiled from data inclusive for the years 2001 -  2004, and adding it to 
2005’s SAR total of 195,000, results in a total SAR count of 260,000. Using this total, 
and an average cost of between £800 and £1,800 per SAR, results in only £230 in
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recovered assets (Harvey 2005). We noted in section 2.5 that identified money 
laundering activity accounts for less than one half of one percent of the entire UK 
banking sector; put another way, in 2003 an estimated £25 billion was laundered in the 
UK, with only £30 million being recovered, some 0.12 per cent (Harvey 2005).
Harvey’s conclusions seem at odds with not only mathematical reality, but also 
with the figures supplied by other scholars, (Walker (2007) and Schnieder (2005)), and 
governmental institutions (HM Treasury). While Harvey’s work is thoroughly 
referenced, the analytical dissonance is understandable, given the breadth of figures 
accessed by the author to provide further context in quantifying the SAR reporting 
process in the UK.
Though an extensive analysis of the current UK SAR regime is beyond the remit 
of this dissertation, researchers are encouraged to view current regime metrics with the 
appropriate scholarly scepticism. Additionally, when analysing the UK’s CFT regime 
with other components of HM government’s “Prevent” counter-terrorism policy, further 
value for money questions arise. For instance, outreach programs to Muslim 
communities throughout the UK have met with less than successful outcomes. In Luton, 
the hometown of the July 7, 2005 London bombers, and more recently, the suicide 
bomber in Stockholm in December of 2010, over £550,000 has been spent with little or 
no meaningful counter-intelligence to show for such a large expenditure (Evans 2010). 
With these ambiguous regime metrics in mind, we return to the analysis of chapter 5’s 
findings as to the relationship of AMLPT innovation to organisational effectiveness.
6.3.2 AMLPT innovation as a measure of organisational effectiveness
The value in iterative piloting of the questionnaire was evident in chapter 5’s 
findings. The combined categories and attributes of diffusion of innovation and 
organisational effectiveness theories were significantly compatible, and provide a valid
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method of evaluation. This confirmed the observation in section 4.5 that both Rogers and 
Campbell are comprehensive in their categorical schemas, as to innovation attributes and 
organisational effectiveness. There was concern, however, as to understanding and 
interpreting the self-perceptions and psychological categories of the respective theories.
With regards to the finding from chapter 5, this was not the case; the contextual 
information derived from the structured and unstructured interviews provided a rich 
variety of contextual information, which furthered the interpretation of meanings 
embedded in the data acquired from both formal and informal research methods. Much 
of the analysis regarding cohort perceptions of the regime and their activities relative to 
regulatory compliance, were the result of the author constantly observing numerous 
subtle and instinctual patterns of behaviour and communication, as well as engaging in 
informal conversations with cohort members.
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Figure 6.3.2.1 -L ick ert aggregate correlation o f  A la n d  OE attributes as a measure o f  AMLPT 
effectiveness (5.0 = high; 1.0 = low; “complexity ” was indicated at a mean o f  2.8, and therefore,
AMLPT exhibited low complexity)
The findings in chapter 5 confirmed the utility of this method, as well as the 
arguments of Maitlis (Maitlis and Lawrence 2003; 2005) and others (Andersen 2004), as 
to the value of consistent observation as a means to uncover and interpret tacit
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categorisation and meanings; meanings that might have been deliberately or 
unconsciously omitted in survey and interview responses. Furthermore, this ability to 
“see beyond” the answer was, in part, due to the many collegial relationships the author 
established during the research.
■  D etec tion  ra te s
■  T urn -around
Process im p ro v em en ts
Figure 6.3.2.2 -  Individual correlations o fA I and OE attributes as a measure o f  AMLPT
effectiveness (5.0 = high; 1.0 = low)
In designing the survey, Rogers’ five attributes o f  innovation (AI): relative 
advantage, compatibility, complexity, observability, and trialability, were assigned a like 
set o f organisational effectiveness (OE) values, drawn from Campbell. The applicability 
o f these categorisations was demonstrated throughout the findings in chapter 5. A 
categorical schema was then created to correlate AI values to OE values, using the 
aggregate o f  Lickert responses (figure 6.3.2.1), and then as individual correlations per 
value as illustrated in figure 6.3.2.2. However, while the attributes o f both theories were 
congruent for measurement purposes, initially, the use o f both o f Rogers’ organisational 
and individual attributes within innovation adoption exposed apparent descriptive 
redundancy.
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Representative Effectiveness Attributes from  Historical 
Survey & Campbell Diffusion Attributes from  Rogers
Overall effectiveness Innovativeness
Flexibility/Adaption Compatibility
Fit Compatibility
Match
Environment Social System
Objectives/goals Relative advantage
Utilisation o f Environment Compatibility
Conflict/cohesion Complexity
Achievement emphasis Relative advantage
Managerial interpersonal skills Change agency & Champions
Control Degree of Centralisation
Size
Training & Development Emphasis Formalisation
Degree of specialisation
Role & norm congruence Formalization
Degree of specialisation
Table 6.3.2.1 -  Original “Measures of Effectiveness "
Representative Effectiveness Attributes from  Historical 
Survey & Campbell Diffusion Attributes from  Rogers
Overall effectiveness Relative Advantage
Flexibility/Adaption Compatibility
Fit Relative Advantage
Compatibility
Environment Social System
Objectives/goals Relative advantage
Utilisation o f Environment Compatibility
Conflict/cohesion Complexity
Achievement emphasis Relative advantage
Managerial interpersonal skills Change agency & Champions
Control Compatibility
Complexity
Training & Development Emphasis Compatibility
Complexity
Role & norm congruence Compatibility
Observability
Table 6.3.2.2 -  Revised and consolidated “Measures of Effectiveness ”
Subsequent comparative analysis, using the original “measures of effectiveness”
(table 4.5.1) to the categories that emerged from chapter 5’s findings resulted in a
revised, consolidated version as reflected in bold in table 6.3.2.2. Other descriptive
redundancy was identified among Campbell’s work, but this was attributable to the
considerable historical pool of literature Campbell drew from, in articulating his view on
"how criterion measures of organisational effectiveness should be developed so that they
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can be used to compare organisations, evaluate the effects o f organisational development 
efforts, and determine what characteristics o f organisations are significantly associated 
with organisational effectiveness as a basic construct” (Campbell 1977). Furthermore, he 
articulated a taxonomy o f the various criteria evident in the literature, as a means to 
account for "all variables that have been proposed seriously as indices o f organisational 
effectiveness”; the attributes listed in the table o f measures o f effectiveness, are drawn 
from this taxonomy, and represent both the unique categorisations, and redundancies as 
he compiled them in 1977. Given their compatibility with Rogers’ attributes, the 
redundancies are listed as a means to demonstrate the breadth o f categorisation available 
to the organisational effectiveness researcher.
O f the five attributes o f innovation: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, 
observability, and trialability, the findings from chapter 5 determined that relative 
advantage and compatibility were the most prevalent (see figure 6.2.3.3), followed by 
complexity, with the remainder equally distributed.
Change 
agency & 
Champions
Trialability
Social
System
C om patibility
Observability
C om plexity
Figure 6.3.2.3 -  Frequency o f  Innovation Attributes
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As to measures of organisational effectiveness (OE), fit  was congruent with 
relative advantage and compatibility, as AMLPT supported cohort goals of deterring 
money laundering, as well as providing a means of automating the process, which 
increased efficiency throughout the social system. Consistency in role and norm 
congruence, as well as control, also resulted from demonstrated compatibility and 
relative advantage, as staff maintained and improved proficiency at profile creation and 
detection methods, as well as standardising processes.
The ability of AMLPT to ensure repeatable processes was significant in 
supporting role congruence, particularly at the FOREX house, given their staffing 
shortage. Consistency and congruence created increased effectiveness in staff training, 
shortening the time between hiring and deploying a new hire as a meaningful resource. 
The findings from chapter 5 show that complexity was far more apparent than first 
articulated in the survey, when compared to informal acknowledgement of not only the 
complexity of AMLPT, but also the ever-changing, and oft-times ambiguous regulatory 
remit. The analysts in particular complained more about regulatory complexity, while the 
MLROs and compliance officers complained about complexity relative to both AMLPT 
and regulatory requirements. When an analyst did express a complaint about AMLPT, it 
wasn’t that AMLPT was too technically complex, rather that the system generated large 
amounts of unstructured data. Such large volumes of data increased the demands on 
analysts, along with exponentially increasing the pool of potential behavioural variables, 
which in turn, created more analytical demands.
Further analysis shows that Campbell’s OE measures support a centrist, 
controlling model of effectiveness, specifically the OE attribute of control, and it is 
appropriate that cohort members perceived the greatest measures of effectiveness relative 
to AMLPT use in controlling the flow of SARs throughout the transaction monitoring 
process. As was noted in chapter 5, control, and control as manifested through the OE
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attribute of environmental utilisation, was driven primarily by the analysts. The findings 
also show that manual SARs processing as been completely replaced by AMLPT; 
furthermore, the centrality of AMLPT has served to improve not only control, but also 
intra- and inter-organisational communication.
6.4 A summary o f the findings and their applicability to the research question
The analysis offered in chapter 6 provides a variety of illuminating insights and 
interpretations of the use, deployment and inherent characteristics of AMLPT, not only 
as a technical instrument, but also as an organisational phenomenon as well. The use of 
diffusion of innovation and organisational effectiveness theories allowed a rich 
assessment of not only AMLPT’s embedded attributes, but also of those tasked with its 
use, as well as the ramifications of that use, for instance in the form of SAR reporting, 
that culminated from these combined actions. It is clear that the transaction monitoring 
process is fraught with ambiguity and supposition. More so, the findings show that using 
quantitative inputs to model qualitative-based behaviour is questionable at best; the 
analysis demonstrates that innovation is best used to improve qualitative measures within 
the profile; that is to say, the re-defining and re-structuring of known behavioural 
attributes, rather than striving for perfection of the unknown through techno-centric 
innovation.
Furthermore, the research demonstrates a contribution on several levels. First, 
that AMLPT is insufficient by itself as a means to deter money laundering. It must be 
used in an environment wherein users appreciate its limitations and innovate 
accordingly. Second, the research firmly established that there is no single, universally 
acknowledged set of parameters that define money laundering. As current detection 
methods emphasise relational methods of linking known suspect behavioural types to 
perceived illegitimate behaviours, AMLPT cannot “learn” those behaviours without rules
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or set expectations. Therefore, detection is at the mercy of what is known -  the rules -  
versus the need to identify what is unknown. However, despite these limitations, 
AMLPT’s role as a medium for information and communication provides significant 
organisational benefits to general organisational efficiency and to specific processes such 
as SAR reporting and transaction monitoring.
Lastly, the analysis determined that measures of an innovation’s rate o f  adoption 
are appropriate as means to gauge organisational effectiveness. Cohort organisations 
displayed a variety of both traits that reflected improvements in detection rates and other 
quantifiable measures. Innovation is also an appropriate tool for understanding a variety 
of organisational behaviours, beyond those of how organisations adopt and adapt to new 
technologies. While grounded in communication theory, diffusion of innovation theory 
demonstrated a potential for use beyond traditional diffusion analysis, and provides 
methods for understanding iterative and incremental thought processes across a variety 
of organisations and technical competencies. The action of behavioural profiling, as 
embedded within the AMLPT artifact, is essentially a subjective method, and is shaped 
by human judgement as well as a variety of technical, formal, and informal contexts, in 
creating a representation of money laundering behaviour. AMLPT as a system is 
revealed as a means to broker a variety of behaviours, actions, and information that is 
dependent on both internal and external stimuli, from which a deliberate suspicion can be 
articulated into some form of actionable meaning. Moreover, this broker role is 
subsumed into the predominate role of innovation locus, wherein formal and informal 
behaviours and norms combine to identify, interpret, and address conflict, cohesion and 
motive, through innovation, re-structuring, or re-interpreting meanings in regulation, 
social mores, and criminal intent.
The social sciences are rich with research addressing the problem of ascertaining 
criminal intent, motive, or other predictive attributes; therein is the perceived benefit of
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AMLPT as a means to detect money laundering or other forms of acquisitive crime. 
AMLPT is the natural progression of financial technology: sophisticated algorithms, 
coupled with data mining and vast computational power that can provide a solution that 
in this case, answers the question of “who”, rather than “what”, as is often the case in 
complex stock trading, currency exchange, or other computationally-demanding 
financial transactions. This dissertation argues that innovation is a natural response to the 
inherent ambiguity in behavioural profiling and addresses both the technical and socio- 
institutional responses, from a learning perspective. The profiling process is as much 
about the preconceived notions of the MLRO, as it is the computational capabilities of 
AMLPT; the MLRO accounts for not only criminal intent, but also that of institutional 
risk tolerance, the regulatory mood and other subjective measures that extend the level of 
re-inventiveness within a set of specific attributes. At the socio-institutional level, 
compliance is perceived as a hedge against the tyranny of regulation, and what many in 
the cohort perceive as capricious rule-making. Profiling is a self-fulfilling activity in 
many ways, in that the very profile itself is based on identifying behaviours that trigger 
events predicated on extant norms, rather than any spontaneous event.
Furthermore, the research in this dissertation establishes that technical 
sophistication is but a means of manifesting, of translating, human conjecture into a 
machine-readable representation of suspicion -  nothing more. It cannot, with any degree 
of certainty, identify a money launderer; it can only report behaviour that may indicate a 
pattern of criminal intent, but ultimately, it is human acceptance of conjectural 
probability that results in a SAR. AMLPT is the classic “silver bullet;” a technological 
solution touted as a means to master, to slay, the complexities of the transaction 
monitoring process. Furthermore, this research has shown that AMLPT is effective in 
automating certain processes, as well as facilitating communication within the 
compliance organisation. More so, AMLPT provides effective improvements in the skills
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and intellectual capital within the compliance group, which in turn, improves over-all 
organisational effectiveness; however, as a stand-alone deterrent to money laundering, 
AMLPT is of marginal benefit.
This dissertation sought to determine if computerised profiling tools are effective 
in support of AML procedures as required by MLROs and compliance officers in a 
banking context. The research analysis throughout chapter 6, argues that is indeed the 
case, albeit through means above and beyond that of simply automating a set of 
processes and procedures. In its role as a locus of innovation, AMLPT is effective in 
communicating action to individuals, as to their roles, tasks, and behaviours, from both 
external and internal stimuli. Furthermore, it then acts as a means of processing, of 
brokering a variety of data, in support of a process we categorise as deliberate 
speculation.
Given that speculation and conjecture comprise the impetus for the profiling 
exercise itself, we further determined that AMLPT is effective in supporting this process. 
However, the complexity of human behaviour is not easily quantified, and AMLPT fails 
in this regard. Moreover, given the volume of data AMLPT is capable of processing, it 
then becomes of question of cognisance, of attribute overload within the MLRO unit. 
Selectivity then enters the process, and any probability of further quantifying accuracy 
degrades accordingly. In a variety of methods, AMLPT translates not only man-machine 
communication, but selective informal attributes as well.
The research showed that the institutional perceptions, of not only AMLPT, but 
also that of the compliance function as a whole, were reflected in the varying perceptions 
of legitimacy regarding the entire compliance and regulatory regime. Subsequently, this 
dissertation established that the much of the perceived effectiveness of AMLPT was due 
in part to socio-organisational receptivity within the compliance and institutional social 
systems, as much as that of AMLPT’s perceived technical benefits. Lastly, this
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dissertation reasserts the legitimacy of interpretive inquiry as a method for cognising 
technology; it further underscores the appropriateness of Orlikowski’s (1992) 
observation that technology is a product of, and medium for, human action, as influenced 
by institutional conditions and consequences.
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C hapter 7. The Contribution, Future Research Directions, and Conclusion
The following discussion surveys the contributions of the research in the areas of 
practice, theory and methodology. Several contributions are significant, while others 
serve to validate the efforts of previous researchers in the areas of innovation and 
Organisational studies. Lastly, potential areas of research that validate and further 
expand on the findings presented in chapter 6 are identified for future investigations.
7.2 Contributions to Practice
The discussion in chapter 6 as to the effectiveness of AMLPT in support of 
MLROs and compliance officers, as measured through attributes of innovation and 
organisational effectiveness, demonstrated that the experiences of the cohort were typical 
of those of the financial sector, based on examples from the literature, and industry 
commentary. The ambiguity inherent in defining money laundering, indeed, even 
quantifying the scope of the problem, in addition to establishing a consensus as to what 
constitutes a suspicious transaction, was a consistent theme throughout the research. 
Moreover, this ontological incoherence is acknowledged by not only regulators such as 
the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), but also a growing body of academic 
researchers.
The impact of financial crime cannot be understated; however, what is at issue is 
the lack of a uniform approach by regulators at the national and international level. The 
lack of uniformity results in the escalating costs of enforcement, not only of deterring 
money laundering, but also other forms of acquisitive crime; furthermore, the research 
demonstrated that cohort organisations realised few tangible benefits from their 
significant outlay in money and resources in deterring money laundering, aside from 
those of preserving reputational integrity and avoiding sanctions. The current regulatory 
remit is far more pervasive than when the AML-CFT regime first came to prominence
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post-9/11. The need to collect ever-increasing amounts of data within a variety of 
commercial transactions, such as registering a car, or obtaining a passport, now affects 
privacy at all levels of society (Schwartau 1994; Jennings and Fena 2000; Lyon 2003), 
but even more so within the banking industry itself. In terms of “the greater good”, only 
one cohort member interviewed during this research articulated a national security ethos 
as to the importance they place on AML-CFT policies. However, it was taken for granted 
by the majority of cohort members, that the entrenched banking ethos of customer 
privacy, as to a customer’s account and transaction history - their monetary privacy 
(Donaghy 2002) - was of even greater importance.
In general, banks share a great reluctance to the sharing of proprietary customer 
data, and this was reflected early on in the study, in the heterophilous behaviour among 
the cohort. While this reluctance was somewhat abrogated by regulatory need, data 
exchange was often problematic, given that the data a MLRO requested in support of 
transaction monitoring, was not the typical marketing and demographic data traditionally 
shared inter-departmentally. The minutiae of details required for effective profile 
creation was considered to be “too intrusive” in some cohort organisations, and often 
times resulted in prolonged negotiations, or required the intercession of senior 
management outside of the compliance organisation, to gain the requisite access.
This dissertation empirically reflected many of the difficulties inherent in 
identifying and quantifying money laundering identified by the FATF (2009), Beare and 
Schneider (2007), and the many other sources mentioned in chapter 2. The inestimable 
nature of money laundering engenders complexity as to the identification of legitimate 
and illegitimate transactions, as well as to the interpretation of the myriad permutations 
of licit and illicit capital movements among financial institutions, resulting in, more often 
than not, deterrence methods driven by rote process, rather than by any investigative 
justification.
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Furthermore, the empirical research identified new concerns in the use of 
AMLPT, along with several process and task enhancements, as well as improvements to 
work practice for AML-CFT practitioners deploying AMLPT. In highlighting these 
potential improvements, the research provides practical contributions for two 
constituents within the social system (see also table 7.1.1):
• Heads of compliance tasked with not only deterring money laundering, 
but also other forms of acquisitive crime, such as fraud and identity theft;
• MLROs, in their capacity as direct managers of the technical and 
organisational employment o f transaction monitoring, KYC-due diligence 
tools and processes, as well as training and skills development.
In highlighting the practitioner contributions relevant to heads of compliance, 
some additional commentary may be o f assistance in clarifying the context of the 
contribution. The exposure of large corporate frauds in the 1990s, as well as the 
emergent threat of terrorism has transformed the nature of compliance. In the City, 
research by Bosworth-Davies (1993) and others, had demonstrated that the compliance 
function was viewed with distain, and perceived as “looking over one’s shoulder” while 
doing business. However, the BCCI scandal,13 along with acknowledgement among 
regulators, such as the FATF and FSA and law enforcement in general, of the ever- 
increasing spread of trans-national crime and global terrorism, elevated the compliance 
function to one of prominence. While still perceived in some quarters as a “necessary 
evil”, institutions in the City can no longer function without a significant investment in 
compliance, and have now accepted this fact, albeit reluctantly.14 Subsequently, with the 
further regulatory responsibilities of the post-9/11 compliance regime now an ongoing 
concern, heads of compliance must look to improved efficiencies among technological, 
organisational, and structural elements within their businesses.
13 A case study o f  the BCCI scandal is included in section 8.3 o f  the Appendix.
14 In 2004, the FSA estimated these costs at £174 Million; no more current figure is available; see 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ml_cost-benefit.pdf. In 2005, the SAR regime alone cost an estimated 
£60 Million; see section 6.3.1 for a detailed discussion o f SARs compliance costs.
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The research demonstrated that AMLPT, while not optimal as a deterrent to 
money laundering, provided significant improvements in internal communication among 
not only the compliance function, but with the institution as a whole. From a business 
perspective, AMLPT was able expeditiously to generate reports and other outputs, 
detailing a variety of regulatory and compliance metrics. Cohort compliance heads were 
then able to detail comprehensively their organisation’s efforts, and enhance those 
measures already in place to protect an institution’s reputation, with not only the 
regulator, but also among competitors and customers alike.
The first practitioner contribution is in the area of management process. In the
view of cohort heads of compliance, this research project uncovered capabilities that
were transformational in the perception of AMLPT, from simply a technology medium
to one of vital informational content, and contributed to improved data and knowledge
exchange among the discrete regulatory and compliance functions of fraud, risk
mitigation, data privacy, and AML. As a result of this transformation, cohort heads of
compliance acknowledged the following result:
• Use of AMLPT as an information broker, rather than simply as a stand­
alone technology, provided them greater visibility across their entire 
organisation, along with the ability to allocate and delegate management 
responsibilities more efficiently, and the means to manage reputational 
integrity more consistently.
MLROs from the research cohort also benefited from the same transformational 
perception of AMLPT’s place in the organisation, but in more localised terms. The 
practical contribution for MLROs were realised in a number of functional areas, mainly 
in transaction monitoring and SAR processing.
The benefits of this transformation were evident primarily among work practices
in the use of external data sources. This was a result of the research process having
enabling a revaluation of existing technological determinism within the MLRO unit.
Rather than depending on AMLPT alone, staff recognised the importance of interactive,
224
non-technical external profile stimuli, such as marketing or demographic-type data, 
customer account data sourced at the branch level, or other data inputs not traditionally 
included in building profiles.
Furthermore, the MLRO unit began to solicit input from other relevant groups, 
such as the fraud department, rather than depending on a single, unidirectional data 
source for feeding the profiling process. In addition to improving the quality of 
externally derived data, the MLRO unit’s ability to identify useful profiling attributes 
also improved as a result of the increased volume of richer data. An additional benefit of 
diverse data sources was that cohort MLROs were able to realise improvements in 
training in data analysis skills, which, in some groups, created the need for additional 
analyst roles. The increased staffing requirements were due to the greater breadth of data 
sources, and the commensurate increase in the volume of incoming transaction data.
The most significant contribution to practice from this research, concerns the re­
defining of the MLRO unit’s comprehension of innovation attributes, such as re- 
invention, re-defining and re-structuring, as a means of improving work practice and 
productivity. These improvements were realised within the behavioural profiling process, 
as well as in the over-all use of AMLPT, and in general improvements in organisational 
efficiency. When the research project commenced, cohort members articulated an 
understanding of the author’s use of categories of innovation as a means to identify 
cohort behaviours; however, by the end of the research project, they also grasped the 
utility of these categories in providing a method of measuring the performance of 
AMLPT. As a contribution to practitioners, it is important to note here that the 
transformational benefits of AMLPT were realised among a limited sample of financial 
professionals; however, they can also be recognised as general improvements to the 
entire AML-CFT practitioner community. Given the scope of practitioner literature and 
conferences, as well as the growing interest in behavioural profiling among academics,
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the author is confident that the practical contributions identified here will be of benefit to 
compliance practitioners at all levels of the compliance function.
The research in this dissertation highlighted the fact that, as a result of pre­
existing techno-determinism, the MLRO unit had not considered the potential 
improvements in communication and work flow that AMLPT offered, aside from those 
of analytics. Prior to the introduction of innovation attributes to the MLRO unit, informal 
structures with the unit had created a predicable work flow that was principally alert 
driven. While this remains unchanged, the cycle time of the profiling process was 
improved, by incorporating external data sources that were now analysed for attributes 
indicative of illegitimacy. The research demonstrated that branch teller staff generated 
the greatest volume of suspicious activity reports. However, with the introduction of 
additional external data sources, the MLRO had a means to correlate branch-level SAR 
reporting against activity reported by the fraud department, or from other, previously 
unexploited sources, such as the customer support organisation. This allowed the MLRO 
unit the ability to prioritise and proactively identify potential suspicious transactions, 
through more deliberate analysis based on multiple sources, rather than only branch-level 
SAR reporting.
The research illustrated the fact that without re-defining and re-structuring these 
external data sources, analysts were limited in their ability to create a richer qualitative 
picture of a suspicious transaction. Therefore, among cohort analysts, the research 
contributed to formalising the process of incremental innovation. Incremental innovation 
took the form of re-definition and re-structuring, of both external and external data 
sources, which resulted in improved productivity by reducing the number of false- 
positives. Prior to formalising the acquisition process for external data, these sources 
were usually ignored, and the aggregate profiling data was often “stale” and not
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reflective of institutional changes in customer account information, or other contributory 
factors that often had a direct impact on the accuracy of a profile.
Within the social system, the research determined that, from not only from 
chapter 2’s discussion, but also within the findings in chapter 5, that both the regulatory 
milieu and deterrence practices, such as those commensurate with AML-CFT measures, 
are highly subjective. Subjectivity also exists at the regulatory level, as money 
laundering cannot be quantified in any meaningful way. This has resulted is ever- 
increasing levels of bureaucracy and rule-making to cover every possible contingency.
Furthermore, within the AML-CFT domain, there is a great deal of subjectivity 
surrounding the definition of illegitimate behaviour. For instance, legitimate tax 
avoidance can be “confused” with illicit capital movements, or that an Islamic charity 
immediately implies a front for jihadist funding.
Moreover, the proceeds of ordinary acquisitive crime are often miscast as 
“terrorist funding” due to subjective determinations by either intelligence agencies or law 
enforcement. Subjectivity also exists at the AMLPT level, as a result of social prejudice, 
institutional conditioning, and personal biases, often a result of historical precedent as 
previously identified chapter 2. Additionally, organisational biases also impart 
subjectivity, as identified in chapter 5.
Practitioner Level Description o f Contribution
Head of Compliance
AMLPT as information broker provides greater visibility into compliance 
organisation, thus affording HoCs the ability to better allocate 
management responsibilities and manage reputational integrity
MLRO
Use o f  innovation attributes to improve work practice and productivity 
within the behavioural profiling process and over-all use o f AMLPT
Social system
Regulatory milieu and deterrence practices are highly subjective; money 
laundering cannot be quantified; results in ever-increasing levels o f  
bureaucracy and rule making to cover every possible contingency or 
launderer behaviour.
Table 7.1.1 -  Summary of dissertation’s contributions to practice
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7.2 Contributions to Theory
The theoretical origin of this dissertation is found in diffusion of innovation 
theory, notably in the work of E. M. Rogers (1962; 1983; 1995; 2003). Diffusion of 
Innovation theory was chosen for this research as it provides rich categorisation and 
behavioural metaphors; metaphors that help interpret AMLPT’s role as a stand-alone 
innovation, and the process by which the relative advantage of AMLPT is 
communicated within the organisation. Furthermore, diffusion of innovation theory is 
unique in its use of time as a dimension, for instance in accounting for the rate o f  
adoption or rejection of an innovation.
Furthermore, the use of time provides a framework or continuum, for defining the 
steps, actions, and participants within the adoption decision process, all of which are 
useful elements in understanding how and why individuals and organisations chose to 
adopt a particular technology. Lastly, Dol theory provides a rich analytical method for 
understanding the role a social system plays in the adoption process, which was of 
significant value in this research, given the focus on both individual and organisational 
innovation adoption. Moreover, given the rapid adoption of AMLPT tools post-9/11, the 
dimension of time was useful in providing insight into the contributory factors of 
AMLPT’s rapid rate of adoption and deployment, as well as categorising behaviours that 
may have led to early, rather than late adoption of AMLPT.
Overall, the research catalogued extensive evidence of a variety of adoption 
behaviours, attributes, and roles that were consistent with Rogers’ characteristics of 
innovations and adopter behaviours. The research findings presented in chapter 5 and the 
subsequent analysis in chapter 6, presented some interesting contributions for the body of 
diffusion of innovation theory, and are described in the following section, and 
summarised in table 7.2.2 at the end of this section.
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The findings resulted in several major and minor theoretical contributions. First, 
the research further validated two of the four critiques of Dol theory as articulated by 
Rogers: pro-innovation bias and source bias. Subsequently, three minor theoretical 
contributions emerge from the findings in regard to bias. Second, the research findings 
identified two significant limitations in diffusion of innovation theory, limitations that 
are not acknowledged by Rogers.
Fichman (2004), Orlikowski and others (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; 
Orlikowski and Robey 1991a), as well as Rogers (2003) and Rogers and Shoemaker 
(1971) all warn of the potential for pro-innovation bias in assessing adoption attributes, 
such as “earliness” in the adoption of an innovation, or the extent or rate of an 
innovation’s adoption. Prior to embarking on the research project, the growing 
significance of transaction monitoring (and therefore AMLPT) within the post-9/11 
AML-CFT compliance regime, led to the author initially entertaining a pro-innovation 
bias. This was based on reviewing the technical literature on AMLPT, as well as 
conversations with practitioners. From the technical review and informal conversations 
among early adopters, the overwhelming perception was that AMLPT as an innovation 
was “good” -  Fichman’s “Right Stuff,” as discussed in section 3.5. This perception of 
“goodness” then mitigates an innovation’s chances of experiencing either rejection or re- 
invention.
However, as the research demonstrated, this perception of “goodness” was not 
the case with AMLPT, based not only on the results of the interviews and survey, but 
also from the author’s observations. AMLPT was subject to a variety of adoption 
attributes: re-invention, re-structuring, and re-defining, along with discontinuance, and 
even rejection of certain facets of AMLPT. Furthermore, contrary to the literature on 
diffusion of innovation, once the research was underway, the author’s initial pro­
innovation bias gave way to one of neutrality. Fichman, Rogers, and Orlikowski all
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argue that pro-innovation bias is endemic within innovation research; however, none of 
them ever empirically state that while the bias can be acknowledged, it cannot be 
overcome.
This supposed inability to overcome pro-innovation bias is counter to the author’s 
experience, and thus forms the first minor contribution to theory: pro-innovation bias can 
be substantially neutralised, provided the researcher is cognisant, through a sound 
theoretical and methodological grounding, that the potential for pro-innovation bias does 
exist. The ability to negate this bias is important, given the observation by Rogers (2003) 
and more recently Phillips (2007), Igira (2008), and Koellinger (2008), that pro­
innovation bias continues to represent an ongoing problem for diffusion scholars, 
particularly in the area of causality.
A second minor contribution addresses an omission in Rogers’ behavioural 
categorisation of change agents. Rogers’ identifies change agents as individuals who 
promote a particular innovation, rather than those individuals considered potential 
adopters. Rogers further states that the role of change agent is unique to diffusion of 
innovation in organisations. However, the research identified the existence of multiple 
change agents across several distinct social systems, rather than only within a given 
social system. In this regard, the primary social system was defined by the MLRO unit, 
as it constituted the principle research domain. Secondary social systems comprise the 
larger institution and regulatory regime. Within this context, of greater significance was 
the action of change agents as boundary spanners between social systems, rather than 
simply effecting change within a social system.
Boundary spanning change agents were essential in communicating the value of 
AMLPT’s abilities to heterophilous organisations, rather than Rogers’ individual-centric 
description of heterophily. Rogers includes change agents as another potential cause for 
bias, in that researchers may side with change agents because of their dynamic role in
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the diffusion process. Rogers (1976; 2003) categorizes this shortcoming as source bias, 
and posits that this bias “is perhaps suggested by the words that we use to describe this 
field of research: ‘diffusion’ research might have been called something like ‘problem 
solving’, ‘innovation seeking’, or ‘evaluation of innovations’ had the audience originally 
been a stronger influencer on this research”.
However, while MLROs were more often than not the most visible change agents 
and boundary spanners within their organisations, individual members, such as analysts, 
support staff and trainers, also acted as change agents within their specific area of 
expertise. Interestingly, Rogers makes no accommodation for multiple change agents 
within the innovation process in organisations.
Moreover, he states that change agents usually possess some form of advanced 
education as a means of legitimising their influence. This was not the case among the 
cohort, as legitimacy was normally recognised through technical or other role-based 
competency. For instance, analysts, given their expertise with the profiling process, were 
both boundary spanners and change agents, as they served to highlight the inherent 
benefits of AMLPT to the compliance organisation, through the use of non-formalised 
external sources of profiling data, such as data from other financial institutions, or 
criminal cases sourced from the media. Due to the variety of demonstrated change 
agency, there was, in turn, an implied, informal hierarchy of AML process expertise, 
emanating outward from AMLPT, to the boundaries of the compliance social system. 
This change agent behaviour was repeated in varying forms throughout the cohort. 
Rogers’ fails to account for the fact that change agency is also situational, and not simply 
innovation-specific.
Furthermore, the research illustrated that change agents exhibit varying levels of 
embedded expertise, which implies a lack of categorical coherence and rigor in Rogers’ 
attributes of organisational innovation, when compared to those of individual innovation.
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This lack of categorical rigor has also been articulated by other diffusion scholars, such 
as Swanson (1994), Rajagopal (2002), Tomatzky and Klein (1982), as well as Moore and 
Benbasat (1991). Subsequently, the third minor contribution also emerges from 
categorical ambiguity, in regards to Rogers’ separation of individual innovation from 
that of organisational innovation, and the categorisation therein of interactive innovation.
In chapter 6, we argued that the findings exposed ambiguity in Rogers’ 
categorisation of interactive innovation. More specifically, how interactive innovation 
pertains to the concept of critical mass within diffusion networks as means of defining 
communication among adopters in a system. However, the findings also demonstrate that 
interactivity among adopters is also a task and role-specific series of actions. Such 
actions, while indicative of adoption, are also indicative of productivity in those tasks 
and roles, rather than only of communicative action.
Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that interactive innovation is not only a 
function of the rate of an innovation’s adoption within a single social system, but also 
among multiple social systems. Given this function, interactive innovation could also be 
considered as a means of indicating productivity within a social system, rather than 
simply as another form of communicative action among individuals and social systems. 
In other words, the more interactive the communication among adopters in a social 
system, the more productive they become through the adoption of an innovation. 
Interactivity, by definition, implies repeated use of an artefact or process.
Therefore, the more familiar an adopter becomes with an innovation, the more 
adopters realise a relative advantage, along with other perceived benefits in work 
practices, such as productivity. Among the cohort, productivity gains were indicated in 
three distinct areas of interactive innovation: SAR processing, training, and the use of 
multiple data sources. Furthermore, interactive innovation can also be categorised as re-
2 3 2
defining, principally within tasks supporting the use of multiple data sources, and as re­
structuring, in the task of SAR processing and in training tasks and roles.
Productivity in SAR processing was indicated in two areas: the first was in the 
volume of SARs processed; the second, in the turn-around time of SARs, defined as 
when an initial SAR report is generated, to when it is forwarded to the FIU. When 
AMLPT was first adopted, early adopter analysts only recognised a 10% increase in 
SARs processed over the previous manual process, with no commensurate decrease in 
turn-around time. As the analysts interacted more with AMLPT, initially through re­
structuring profiling attributes, as well as the technical parameters of the transaction 
monitoring process, productivity was indicated initially in the increased volume of SARs 
processed. Manual profiling, as well as early use of automated profiling, typically 
employed static data, sourced primarily from branch teller staff, that was then batch 
processed. With the introduction of multiple data sources, the profiling process itself 
became iterative and interactive, rather than simply re-using the same batch of branch 
SAR data. Moreover, as analysts continued to interact with AMLPT, they were able to 
not only re-define the profile itself, but also re-structure the SAR reporting process, 
reducing SAR turn-around time from an average of 15 to 20 working days to 10 
working days.
Furthermore, the use of multiple data sources allowed analysts the ability to re­
structure this data, by eliminating redundant or spurious data from the pool of profiling 
attributes. With this “cleaner” data, analysts were no longer required to make multiple 
data queries to extract useful profiling attributes; they could then focus on efficiently 
processing ever-larger volumes of data, which also enhanced productivity.
Increases in training productivity were indicated in several areas within cohort 
organisations. First, training was re-structured through the use of self-paced, computer- 
based training (CBT) augmented with real-world case studies, extracted from AMLPT
233
data. Second, as MLROs increased their interactivity with AMLPT, training resources 
were re-structured, using materials drawn from multiple data sources, actual SAR 
reporting data, and other real-world case study materials. From these materials, MLROs 
were able to build a rich catalogue of training resources for training not only current 
staff, but also newly hired employees. Productivity was indicated in the increase of self­
managed training and certification, along with realising over-all improvements in role 
and skills proficiency. As a result, staff were able to gain professional accreditation more 
quickly, rather than waiting for formal in-house or external training, along with also 
increasing the MLRO unit’s general productivity.
More importantly, the self-paced process also fostered additional interaction with 
AMLPT, through the use of hands-on case study examples. Another indicator of training 
productivity was realised through shortening the time a newly hired employee became 
productive within the organisation. Rather than using rote training materials or classroom 
settings, the case studies generated through interactive innovation, in the areas of 
profiling and analysis, proved more effective as learning tools than instructor-led 
training. Lastly, in several cohort organisations, seasoned employees were encouraged to 
use self-paced training to become cross-trained in other skills or roles, or to improve 
mentoring skills.
Therefore, the third and final minor contribution is the determination that 
interactive innovation can be used as an indicator of productivity within the social 
system. The use of interactive innovation, as a means to indicate productivity, is 
consistent within this dissertation, given the integrated use of organisational 
effectiveness attributes and those of innovation adoption as indicators of AMLPT 
effectiveness. Further support for use of interactive innovation, as an indicator of 
productivity, is also found in Rogers’ work (2003). He states that a fourth criticism of 
diffusion theory also pertains to the monadic aspect of adopters, relative to the
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consequences of adoption; specifically, the distribution of perceived socioeconomic 
benefits among individuals within the system. However, Rogers speaks only in terms of 
the consequences of an innovation’s adoption, rather than any quantifiable or qualitative 
goal or indicator. Rather than a value or benefit-based consequence, we argue that the 
findings reveal that interactive innovation, within the innovation adoption process, may 
provide an indicator of ongoing organisational productivity, rather than highlighting 
differing rates (or speed -  Rogers (2003) of an innovation’s adoption within a social 
system. Rogers further states that such socioeconomic disparity can be found in any 
system under investigation, predominately in studies undertaken in developing nations.
We attribute Rogers’ reluctance to use productivity as an indicator of adoption 
behaviour, to our observation that many of his early case studies focussed primarily on 
the social economic benefits of innovation, in either rural or deprived societies, rather 
than within technology-driven social systems. We argue that “disparity” is not a proper 
description of the result of an innovation’s adoption within a social system; rather, 
productivity imparts a tangible indicator of an innovation’s benefit or value among 
members of a social system, as derived from an innovation’s adoption. Rogers 
categorises these disparities as “equality gaps”, categorising such gaps as computational 
advantages, funding, and other structural mechanisms, as well as individual 
considerations such as training. However, he offers no means of indicating these gaps, 
hence the suggested inclusion of productivity as a qualitative indicator of rate o f  
adoption, along with further qualifying “gap equality”.
Moreover, what is clear from the use of Dol theory is that rate o f  adoption, 
although a key theoretical tenet cannot be used without empirical contextual 
understanding of the social system. Rogers’ devotes much of his work to defining the 
constituent elements that contribute to an innovation’s rate o f adoption, but much less on 
the social system itself. We submit that they are crucially interdependent, rather than
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independent considerations. Further to this observation, is the suggestion that Rogers 
should re-evaluate all the constituent elements within rate o f adoption, specifically as it 
relates to rate o f adoption in organisational innovation. Subsequently, the crux of the 
dissertation’s significant theoretical contribution is drawn from this observation.
The significant contribution to theory is found in the inclusion of Rate o f  
Adoption, defined as either continuous or incremental, as an independent variable within 
Rogers’ model of organisational innovativeness. However, we do not propose the 
inclusion of incremental innovation as yet another type of innovation, as articulated by 
Gatignon, Tushman, et al. (2002) who define incremental innovations as “those that 
improve price/performance advances at a rate consistent with the technical trajectory”. 
Rather, we propose the addition of rate o f  adoption, inclusive of continuous or 
incremental innovation, as an independent variable of organisational innovativeness, as 
illustrated in figure 7.2.1.
In depen den t Variables D epen den t V ariable
INDIVIDUAL (LEADER) CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Attitude toward change (+) \
INTERNAL CHARACTERISES OF 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
1. Centralization (-)
Figure 7.2.1 -  Revised Independent Variables Related to Organisational 
Innovativeness, illustrating inclusion of Rate ofAdoption as either Continuous or 
Incremental (From Rogers (2003))
We previously noted that Rogers makes no mention incremental rates o f
adoption', instead, he uses “stages” as metaphor for what is essentially a chronological
progression. Furthermore, he implies that both individual and organisational innovation
2. Complexity (+) ORGANISATIONAL
INNOVATIVENESS3. Formalization (-)4. Interconnectedness (+)
5. Organisational slack (+)
6. Size (+)
EXTERNAL CHARATERISTTCS OF 
THE ORGANISATION 
1. System openness (+)
RATE OF ADOPTION
1. Continuous
2. Incremental
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processes are continuous. Rogers uses stages to identify thresholds or benchmarks of an 
innovation’s adoption; however, while useful in this research for correlating innovation 
as a measure of organisational effectiveness, further analysis exposes a weakness in this 
assumption, specifically as it relates to individual innovation within an organisation. 
Within Rogers’ model of the innovation process within organisations, he defines two 
distinct phases: phase I, initiation, and phase II, implementation. Within phase II, he 
includes the processes of re-defining and re-structuring an innovation, wherein the 
innovation is modified and re-invented to f it  the organisation, and the organisational 
structures are altered to accommodate the innovation.
The research noted that both behaviours were widely evident among the cohort, 
but contrary to Rogers’ assumption of continuity, these behaviours often resulted in 
discontinuity in the rate of adoption. Rogers accounts for discontinuity, calling it 
discontinuance, which he describes as an individual's decision to reject an innovation 
after it has been adopted. However, this is an incorrect categorisation for several reasons. 
First, once the relative advantage of profiling had been established, it was constantly re­
defined and re-structured, given the internal and external stimuli employed to refine the 
element of suspicion -  the alert -  that initiates the profiling process. Moreover, the 
profiling process, while iterative relative to data analysis, always maintained a 
progressive and continuous adoption trajectory, inclusive of some AMLPT functions 
being discarded or rejected by both individuals and the organisation; however, the 
profiling process was still universally adopted and not rejected in its entirety. Rogers’ 
description of discontinuance conflicts with the incremental, and thus, varying rates of 
adoption, demonstrated by cohort organisations, in their selective adoption of specific 
features and functions within AMLPT.
Second, profiling aside, no cohort organisation simultaneously deployed all the 
various technical capabilities within the AMLPT platform; rather, certain role-specific
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functionality was trialled and adopted, thus creating the phenomenon of sub-unit 
incremental innovation, a phenomenon not acknowledged by Rogers. Sub-unit 
incremental innovation was in contrast to continuous, linear adoption at the higher, 
organisational level, and that of the adoption of automated profiling in general. For 
instance, some cohort MLRO organisations had made extensive use of data mining, 
incrementally introducing ever larger data sets into the analysis process across the 
organisation. This then resulted in greater demands on the existing technical 
infrastructure, in areas such as processing power and data storage. Subsequently, the 
MLRO then re-defined the minimal requirements necessary for transaction monitoring, 
in increments that would not overwhelm the technology infrastructure. The technical 
limitations were such that only a reduced set of AMLPT was in use at any one time, and 
incrementally adopted as the situation warranted.
Significance Description o f  Contribution
Minor
• Pro-innovation bias can be substantially neutralised, provided the 
researcher is cognisant, through sound theoretical, as well as 
methodologically grounding, that the potential for bias does exist.
•  Multiple change agents can exist across a social system, rather 
than only within a given social system; they also act as boundary 
spanners among social systems
• Interactive innovation can be used as a indicator of productivity 
within the social system
Major
• Proposed inclusion of Rate of Adoption, as an independent 
variable within Rogers ’ model of organisational innovation, when 
defined as either continuous or incremental innovation
•  That innovation adoption is not only linear; it is also iterative and 
reflexive, and among the cohort, was only continuous within the 
adoption process relative to profiling.
Table 7.2.2 -  Summary of dissertation’s contributions to theory 
Lastly, this contribution also provides another avenue of analysis to address a 
significant problem with Rogers’ linear models in general. The findings repeatedly 
demonstrated that innovation adoption is only linear in certain respects. It is more often
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than not progressively iterative, at times reflexive, and among the cohort, was continuous 
only within the adoption process relative to AMLPT.
7.3 Contributions to Methodology
The study utilised an ensemble of qualitative data collection tools, combining 
primary and secondary data sources that, in turn, provide a comprehensive perspective of 
the phenomenon under study (Eisenhardt 1989). Furthermore, the author called on tools 
and methods such as various models of innovation, as articulated by Rogers (2003), 
Swanson (1994), and Kwon and Zmud (1987), as well as models and theories relating to 
the relationship between technology and organisations, primarily through the work of 
Orlikowski (1992), and Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991). Given the breadth of 
organisational effectiveness research, Campbell (1977) and Cameron (1981; 1986) were 
particularly helpful in defining a set of coherent effectiveness criteria from the vast 
literature on the subject. Lastly, the author examined the narrative accounts captured in 
the structured and unstructured interviews, using Potter’s (1996) “talk and texts in 
interaction” to identify how various actors within the cohort interpreted effectiveness and 
innovation, as well as their perceptions of, and interactions with, the larger institutional 
and regulatory domains.
Given the inherent ambiguity and subjectivity evident within both the regulatory 
regime, and the phenomenon of money laundering itself, the utility of pluralist methods 
was significant in assisting the author in interpreting a variety of formal and informal 
situated actions (Suchman 1987). Such actions encompassed not only that within the 
innovation process, but also actions evident in daily work practices and other embedded 
norms, within not only the AMLPT technology artefact, but also evidenced within a 
variety of organisational contexts. The suitability of pluralist methods has by articulated 
by a number of eminent information systems scholars, such as Ciborra and Bra et al.
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(2000e), Robey (1996), Walsham (1995; 2002), Mingers (2001; 2003), and Kraemer and 
Dutton (1991), to the extent that methods from multiple theories can be incorporated into 
a metaparadigm, wherein “the goal is a more rich, holistic, and contextualised purview” 
(Lewis and Grimes 1999).
The suitability of pluralist methods was further demonstrated in this dissertation’s 
breadth of findings. Without drawing on research methods and tools from the 
behavioural sciences disciplines of communications and organisational studies, it would 
not have been possible to recognise certain behaviours and stimuli that exposed the 
theoretical limitations within Dol theory identified in section 7.2. This has led to a re­
appraisal of several elements in the theory; for instance, the use of productivity, rather 
than disparity, as a means of indicating the value of an innovation within a social system. 
Another is the revised model of organisational innovation that is inclusive of rates o f  
adoption, as is establishing that innovation is not a strictly linear phenomenon. Thus, the 
use of not only pluralist methodologies, but also two distinct theoretical lenses, those of 
Rogers, and Campbell, provided a major methodological contribution of this thesis.
7.4 Limitations o f the research
While the previous sections outlined the breadth of the dissertation’s 
contributions to research and practice, several limitations of the research should be 
acknowledged.
The empirical case considered in this dissertation concerned ascertaining the 
effectiveness of AMLPT in support of AML procedures, as required by MLROs and 
compliance officers in a banking context. It did not examine other AML compliance 
methods, such as the use of KYC and other due diligence procedures. Moreover, given 
the limited size of the subject group, it is not representative of other financial institutions, 
nor does the research assess comparative levels of AMLPT effectiveness among similar
240
organisations. Several of the issues raised in the research as to categorical ambiguity, in 
identifying adoptive behaviours in organisations, have also been identified in other 
innovation studies, notably by Blau (1970), Blau and McKinley (1979), Van de Ven 
(1986), and Moore and Benbasat (1991). Furthermore, by focussing only on compliance 
organisations, the MLRO unit specifically, other constituent elements in the compliance 
chain, such as teller staff, or other risk-mitigation organisations, such as fraud detection 
and identity protection, were not included. Subsequently, there could be concerns as to 
extrapolating the findings to other compliance organisations and financial institutions in 
general.
Many of the organisational and technology exigencies identified in deterring 
money laundering have also been identified in other studies of behavioural profiling and 
AMLPT use, notably those of Canhoto and Backhouse (2007; 2008), and Gill and Taylor 
(2003). The dissertation provided additional contextual material for scholars such as Gill 
and Taylor (2004), Reuter and Truman (2004; 2005), Harvey (2005; 2009), Harvey and 
Lau (2009), and Beare and Schneider (2007), whose work analyses the ambiguity in 
quantifying the extent of global money laundering. Furthermore, additional contextually 
relevant material may be of use in the work of Demetis and Angell (2006), Cary, Wen et 
al (2003) and Bedi (2004), whose research addresses the efficacy of risk-based anti­
money laundering policies and procedures. The dissertation also drew on work from 
Donaghy (2002), whose research encompasses other obstacles to efficient regulation, 
such as the data privacy concerns among banks, relative to pervasive customer account 
monitoring.
Additionally, several of the issues directly related to AMLPT’s limitations, 
primarily as a positivist solution to a systemic phenomenon of significant complexity, 
have been addressed by other researchers such as Angell and Demetis (2005), as well as 
Nardo (2006). Lastly, the research raised concerns as to the lack of regulatory
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consistency in quantifying not only the scope of global money laundering, but also the 
cost-effectiveness of regime measures to mitigate the illicit movement of money, as 
reflected in chapter 2’s historical context. A variety of both practitioner and academic 
studies have led to similar conclusions as those presented in this dissertation, and could 
legitimise claims that the research findings may be generalisable to quantifying the 
extent of money laundering in the United Kingdom’s financial institutions.
7.5 Suggested Directions fo r  Future Research
The final section of the dissertation considers the research’s scope and trajectory, 
and how the results can be further developed for future research. Given the limited 
sample of organisations, the initial logical point of departure would be an enlargement of 
the scope of the study, to include other types of financial institutions of varying size.
The cohort institutions engaged in similar types of banking, as well as being party 
to the same comprehensive regulatory environment albeit with different types of 
customers; therefore, enlarging the sample size would include differing levels of 
innovativeness, along with cultural diversity, which could aid in identifying alternate 
approaches to innovation adoption in a banking context. Moreover, increasing the scope 
of the research, for instance, by incorporating divergent organisational and technical 
contexts would be of benefit. Given the inherent ambiguity of money laundering and 
profiling, identifying a variety of contexts that are inclusive of more definitive 
descriptions of formal and informal roles and norms, could mitigate some of the 
ambiguity in defining illicit behaviour or suspicious transactions.
A second research direction would extend the study to other types of banking, 
such as Islamic banking, and currency exchange operations, such as money service 
bureaux, bureaux de change, and informal value transfer systems, such as hawala. Given 
the relationship-centric nature of Islamic and hawala-type banking, it would be
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extremely valuable to apply a similar study of behavioural profiling to these types of 
transactions, given the inherent systemic exclusivity of the transactional norms within 
both forms. Furthermore, the extensive presence of money service bureaux (MSBs) in 
the United Kingdom, as well as the diverse nature of the transactions involved therein, 
create their own unique set of profiling obstacles. MSBs engage in transactions such as 
pre-paid cash cards, money orders, and other types of “cashless” transactions, and thus 
pose significant problems in profiling specific types of behaviour. The first obstacle is 
the intermittent nature of the relationship between the MSB and its customers. The 
ability to profile is dependent on an ever-increasing pool of comparative attributes, based 
on the account history of a particular customer.
MSBs have few “regular” customers, so cataloguing historical profiling data 
becomes problematic; the majority of MSB users are atypical in their “account” 
behaviour, relative to that of customer account behaviour in high street banks. The 
second obstacle relates to the attributes of the transaction, in that the majority of such 
transactions fall below certain thresholds of regulatory scrutiny, so they have no linkages 
that can be correlated to an individual. Lastly, the cashless nature of the transaction, such 
as the purchase of a phone card that can then be topped-up through illicit means, 
eliminates linkages to not only the original purchaser, but also to the provenance of the 
cash used to purchase the card.
Lastly, given the pervasive regulatory influence behind the adoption of AMLPT, 
research into the regulatory culture of various national agencies, such as the FIU, and 
supra-national bodies, such as EU or FATF would provide additional context for future 
research. Moreover, the socio-political motivations of large national AML-CFT 
enforcement bodies such as FinCEN in the United States could provide insight into the 
motivations behind policy making or the supra-national enforcement of national money 
laundering laws. The research demonstrated that, among what Angell and Demetis
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(2005) call the “three-level hierarchy”, there is a disparate view as to the objectives and 
scope of AML-CFT regulation. Therefore, a need exists to examine the subsequent 
effects of this disparate approach in deterring money laundering at the global level.
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8.2 UK Financial Services Authority SAR
Financial Services Authority
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8.3 BCCI Case Study
The inspiration of an Indian-born Pakistani banker, 50-year old Agha Hasan Abedi,
BCCI was founded in 1972, and was originally capitalized at $2.5 million. From day one,
BCCI engaged in obfuscation and dissimulation. Records show that, when BCCI was
registered in Luxembourg in 1972, an obscure solicitor from Bromley, Geoffrey Robert
Edward Wallis, was its largest shareholder, holding 17,499 of the original 50,000 shares
(Lascelles, Donkin et al. 1991). Abedi and BCCI were backed by a consortium that included
the ruling head of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahayan, the Bank of America,
and members of the Saudi Royal family. Writing in The BCCI Affair: A Report to the
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, (“The Kerry Report”), the staff of
Sens. Kerry and Brown identified 5 critical considerations to the creation of BCCI:
“Abedi needed five things to create BCCI. First, a bank secrecy and confidentiality 
haven, which he found first in Luxembourg, and then in Grand Caymans. Second, a 
source of capital, $2.5 million, which Abedi ultimately obtained from Bank of 
America, supplemented by another $500,000 from Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi. 
Third, a source of initial assets, $100 million, of which at least half were provided as 
deposits by Sheikh Zayed. Fourth, a group of like-minded Pakistanis to operate the 
bank. These were now widely available as a result of Bhutto's nationalization of their 
banks. Lastly, credibility in the international community, through a relationship with 
an established Western financial institution which would provide prestige to BCCI, 
but not interfere with its unique approach to banking. This too was provided by Bank 
of America during BCCI's formative years. "(See testimony o f Rahman, S. Hrg. 102- 
350, Pt. 1, pp. 489-491 o f Kerry BCCI report; Financial Times, May 17, 1978, "The 
man who adds mysticism to banking,” S. Hrg. 102-350, Pt. 3, pp. 303-304; "The 
mysteries behind Abedi's bank, Euromoney, July 1978)
The most critical of these five elements was the relationship between BCCI and Abu
Dhabi, as the Kerry Report States:
“It is absolutely clear from BCCI documents that Abedi's relationship with the Sheikh 
of Abu Dhabi and the Al Nahayan family was the foundation of the establishment of 
the bank without which BCCI never could have come into existence. Throughout the 
first critical decade of BCCI's eighteen year existence, as much as 50% of BCCI's 
overall assets were from Abu Dhabi and the Al Nayhan family, who were earning 
about $750 million a year in oil revenues in the early 1970's, an amount that rose to 
nearly $10 billion a year by the end of the decade. Until the formation of a separate
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affiliate, the Bank of Credit and Commerce Emirates (BCCE), BCCI functioned as the 
official bank for the Gulf emirates, and handled a substantial portion of Abu Dhabi's 
oil revenues. And yet from the beginning, there was an oddity about this central 
relationship: at no time while Abedi was in charge of BCCI did Abu Dhabi hold more 
than a small share of BCCI's recorded shares. Abu Dhabi appears not to have 
capitalized BCCI, but instead to have insisted on guaranteed rates of return for the use 
of its money” (Kerry and Brown 1992).
Despite Abedi’s stated belief to abide by Islamic principles in all his BCCI 
endeavours, what emerges from the statement in the previous paragraph, is the fact that BCCI 
was founded on a “promise to pay,” based on “Ponzi’Mike rates of return, rather than having 
been properly capitalized. Indeed, by the end of the 1970s, BCCI was insolvent and did in 
fact resemble a “classic” Ponzi scheme, in that BCCI’s managers were constantly engaged in 
moving money from one vehicle to another, hiding the bank’s losses through a complex 
system of holding companies, “financial services” companies, and other paper entities. In 
fact, later investigations would determine that BCCI was never liquid over its entire existence 
(Passas 1993; Passas 1996; Passas and Groskin 2001; Spalek 2001; Hemraj 2005). This 
monumental “shell game” aside, BCCI, throughout its entire existence, served primarily as 
nothing more than a source for “no questions asked” loans with little or no collateral in the 
traditional sense, except for, in many instances, the borrower’s notoriety, governmental 
affiliation, or ability to ensure BCCI’s high profile as a guarantee. Abedi was star-struck and 
made it bank practice to collect marquee depositors, regardless of their credit worthiness or 
questionable affiliations.
Indeed, as the bank’s situation became increasingly tenuous, the seedier its cash 
sources and account holders became, to the point where in some circles BCCI was laughingly 
referred to as the “Bank of Cocaine and Criminals International” (Kollewe 2005). 
Furthermore, adding to the bank’s outsider status, BCCI had no real “headquarters,” only 
branches, so there was no single national regulator responsible for its oversight. BCCI 
became the lender of choice to the Third World because of such lax fiduciary practices, and
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as a result, the majority o f  BCCI’s money laundering and criminally fraudulent activity
occurred within this remit, as the following testimony by a BCCI official during the Kerry
investigation describes:
“ ...there were consistent themes in BCCI’s activities in the Third World, in terms of 
the kinds of services that government officials would be looking for from BCCI. First, 
to the extent the official controlled a source of government funds, the official typically 
wanted to be compensated in connection with his decision on where to place the 
funds. The solution to this problem was simple enough — BCCI would pay a 
"commission” to the official involved. Second, to the extent the official controlled 
transactions involving government funds, the official might well want to be 
compensated on a fee basis, transaction by transaction. BCCI developed a number of 
techniques in response to this requirement, which typically involved one form or 
another of skimming the government funds that moved through the transaction, again 
with the revenues deposited in a safe place outside the official's country. Third, to the 
extent the official was in a position to generate substantial resources of his own 
through non-BCCI corruption, he often would want a safe and confidential place to 
hide his money. Again, BCCI would comply. In each of these cases, BCCI would 
make use of applicable techniques for hiding and laundering cash: manager's ledgers 
or numbered accounts; phony loans to hide (and legitimize) real, but unclean deposits; 
circuitous routing of funds through bank secrecy havens like the Grand Caymans and 
Panama, and so on”(Kerry and Brown 1992).
Over the life of BCCI, Abedi’s efforts mostly focused on the Third World; however, 
BCCI was essentially of European origin, in that it was originally chartered in Luxembourg, 
given the principality’s strict banking secrecy laws. Abedi understood that to establish BCCI 
as a viable entity among leading international banks, he would have to somehow establish 
himself in the United Kingdom. Leveraging his knowledge of, and extensive contacts within, 
the Asian communities amongst the UK’s larger metropolitan areas, Abedi established a 
string of BCCI branches, and soon was doing a brisk retail trade. In fact, this affinity for the 
Asian community, specifically with his fellow Muslims, was an underlying tenant in the 
founding of BCCI. In an interview with the Financial Times, dated November 11, 1991, 
Abedi states that BCCI was a reflection of his credo as a “supra-national” Muslim and that 
the bank would serve as “the best bridge to help the world of Islam, and the best way to fight 
the evil influence of the Zionists” (FT1991; Ehrenfeld 1994).
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Given this statement, later revelations of BCCI’s involvement with the first wave of 
Arab liberation movements, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Abu 
Nadal’s Black September, and Fatah, (as well as funding their later moves into state- 
sponsored terror operations), should come as no surprise; they are emblematic of the 
systemic, quasi-criminal culture that pervaded within BCCI. Western intelligence agencies 
were complicit also, as both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the United 
Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) used BCCI resources to fund covert operations 
throughout the world. For instance, Lt. Col Oliver North ran his “Contras - Arms for 
Hostages,” (later to be known as “Iran-gate”), operation with money “borrowed” from BCCI. 
The CIA, working covertly in Afghanistan, was buying arms with BCCI laundered funds to 
fight the Russians, and then used BCCI’s Pakistani connections to purchase mundane items 
such as mules and logistics bases to distribute and store those arms. BCCI was very much a 
reflection of the dealmaker, “no price too high” mentality of Abedi (Lascelles, Donkin et al. 
1991; Passas 1993; Passas 1996).
As Abedi sought legitimacy from the British banking establishment, the Bank of
England initially viewed Abedi’s efforts with indifference, the occasional regulatory “hand
slap” aside. Such remonstrations normally occurred when grumbling within the City
demanded “something” be done regarding BCCI’s cavalier attitude to banking. Abedi was
nothing if not persistent. Following his successful efforts at entrenching BCCI on the high
street, Abedi then re-registered BCCI in the Caymans, and re-located his senior management
to London in 1974, where for the next 15 years, the bank’s internal structure, consisting of a
number of subsidiaries beneath a Luxembourg holding company, would remain relatively
uniform until the bank’s demise in 1991 (Dale 1992; Robinson 2004). BCCI existed for 19
years. In those 19 years, Abedi fooled the world into thinking BCCI was the best capitalized,
most politically connected, and perhaps most ironically of all, the most ethical bank in
existence. He often stated that BCCI’s “success” lay in its Islamic-based founding principles
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of charity, social responsibility and non-usurious lending when servicing his Arab clientele. 
BCCI’s phenomenal growth, and Abedi’s ability to influence policy from Whitehall to 
Washington DC, through his unending networking, allowed him to quickly establish the 
legitimacy that regulators in the United States and United Kingdom would not bestow.
While the Bank of England tolerated BCCI, granting token allowances such as 
according BCCI “licensed deposit taker” status, rather than formal recognition as a bank 
under the Banking Act of 1979, American authorities offered no such accommodations. 
Furthermore, the Bank of England would prove alarmingly complacent in auditing its 
relationship with BCCI, setting an unwelcome precedent that would result in reputational 
harm for not only the Bank of England, but the entire City of London’s financial 
establishment (Kerry and Brown 1992; Lohr 1992; Ehrenfeld 1994; Naylor 1994; Robinson 
2004). Despite Bank of American having been an early partner in the formation of BCCI, 
holding a 30% founding share, New York regulators turned-down BCCI’s attempts to 
purchase a US bank in 1976 due to BCCI’s lack of a “lead” regulator. Undeterred, Abedi 
used his Washington DC connections to hire former President Jimmy Carter’s tarnished 
White House budget director, Burt Lance, and through furtive means, acquired the National 
Bank of Georgia. Abedi went on to purchase two more banks through the same covert 
methods, but eventually was exposed by a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
investigation. The subsequent uproar and threats of criminal sanctions by the SEC forced 
Abedi to assuage SEC concerns through sheer force of will and chicanery. Financial General 
- one of his earlier bank purchases - which by this time had bought National Bank of Georgia, 
would be renamed First American, and “fully independent from BCCI” (Lascelles, Donkin et 
al. 1991; Lascelles, Donkin et al. 1991; Robinson 2004). Abedi duped the SEC, and First 
American remained firmly in BCCI hands.
In keeping with his obsession with face and pedigree, Abedi obtained the services of
Clark Clifford, a former Secretary of Defence and eminent Washington DC attorney, to head
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First American as chairman. Robert Altman, Clifford’s law partner, was named President. 
The establishment of First American was a milestone for BCCI, in that it went some way 
towards providing a semblance of the legitimacy Abedi had long sought since BCCI’s 
inception, and more importantly, provided access to Washington’s elite that would help in 
furthering BCCI’s influence. Meanwhile, in 1985, the story in the United Kingdom was not 
as promising. BCCI was forced to disclose to Bank of England officials a $1.3 billion dollar 
loss in its Treasury Division. A bank’s treasury is where the bank trades large amounts of 
money and currencies, with some dealing being undertaken on behalf of clients and 
comprises, to some extent, the heart of a bank’s operation. Treasuries also speculate on the 
rise and fall of currency prices using their own money (Lascelles, Donkin et al. 1991).
BCCI’s treasury embarked on a decided different approach, in that it used its client’s 
funds without their understanding and proved incredibly incompetent in the process. As the 
size of the losses became untenable, Syed Raziuddin Ali Akbar, the head of BCCI’s treasury 
operations, created a means to manipulate evidence of their spectacularly poor efforts. Losses 
were diverted to a split accounting entity within the treasury, christened “Number Two,” 
which was off the books. As City bankers in London began circulating rumours regarding 
BCCI’s solvency, the scale of BCCI’s treasury losses were communicated to the Insitut 
Monetaire Luxembourgeois (IML), the Luxembourg banking regulator who then requested an 
audit of the treasury. Price Waterhouse, (at that time the auditors of BCCI’s Caymans-based 
operations), began their own investigation in January of 1986. Cover-up techniques such as 
using options contracts to roll losses from one year to the next were discovered. Price 
Waterhouse, having acknowledged what they perceived as incompetence, forced a write­
down of $225 million dollars on BCCI’s profits for 1984 and 1985, unaware of the massive 
losses hidden in Number Two.
While the treasury was legally a part of BCCI (Overseas) Ltd., headquartered in the
Caymans, the bank’s majority shareholders in Abu Dubai demanded the treasury be relocated
284
there to ensure more adequate oversight (Lascelles, Donkin et al. 1991; Lascelles, Donkin et 
al. 1991). In 1986, the Bank of England, having finally grasped the scale of malignancy at the 
heart of BCCI, finally took concrete action, forming a College of Regulators to oversee the 
bank’s affairs and provide a conduit to the Bank of England as to BCCI’s commercial 
behaviour (Dale 1992). Aside from BCCI and Abedi’s trials in the United Kingdom, Abedi’s 
success in the United States was short lived as well: 1988 would prove to be the year in 
which BCCI began a rapid descent in both financial and reputational terms, on both sides of 
the Atlantic.
Never having known to turn away a depositor, BCCI was, by this time, awash in drug 
money from the Medellin cartel, sourced primarily through its Panamanian subsidiary. In 
addition to cartel holdings, Manuel Noriega held significant deposits with BCCI, as did the 
heads of other drug intermediaries, gun running syndicates, and various other Latin American 
criminal enterprises. Drug and smuggling holdings were augmented by the operational funds 
of Middle Eastern terrorist groups, Russian arms smugglers, and any other Organisation with 
large sums of money that needed legitimisation.
1986 saw the US begin an extensive criminal investigation into BCCI’s laundering of
Columbian drug profits, under Operation C-Chase (“C” for cash). From C-Chase-generated
intelligence, U.S. authorities were, by this time, intensely interested in BCCI’s Tampa,
Florida operations, which proved to be the proverbial “tip of the iceberg” relative to BCCI’s
criminality (Lhor 1991). BCCI’s operations were laundering cocaine profits in Miami,
Columbia, (BCCI had five branches in Medellin alone), Panama, and in the Bahamas, a paper
entity that didn’t exist except as a “ghost” conduit for reporting purposes. BCCI’s various
Caribbean branches serviced any and all forms of the drugs trade, the Jamaican, and
Bermudan marijuana markets in particular. Branches in the United Arab Emirates laundered
heroin profits from Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, and BCCI’s Hong Kong branch serviced
the Laos-Burma-Thailand “golden triangle” heroin trade. While lucrative at first appearance,
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cash was merely being shuttled from branch to branch to cover rapidly mounting losses. At 
one point Abedi was forced to steal $150 million from the staff pension fimd to cover holes in 
the balance sheet.
In 1989, C-Chase’s discoveries were now turning into indictments, and as a result of 
ancillary information developed from C-Chase, Senator John Kerry began hearings, initially 
into BCCI’s relationship with Manuel Noriega. Kerry, as head of the Senate’s Narcotics, 
Terrorism and International Operations sub-committee, (under the supervision of the Senate 
Foreign Relations committee), had a particularly broad remit. In several days of testimony, it 
became quite clear to one of Kerry’s staffers, Jack Blum, that BCCI might in fact be the 
largest example of money laundering to date, and that C-Chase investigators needed to dig 
deeper to establish a better understanding of the larger institutional problem of BCCI. Despite 
the hundreds of leads in their possession, all pointing back to BCCI, the C-Chase 
investigators told Blum they already had too much on their hands and could be of no further 
assistance (Lohr 1992; Robinson 2004).
Undaunted, Blum presented his case to the IRS and Justice department, who, like the
C-Chase team, were unreceptive. Finally, Blum approached Robert Morgenthau, the New
York City District Attorney, who was very interested, so interested that he immediately
assigned his assistant, John Moscow, to the case. First American, now First American
Bankshares, (Abedi’s flagship American operation), had offices in New York, so Morgenthau
had no problems with jurisdiction. Blum began methodically building his case against Abedi,
BCCI, First American, Clifford and Altman. When Blum established the extent of BCCI’s
operations in the United Kingdom, he took his information to the Bank of England and was
immediately stymied. Around the same time as Blum’s inquiries, the Bank of England,
through the UK’s secret services, had been made aware that Black September’s head, Abu
Nidal, had a relationship with BCCI; this relationship encompassed 42 accounts throughout
the bank’s London branches. Further disclosures soon followed: both the City of London
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fraud squad and an un-named Middle Eastern accountant delivered reports documenting huge 
frauds within BCCI. 6 months later, in April of 1990, perhaps the most serious accusation to 
date surfaced, that BCCI had accumulated roughly $600 million in unrecorded deposits; Bank 
of England principals later argued that this report, once verified, contained no evidence of 
systemic fraud (Dale 1992; Robinson 2004). At this juncture, BCCI as a bank and 
commercial entity had roughly 1 year left in its existence.
The final chapter of the BCCI saga contains a final irony. For all their regulatory 
bluster and despite the fact they grasped the extent of BCCI’s criminality early-on, the 
outcome of American efforts were in some ways anti-climatic. On the positive side, the 
BCCI-Tampa/C-Chase investigation resulted in the largest US money laundering conviction 
to date, with the conviction of five senior BCCI managers, and a fine o f $14 million assessed 
against BCCI. On the negative side, Morgenthau’s case, which looked to have such promise 
at the start, was a washout. Altman was acquitted on all counts, and Clifford’s trial was 
postponed for health reasons and he later died without ever seeing a courtroom. Morgenthau 
was left with nothing for the $20 million in trial costs and his reputation was tarnished for 
several years after the event, the result of charges of prosecutorial misconduct, excessive 
offers of immunity to BCCI witnesses and lastly, (to the chagrin of the UK’s Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO)), an offer to fend off prosecution by the SFO of a key BCCI co-conspirator, 
Imam Imram.
Imram had served as the chief assistant to Aga Hasan Abedi and Swaleh Naqvi, 
BCCI’s president. Imram was adamant that he had immunity from the SFO, even as he faced 
a pre-trial hearing at the Old Bailey on December 16, 1993. Such was the contentious nature 
of the relationship between the New York District Attorney’s office and the SFO, that John 
Moscow was summoned to testily on behalf of Mr. Imram. As reported by The Independent 
on the 17th of December, 1993,
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“...the case caused friction with the US investigators. Last month John Moscow, the 
New York assistant district attorney who is jointly leading the BCCI inquiry, spoke in 
court on behalf of Mr. Imam's application. Mr. Moscow said that had they known that 
the SFO would prosecute Mr. Imam, they would never have shared confidential 
Grand Jury evidence with the SFO. After the hearing Christopher Dickson, the SFO 
case controller for BCCI, admitted there had been a 'glitch' in the SFO's relationship 
with the US BCCI investigators over the prosecution of Mr. Imam” (Willcock 1993).
Conversely, despite a record of indifference, incompetence and sporadic action, it was
the Bank of England that finally shut down BCCI. In December of 1990, a BCCI executive
confirmed to Price Waterhouse the existence of the unrecorded deposits rumoured to exist
back in April of that year. In the first week of January, Price Waterhouse informed the Bank
of England of the unrecorded deposits, and Abu Dubai agreed to make good any shortfall that
could arise as a result of the situation. Price Waterhouse further informed the Bank of
England that a small percentage of “irregular” transactions may have be processed by BCCI’s
UK branches, and agreed to investigate further and report back its findings. On March 4th,
1991, the Bank of England commissioned Price Waterhouse to investigate BCCI under
Section 41 of the Banking Act. Section 41 of the Act allows for independent examiners
“ ...if it appears to the Bank desirable to do so in the interests of depositors or 
potential depositors of an authorised institution the Bank may appoint one or more 
competent persons to investigate and report on: (a) the nature, conduct or state of the 
institution’s business or any particular aspect of it; or (b) the ownership or control of 
the institution; and the Bank shall give written notice of any such appointment to the 
institution concerned” (HMSO 1987).
The Bank of England received Price Waterhouse’s Section 41 report on June 24,
1991. The report, entitled the “Sandstorm Report,” after the use of “sandstorm” as a code
word for BCCI, revealed “massive and widespread fraud” that went back a number o f years.
The fraud involved not only past but existing management as well, despite an earlier
reorganisation taken by the Abu Dubai owners in October 1999. Further evidence of
malfeasance was provided by 6,000 previously withheld files of Swaleh Naqvi, then BCCI’s
chief executive. This additional evidence was incorporated into Price Waterhouse’s final draft
Section 41 report, delivered on June 28th, 1991. Despite the report being in draft form, on
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July 1st the Bank of England relayed its contents to Barbara Mills, the head of the Serious 
Fraud Office. On the 2nd of July, the College of Regulators met, and without informing Abu 
Dubai began discussions as to how to wind up BCCI. A draft closure plan was delivered to 
the Governor of the Bank of England on July 4th, who then informed both the Prime Minister 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the Bank of England’s decision to close BCCI, which 
was then finalized on July 5th, the last day of BCCI’s existence (Lascelles, Donkin et al. 
1991; Waterhouse 1991; Dale 1992).
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8.4 Legitimate and illegitimate Terrorist Fundraising in the UK -  the PIRA and 
LTTE Case studies
The UK’s legislative approach in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, reflected the general 
legal consensus that money laundering was primarily an adjunct crime to drug trafficking or 
other organised criminal conduct. However, incidents such as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21st 1988, would highlight the ascendant threat 
of transnational terrorism. Terror attacks were no longer simply a localized response to a 
perceived injustice, but could now be the result of seemingly unrelated acts by nation-states 
against non-state actors or vice-versa. In the case of Lockerbie, Libyan agents had appeared 
to act at the behest of Iranian demands for a response to the accidental shooting-down of Iran 
Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes, in the Persian Gulf, on July 3rd of that year (Cox and 
Foster 1992; Rowan 1992).
The investigation into both the Lockerbie tragedy as well as the 1993 World Trade 
Centre bombing in New York City, (as well as other world-wide terror attacks during this 
timeframe), would expose flaws in the preconceived notions then in vogue as to the 
relationship between money laundering and terrorism. It was now clear that money 
laundering was no longer a benign component of criminal enterprise, but also a deliberate 
means of facilitating funding of terror operations and a means to hide ill-gotten gains. 
Perhaps no other relationship illustrates the dilemmas inherent in such a nexus quite as 
effectively as that of the Provisional IRA (PIRA) with its political wing, Sinn Fein.
8.4.1 - The Provisional Irish Republican Army
UK law had viewed terrorism, (and the use of money laundering in supporting 
terrorism), largely through the lens of its experiences in Northern Ireland. As David Bonner 
stated in 1992, “the principal terrorist threat which has shaped the United Kingdom response 
since 1968 has been terrorism connected with Northern Ireland” (Bonner 1992; Bamford
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2004). Subsequently, legal instruments such as the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) and the 
Money Laundering Regulations (MLRs) make mention of terrorism, primarily in regards to 
Northern Ireland and by extension, to related acts of terrorism on the European mainland 
(Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh 1994; Walker 2000). The terrorist threat to the UK 
emanated from a variety of paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, the majority of which 
were Republican in origin and who sought a united Ireland devoid of British governance. 
Loyalist representation fell to Organisations such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 
and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), with the UDA being by far the largest. Loyalist efforts 
at destabilizing Republican unification efforts were hampered by corruption and extortion for 
personal gain at the leadership level, and moreover, loyalist paramilitaries rarely displayed 
the operational competency of their Republican counterparts. While Republicans would 
resort to criminality in advancing their political and paramilitary aims, loyalist groups were 
further crippled by a reliance on criminality and violence for its own sake and lastly, lacked 
the sophisticated public relations capabilities Republicans would evolve over the course of 
the “The Troubles” (Bruce 1992; Bruce 2001).
Of the Republican groups, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) were the
most well-organised and effective, utilising a disciplined command structure, sophisticated
operational methods, and a variety of fund raising means to further their operations. The
PIRA’s “celP’-type unit structure was organised along military lines, with “active service
units (ASUs)” as the primary structural element which varied in size, depending on
operational requirements. Sympathetic “civilians” were used as an advanced warning system
to warn of British Army patrols and to help cache weapons, as well as in gathering
intelligence for ascertaining British Army intentions, and lastly, to foil the Army’s use of
countermeasures against PIRA ambushes and bomb attacks. In addition to the operational
cells, a complete command structure comprised a total of ten sections or departments, such as
quartermaster, security, education, publicity and finance. For instance, the “Foreign
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Operations” section was responsible for operations outside of the Irish Republic, primarily in 
England, as well as formulating alliances with other “liberation” movements (Horgan and 
Taylor 1999).
These exchanges of “operational expertise” included trading information on bomb 
making and weapons acquisition, as well as planning joint operations of both a criminal and 
“political” nature. For instance, state actors such as the Libyans, were enlisted to acquire 
weaponry above and beyond that of simple small arms such as machine guns, plastic 
explosives and rocket launchers. As relations among transnational terrorist groups solidified, 
these joint operations would also entail “outsourced” operations, such as those undertaken to 
train the guerrillas of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in bomb- 
making operations, during one such exchange in Columbia in 1999-2001 (Robinson 1998; 
Clarke and Lee 2008). Critical to the ongoing support of PIRA operations were the extensive 
activities of the PIRA Finance Department, which, since its inception in the late 1970s, was 
demonstrating increased sophistication in both the methods and sources used to create diverse 
funding channels in support of PIRA operations. These methods employed a variety of 
criminal means, such as armed robberies from banks, post offices, and building societies, as 
well as cigarette and fuel smuggling, fraud, extortion, and the marketing of counterfeit goods 
such as compact disks (CDs), video tapes, and designer clothing. The proceeds of this 
criminality were laundered through a variety o f legitimate fronts such as removal companies, 
guest houses, and pubs. It was estimated, at the time of the first “cease-fire” agreement in 
1994, that the PIRA was enjoying an annual income of IR£10 million. (Horgan and Taylor 
1997)
While these funding streams could be interrupted through traditional law enforcement
methods, interrupting the flow of funds to the PIRA, diverted from legitimate Sinn Fein fund
raising in Ireland, and from US-based NORAID, (Irish Northern Aid, Inc.), proved more
problematic. The efficacy of NORAID’s fund raising in the United States was particularly
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galling to authorities in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, as they were powerless to 
stop what they saw as blatant support for terrorism. Furthermore, American support for 
Republicanism extended into congressional and presidential circles, particularly as advocated 
by Senator Ted Kennedy and later, President Bill Clinton. Such was Kennedy’s support for 
Republicanism that in 1981, he created, along with then-Speaker of the House Thomas “Tip” 
O’Neill, the “Congressional Friends of Ireland” (Wilson 1995; Carroll 2007).
As Anglo-Irish peace efforts intensified in the mid-1990s, President Clinton appeared 
to go out of his way to appease the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, to encourage their 
further participation in the talks that preceded the eventual “Good Friday” agreement, signed 
May 22nd, 1998. Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, while publicly renouncing violence, 
was known to still be active in IRA command circles. Clinton’s hypocrisy, in granting Adams 
a White House audience, as well as allowing him to attend several NORAED and Sinn Fein 
fund raisers held in New York City in 1994, starkly contrasted with his condemnation of 
several high-profile terrorist attacks during his first term. This included several statements 
expressing “revulsion” at fundamentalist Islamic terror, (a result of the 1993 World Trade 
Centre bombings) along with his words denouncing domestic right-wing terrorism, (whose 
adherents were responsible for the 1995 Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing). 
Conversely, and perhaps more hypocritical, was both Clinton’s and Kennedy’s silence in
t hcondemning PIRA’s bombing of Canary Wharf in London on February 9 , 1996, in the 
mistaken belief that it would “alienate” Adams and others from continued participation in the 
“peace process” (McMenamin 1996).
Such selective condemnation was not unique to President Clinton, and would be a
hallmark of American law enforcement and public policy relative to Irish nationalism,
particularly when applied to the fundraising efforts of PIRA and other Republican
Organisations. While NORAID’s website stated that “Irish Northern Aid is an American
based membership organisation that supports through peaceful means, the establishment of a
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democratic 32-county Ireland,” (Aid 2007; Melaugh 2009), they were not alone in raising 
awareness of and money for “victims” of The Troubles. Collection jars for a variety of 
Republican support Organisations could be found in just about any place where Irish "ex­
pats” congregated in major American cities. (Time 1979) Moreover, this fundraising was not 
as altruistic as NORAID and other organisations would have the authorities believe.
Investigations by American customs and law enforcement bodies, dating back to the 
early 1970s, would implicate members of NORAID in gunrunning as well as drugs 
trafficking in support of PIRA. These investigations would, over time, severely hamper 
Republican fundraising and weapons procurement, resulting in the need to seek arms from 
Europe and the Middle East, and re-emphasize fundraising through criminal means. 
Moreover, further pressure on NORAID and other fundraising sources would increase, a 
result of American outrage over PIRA’s complicity in the Hyde Park and Brighton 
conference bombings on the UK mainland, (in 1982 and 1984 respectively), to the point 
where NORAID’s efforts in the United States would dwindle to insignificance. NORAID’s 
problems aside, the peace process provided Sinn Fein, in furthering its aims, with legitimacy 
as well as increased exposure outside of Ireland. It would suffer none of the perception 
problems of NORAID, and its fundraising efforts would remain undiminished, given its 
enhanced status as a political party.
Subsequently, Sinn Fein would continue as a conduit for PIRA funds through the 
remainder of the decade. The Sinn Fein-PIRA relationship would serve as a financing and 
organisational model for other transnational terror, liberation and nationalist movements. It 
was becoming increasingly clear, that, while authorities could identify and eradicate one arm 
of the funding hydra, (even if an arm was “legitimate”), it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to establish just how many funding arms a proscribed Organisation could 
reconstitute. Moreover, when allied with a political party, as in the case of Sinn Fein and
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PIRA, a terror Organisation could claim it was simply a legitimate part of the political 
process, and therefore, protected by law.
8.4.2 - The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)
The United Kingdom, particularly in the late 1980s through the 1990s, would witness 
a variety of terrorist groups and “liberation movements” exploit this political “legitimacy,” 
through organisational changes in their structure and public face. These groups would take up 
residency, primarily in the major conurbations, and normally within areas of specific ethnic 
Diasporas. For instance, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), a group fighting to 
establish a separate Tamil homeland on the island of Sri Lanka, were actively fundraising 
among the UK’s Tamil population. The UK was one of 44 countries that LTTE is known to 
maintain a presence and given the extent of the Tamil community in the UK, LTTE considers 
the UK one of its “top-level contributing countries” (TLCs). LTTE coordinates fundraising 
through the local Tamil Co-ordinating Committee or TCC. These committees are organised 
along the lines of the department structure used by the PIRA, with a political unit, a finance 
unit and procurement unit, among other functions.
The TCCs utilised, among other methods, a process akin to “tithing.” Tithing 
involved the surrender of a mandatory amount of one’s wages, benefits -  any type of income, 
the percentage of which usually was between 2 -  10%. While couched in mantle of charity or 
community support, tithing in essence was simply a highly effective form of extortion, as 
many of those targeted for fundraising were in the United Kingdom illegally and hesitant to 
engage the authorities as to their victimization. Moreover, LTTE fundraisers were usually ex­
fighters or relatives of high-ranking LTTE cadre and given their extensive reach and status, 
would exploit an illegal’s fear of reprisal in the homeland as a further means of coercion. 
Rather than risk a direct link to LTTE’s leadership, the Tamil Youth Organisation (TYO) was 
created as an enforcement, collections, and operational arm, and is active in 9 countries,
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especially in the United Kingdom. The TYO ran Tamil gangs that would undertake a variety 
of criminal activity, including drugs dealing and credit card fraud, and served as a means to 
inject violence into the Tamil community. Fundraising methods would evolve into legitimate 
enterprises, such as charities and language schools, as well as illegitimate property 
investment and the sale of counterfeit goods, whose profits would then be laundered through 
the creation or acquisition of legitimate businesses, repeating the cycle. LTTE was not alone 
in capitalizing on its fellow nationals. Other major Organisations, such as the Basque 
separatist group ETA, and Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), (fighting to legitimize a Kurdish 
homeland astride the border regions of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey), would also exploit their 
respective UK immigrant communities in a similar fashion to that of LTTE.
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8.5 Funding 9/11: Saudi largesse, charity, hawala and IVTS
In the early 1990s, emboldened by their victory in Afghanistan, Islamic militants now 
turned their ire on the West, particularly the United States, whose support of Israel and 
presence in Saudi Arabia were an affront to Islam. The consensus among fundamentalists was 
that America should be punished for her actions, and in such a way that the supremacy of 
Islam over America and her Western allies would be never in doubt. While the United States 
may have indeed been guilty of a variety of cultural and political transgressions, a great irony 
of the situation was that the United States had supported the Afghan mujahidin (holy 
warrior(s)) in forcing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan, and would now face the “blow 
back” of their success in training the Afghans. In funding jihad  in Afghanistan, the muj were 
able to call on a variety of sources for cash and arms, and more often than not, arms and cash 
that were provided through the “generosity” of the American “people” in the guise of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), funded by dollars held by BCCI’s Pakistani 
representatives. However, while the CIA’s billions funded the majority of muj hardware and 
logistics, the greatest provider of resources in hard cash and “Afghan Arab” fighters was 
Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent, Pakistan (Lumpkin 2006).
The Saudis poured millions of dollars into funding jihad, not only in Afghanistan, but
in other parts of the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Using both overt and covert means,
their objectives were primarily those of protecting the faithful and spreading their particular
Wahhabist form of Islamic fundamentalism (Cooley 2000; Bergen 2001; Unger 2005; Atwan
2006; Wright 2006). In what would be the pattern for years to come, the Saudis used a
combination of zakat, and, after the closure of BCCI, the resources of the Islamic Bank for
Development (IBD). Ancillary to their support of jihad, the Saudis believed in a form of
“religious colonization and economic solidarity” in support of spreading their Wahhabist
beliefs, paid for by Saudi oil. While the vastness of Saudi oil wealth is well known, what is
more surprising is the amount generated by the House of Saud’s zakat obligation of two
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percent. Given that the Saudi royal family has some 6,000 members, with a combined wealth 
of $600 billion, Saudi-sponsored causes can be assured a zakat of $12 million a year. The 
money is funnelled through two banks, the Dar al-Islami (DMI), and the Dallah al-Baraka 
(DAB), which have extensive networks throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Both 
banks sponsor schools, cultural and economic programs, along with helping spread Islamic 
fundamentalism and its credo of Sharia or Islamic law, all within the expanding Saudi sphere 
of influence (Napoleoni 2005). This background of Saudi religious imperialism set the stage 
for Saudi underwriting of both the muj in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the growing global 
reach of militant Islam in the 1990s.
In Afghanistan, the instigator of this effort was the scion of a well-respected and
extremely wealthy Saudi family, Osama Bin Laden, who was also courted by the Americans;
much like his Saudi sponsors, the Americans were impressed by his efforts against the
Soviets in Afghanistan. The defeat and subsequent exit of the Russians had seen infighting
and consolidation among the various muj factions, with a group known as the Taliban (or
“students” in Pashtu) eventually achieving political and institutional supremacy. The Taliban
espoused a severe form of Islam that, in practice, closely resembled Bin Laden’s Wahhabist
faith. His substantial personal resources aside, Bin Laden was able to fund not only his work
in Afghanistan, but also the beginnings of his own fundamentalist, anti-Western
Organisation, al-Qaeda (literally the base) through a network of Islamic charities that served
to launder vast amounts of dollars and sterling in support of his cause (Bergen 2001; Ruthven
2002; Corbin 2003; Atwan 2006; Wright 2006; Burke 2007). In furthering al-Qaeda
operations, Bin Laden had invested over $50 million in a subsidiary of DMI in Sudan, the al-
Shamil Islamic Bank. With his Saudi connection to both DAB and DMI and its Sudanese
subsidiary, the Tadamon Islamic Bank, (the second largest bank in Saudi Arabia), and lastly,
the Faisal Islamic Bank, (headed by Saudi King al-Saud’s son, and whose board of directors
included several of Bin Laden’s extended family), Bin Laden was able to fund his operatives
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throughout the world (Napoleoni 2005). While Bin Laden enjoyed the use of Saudi banks and 
other Islamic funding channels, he had put the Saudis on notice that he would not tolerate 
their relations with the West, vehemently denouncing continued American presence in the 
Kingdom. In 1999, a joint US-Saudi intelligence operation had discovered a $3 million 
payment to Bin Laden by five top Saudi business men.
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It was the US contention that the payment constituted “protection money” to prevent
attacks against their interests in Saudi Arabia. While it was clear that some in Saudi society
considered Bin Laden a threat, he would continue to enjoy the support, indeed the adoration
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of the majority of Saudis. This would be reflected in the tacit support of the Kingdom’s 
rulers, as well as the continued payment of zakat by business men and other strata of Saudi 
society in support of his organisation (Palast 2002; Napoleoni 2005). In distributing funds to 
his Organisation, Bin Laden used a variety of methods and conduits, such as Islamic financial 
institutions, numerous Islamic charities, and overt investment. A significant means of 
exchange among these resources was a cultural component of Islam, hawala banking. A 
hawala transaction or “informal value transfer” (system - IVTS) as it is now more commonly 
referred to, follows a simple pattern as illustrated in figure 8.5.1.
A simple hawala or IVT-like exchange comprises an originator, two trusted 
intermediaries and a recipient. For instance, should you desire to fund a bombing in Yemen, 
you would arrange a meeting with the local IVTS provider, who retains in Yemen, a 
percentage of the exchange differential between the official and the kerb price of your dollars 
or sterling. The provider then contacts, through the appropriate means, his/her counterpart, 
who then delivers your explosives. The accounts between the two IVT operators will be 
settled through compensatory payments (i.e. when someone from Yemen sends money to 
your country of residence or base of operations). Should there be an imbalance, for example 
one side incurs a greater expense than the other -  for whatever reason -  the difference is then 
remedied via bank draft, wire transfer, money order or hand-delivered currency. Settlement 
can also include legal or illegal trade of goods ranging from gold and precious stones to AK- 
47s, drugs, or trafficked humans (Passas 2003; Zagaris 2007).
While the above example represents a hawala-IVT transaction in a criminal context, 
hawala-TVT transactions provide a legitimate means of facilitating the flow of goods, capital 
and commerce throughout the world. Zagaris (2007), citing an “occasional paper” produced 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), provides a succinct summary of the benefits of 
hawala-WT transactions (or informal funds transfer (IFT) in this case) in the developing 
world:
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“In countries with limited financial capacity, IFT systems play a critical role. 
The initial growth of hawalas was primarily due to their facilitation of trade between 
distant regions at a time when conventional banking instruments were either weak or 
absent. Hawalas are characterized by speed, lower transactions costs, cultural 
convenience, versatility, and potential anonymity, contribute to their widespread legal 
and illegal use. (Qorchi, Maimbo et al. 2003) Executing hawala transfers between 
major international cities takes, on average, 6-12 hours. In general, transfers between 
countries where the recipient is located in a different time zone or where 
communications are less reliable require 24 hours. Because the system is based on 
trust, modem telecommunications systems are not a prerequisite. Historically, many 
transactions were done by word of mouth, and credit was based on personal note of 
hand, rather than on documents representing specific goods (Qorchi, Maimbo et al. 
2003).
The direct cost of making funds transfers between major international centres 
averages approximately 2-5 percent, less than the costs of transfers through formal 
banking systems. The economy is due in part to hawala’s limited overheads and the 
virtual lack of regulation and taxation. Since, hawaladars can operate from their 
homes or little shops, or can be unobtrusively accommodated within existing 
businesses, they incur few, if any, additional operating costs. They often operate with 
little more than a table, phone, and fax machine, or, for the most sophisticated, an 
internet connection” (Qorchi, Maimbo et al. 2003)
The advantages the hawala system provides in secrecy, expediency, and local 
knowledge are self-evident, for an individual engaged in transnational terror operations such 
as Bin Laden. Given that billions of pounds are transferred this way every year, the 
challenges of following the money in such instances are daunting; for this reason alone, 
hawala and IVTS continue to be a preferred means of financing transnational terrorist 
operations, as well as laundering the profits earned exploiting the crime-terror continuum 
(Makarenko 2004; Oehme 2008). Bin Laden would employ Islamic financial resources, 
routed through an extensive hawala system to pursue an increasingly successful terror 
campaign against not only his Saudi “hosts,” but also the very heart of America’s financial 
and governing institutions. While a multitude of theories exist as to Bin Laden’s motivations 
for attacking the United States, it was his stated aim to re-create a modem version of the 15th 
century Islamic Caliphate that had, at one time, overseen the entirety of the modem Middle
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East, and would be free of “infidel” Western influences; Wahhabist mores would govern the 
faithful, with ol-Qaeda’s credos of jihad and Sharia the supreme manifestations of this aim.
From the early ‘90s up to the September 11, 2001 attacks, “freelance” Islamic 
terrorists, such as Ramzi Yousef, (who organised the first World Trade Centre bombing), and 
al-Qaeda, undertook increasingly bolder attacks against Western interests, including 
participation in the attack on US forces in Somalia (the “Blackhawk down” incident), the 
1998 bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the October 12, 2000 
attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. al-Qaeda’s increasing capabilities, as well as its 
sophisticated funding and Organisational ability, would culminate in the catastrophic second 
attack on New York’s World Trade Centre, felling both towers, and killing close to 3,000 
people on September 11, 2001. Utilising hijacked commercial airliners, 19 terrorists 
undertook a total of three separate attacks, and, by crashing the airliners kamikaze-like into 
their targets, caused severe damage to the Pentagon in Washington DC, as well as the 
complete destruction of the World Trade Centre; the third attack, said to have been targeting 
the Capitol building, was foiled by passengers, resulting in the plane crashing into a field in 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania with the loss of all aboard (Bergen 2001; Ruthven 2002; Corbin 
2003; Atwan 2006; Wright 2006; Burke 2007).
8,6 The Brinks-Mat Case Study -  Detection without Automation
Perhaps no case both illustrates the complexities of a sophisticated laundering
operation and details AML techniques better than the Brinks-Mat gold bullion theft, which
occurred on November 26, 1983. On that day 6,400 gold bars, with a market value of
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£26,369,778 was taken from the Heathrow warehouse of Brinks-Mat, an armoured courier 
company. A month after the theft, 4 men were behind bars, yet the vast majority of the gold, 
along with two boxes of jewels that were also taken, had not been recovered. Mickey 
McAvoy, one of the four convicted of the theft, had two friends, Brian Perry and John Lloyd 
that he called on to handle the stolen gold. Kenneth Noye, an associate of Perry and Lloyd, 
was contacted to help dispose of it; Noye, already known to police at the time of Perry and 
Lloyd’s request, was under investigation by HM Customs and Excise for gold smuggling and 
involvement in a tax fraud scheme. Noye mobilised several accomplices, among them a 
jeweller, John Palmer. John Palmer and an associate Garth Chappell owned a bullion 
dealership in Bristol called Scadlynn Ltd. It was alleged that Palmer had left the day-to-day 
operation of Scadlynn to Chappell, so that he could manage a small chain of jewellery stores 
in Bristol, Bath, and Cardiff. Noye, using his understanding of fraudster techniques garnered 
from his exposure to Customs and Excise inquiries, thought Palmer’s Bristol operations 
would be an ideal conduit to launder the Brinks-Mat gold (Robinson 1998).
To prevent further identification of the gold, Noye knew that each bar had a unique 
serial number that must be removed. Palmer had his own smelter and agreed to melt the gold 
bars and recast them with a mixture of copper and silver coins so as to create the impression 
of scrap bullion. Upon completion of the smelting operation, the now-mixed bullion would be 
taken to the local branch of Her Majesty’s Assay office. Each amalgamated ingot would be 
weighed, taxed, and “legitimised”. Scadlynn was now able to distribute the bullion to 
commodity brokers and other precious metal dealers, who would then extract the pure gold 
for sale to the British jewellery trade.
Knowing he had to conceal his activities, Noye travelled to the Isle of Jersey in 1984,
carrying with him £50,000 in £50 notes, intending to meet with officials of Charterhouse
Japhet Bank, Bath St., St. Helier. He requested they purchase 11 one-kilo gold bars on his
behalf, roughly 24 pounds with a cash value of £100,000, with the stipulation that the
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accompanying certificates that authenticate both the quality of the gold and proof of 
ownership, did not display any serial numbers. His insistence on this point, along with threats 
to terminate the transaction should his wishes not be accommodated, raised doubts among the 
bank staff as to his legitimacy; this was despite the bank’s repeated assurances that there 
would be no serial numbers on the certificates. Noye, now content with the banker’s 
reassurances, returned to London, leaving the £50,000 as an initial deposit.
However, unbeknownst to Noye, the banker’s doubts were sufficient for them to 
contact the police, who, upon Noye’s return to Jersey to deposit the remaining £50,000, 
followed him, and reported his behaviour to authorities in the United Kingdom. Despite his 
initial mis-step, Noye had now “placed” the stolen gold into the legitimate market. It was no 
coincidence that the 11 bars that comprised Noye’s Jersey transaction physically matched the 
configuration of the bars that comprised the purloined Brinks-Mat gold; the 11 bars weighed 
a little over 24 pounds and were easily transportable in a grip. This portability would expedite 
Noye’s moving the remaining gold through Scadlynn, and should anyone question the 
transactions he now had certificates that legitimised the gold’s provenance. Scadlynn would 
profit by charging the going rate for scrap plus the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the 
transaction; further benefits came through an arrangement whereby Scadlynn was allowed 
any additional undeclared VAT as profit.
Over a period of 5 months, Noye, Perry, and Lloyd made cash deposits and
withdrawals from a Barclay’s Bank branch in Bedminster, Bristol, totalling £10 Million,
typically transporting the cash through a variety o f unorthodox means (Bosworth-Davies and
Saltmarsh 1994). Using a false passport in the name of “Sydney Harris”, Noye made further
deposits of his share of the cash in a branch of the Bank of Ireland in Croydon. He initiated a
standing order that upon each deposit, the amount deposited would be immediately wired to
the bank’s Dublin branch. In addition to Noye’s deposits at the Croydon branch, McAvoy’s
girlfriend, Kathy Meacock, and the roommate of John Lloyd, Jeannie Savage, whose husband
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was then currently serving 22 years for armed robbery, made additional deposits on alternate 
days. These deposits were then wired to the Dublin branch as well. To this mix, Brian Perry 
introduced two additional individuals: Gordon Parry, and a solicitor, Michael Relton, a 
partner in a successful south London criminal law practice. Relton had unsuccessfully 
defended Parry several years prior on a drugs trafficking charge, resulting in a three-year 
tariff for Parry.
8.6.1 Placement -  The gold is now in the system
Relton assisted Parry in depositing £793,500 of Scadlynn-generated cash in the Bank 
of Ireland’s Balham branch in southwest London (see figure 2.8.2.1). These funds were in 
turn immediately wired to a branch of the bank in Douglas, Isle of Man. Parry drafted in a 
further accomplice, his wife’s cousin heretofore un-named in any reference, and, using the 
Balham branch, deposited a further £500,000 to then be transferred to the Isle of Man 
account; in all, the combined effort to date of all the principals resulted in £1.5 Million in 
cash laundered through the Balham branch. To cover their “paper trail” further, Gordon Parry 
withdrew a portion of the Isle of Man cash, and deposited these funds in a new and separate 
account at the Bank of Ireland’s Balham branch. Over a period of time, using small uneven 
amounts, he then withdrew those funds, and having created still another offshore account, 
deposited these funds accordingly (Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh 1994; Robinson 2004).
Meanwhile, Noye provided a steady feed of Brinks-Mat bullion into the Scadlynn 
furnace, the “scrap” providing a steady flow of cash to the enterprise’s London accounts. As 
the volume of cash increased, so did the need for further means of disposal. Now it was time 
to begin the “layering” process, wherein the hard cash proceeds of the robbery would be 
circulated through a variety of means to further obfuscate its origins. Early August, 1984, 
found Parry, using a solicitor’s introduction provided by Michael Relton, opening an account 
at the Zurich branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, using a deposit of £840,435. A
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timeline of several related events then unfolds: a week after Parry’s deposit, an as yet 
unidentified man entered the Hong Kong and Shanghai bank’s Bishopsgate headquarters in 
London, carrying a satchel containing £500,000, and gave instructions to forward it to the 
bank’s Zurich branch.
8.6.2 Layering -  The cash proceeds are now in circulation to hide their source
A further two weeks transpired, and over a three-day period, August 29th to the 31st, 
Perry, Parry, Relton, and a friend of Parry, a jeweller named John Elcombe, along with his 
wife, had all “coincidentally”, as it would be later claimed in court, arrived in Zurich. Further 
to this “coincidence” was the fact that all five had opened accounts at the identical branch of 
the Hong Kong and Shanghai bank; with the money deposited over this three-day period and 
the Bishopsgate deposit by the mystery bag-man, the Zurich account holdings now totalled a 
little under £1 Million (see figure 2.8.2.2).
Further layering excursions continued. August 30th, a Thursday, found Perry and 
Parry in Vaduz, Lichtenstein, a short journey from Zurich, where they each opened a cash 
account with £45,000 at the Bank of Lichtenstein, and instead of using account numbers used 
names, Parry called his account “Glads” after his mother, and Perry called his “Como” after 
the singer and as a play on his own name. However, Parry was still not done. Travelling to 
Jersey, he purchased an “off the shelf’ company called “Selective Estates”. Off the shelf 
companies have the legal utility of being quick and easy for establishing a viable company, 
are usually paper-based, with no physical assets. They are used primarily as vehicles for tax 
avoidance or proof of non-domiciled headquarters for incorporation and usually found in a 
non-aligned or geographically-isolated location.
From Jersey, Parry travelled to Guernsey where he opened a business account at the 
Barclay’s branch, using money transferred from the Isle of Man account. “Selective Estates” 
then wired the money from this deposit on to the Zurich Hong Kong and Shanghai account.
306
In keeping with his quirky account naming convention, Parry opened a new account at the 
Zurich branch, and called this account “Burton”, apparently as a tribute to the then recently 
deceased actor. In September, Parry’s jeweller friend, John Elcombe, deposited a further 
£650,000 into his personal Zurich account, an account for which Gordon Parry was a co­
signatory. Later that day, Parry ventured to Lichtenstein where he deposited in his Bank of 
Lichtenstein account, what he thought was £400,000; yet when counted, it turned out to be 
£500,000. On the 24th of September, John Elcombe placed yet more cash into his personal 
account, this time in the amount of £435,000; he then topped-off this amount on December 
4th with an additional £640,000.
Scadlynn’s smelting operation continued to generate a phenomenal amount of revenue 
to the extent that the firm’s local Barclay’s branch was forced to hire extra teller staff to 
handle the volume of Scadlynn’s transactions. Furthermore, what had up until now been 
simply a robbery and laundering operation was take a more sinister turn. Noye’s 
transgression early on had not gone un-noticed, and the Jersey police soon alerted Scotland 
Yard who then began a low-key watch on Noye’s activities. They soon noticed he kept the 
company of one Brian Reader, a wanted felon whose last whereabouts were thought to have 
been in Spain, and began an increased level of surveillance. Such was their alarm that rather 
than using normal personnel and procedures the authorities requested the help of C -ll, the 
Metropolitan Police’s elite secret reconnaissance and close-target surveillance unit.
An operational plan was soon in place, and on the evening of Saturday, January 26,
1985, it was executed. That evening two C -ll officers, John Fordham and an unnamed
colleague, penetrated the periphery of Kenneth Noye’s property. According to police records,
sometime around 6:25 PM, one of the three Rottweiler dogs Noye deployed to secure his
grounds happened upon Fordham. The other two dogs joined in the discovery, cornering
Fordham and alerting Noye to Fordham’s presence. Reader may have accompanied Noye, but
what was certain was that Noye was armed with a 4-inch knife. Fordham was later found
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dead by police with 11 stab wounds, the majority in his back. Noye was immediately 
arrested; Reader was found a few miles away, and both were subsequently charged with 
Fordham’s murder. Noye later pleaded self-defence, and Reader claimed he wasn’t involved 
at all. What was to prove a bitter disappointment to the officers involved, both men were 
acquitted 10 months later at the Old Bailey. However, all was not lost, as a search of Noye’s 
home found enough evidence -  a small cache of bullion -  to link him to the Brinks-Mat 
robbery. Both Reader and Noye were charged with conspiracy to handle stolen goods; three 
days later police also arrested Palmer and Chappell, and from there it was a matter of time 
before Scadlynn would be wound-up.
Oblivious to the events at Noye’s home, John Elcombe and his wife left London for 
Zurich in Gordon Parry’s Mercedes, with £710,000 concealed in the boot. Crossing into 
Germany at Aachen, they were stopped by a border guard who asked if they had any cash to 
declare. They stated they had £45,000, which represented their life savings, and that they 
were on their way to Switzerland, where they intended to make a deposit. His suspicions 
aroused, the guard decided to search their car, and discovered the £710,000. Elcombe and his 
wife then changed their story, claiming to be antique dealers with a business in Belgium, but 
this only caused more consternation among the guards and the two were detained. The money 
was then removed from the car, counted, and a note made of the serial numbers on the bills.
The border authorities then began a series of phone calls, first to their command in
Wiesbaden, who after debating the issue, instigated a series of calls to the German branch of
Interpol. German Interpol sent a telex to their British counterparts, inquiring if they were
looking for either a John or Anne Elcombe? Was the Mercedes they were holding at the
Aachen border station listed as stolen in the UK? What about the theft of a large sum of
money? The British branch of Interpol passed the German inquiry on to their counterparts at
Scotland Yard, whose answer to those three questions was “no” -  which was then passed on
to British Interpol, who then passed the answer on to German Interpol, who in turn forwarded
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on the information to German Customs and Immigration, who eventually telephoned the 
guard at Aachen to inform him that his charges could be released, along with their cash. John 
and Ann Elcombe were assisted in loading the cash into their car, and then proceeded to drive 
on to Zurich. (Robinson 1998)
Later that evening, one of the Scotland Yard investigators had a revelation regarding 
the Mercedes that had been in question earlier in the day. He realized that the name of the 
registered owner, Gordon John Parry, was vaguely familiar. Upon further reflection, he 
realized that Parry’s name was connected to the Brinks-Mat raid inquiry. Without further 
delay he contacted the Brinks-Mat investigators, who were staggered when he mentioned 
John Elcombe’s name; however, by the time they were able to alert British Interpol, who then 
had to ask German Interpol to arrest the Elcombes, they were out o f reach.
The events at Aachen had rattled the Elcombes, and they decided a more leisurely 
route to Zurich was in order. Taking roughly a week to transit Germany to Switzerland, they 
finally arrived in Zurich, where John undertook a series of transactions. First he deposited 
£100,000 in his own account. He then opened another account, depositing £608,000, which 
was then only identifiable by the number 720.3, rather than his original named account. The 
£2,000 difference between what they left the UK with and what they now deposited was 
attributed to “expenses,” including an extravagant stay at a royal suite in the Dolder Grand 
Hotel in Zurich, a sop to take the edge off the events in Aachen. On the 4th of February, 
another unknown depositor placed £493,970 in Parry’s “Glad” account. A week after the 
murder at Noye’s, John Elcombe transferred £1.6 Million from his Hong Kong and Shanghai 
bank account into 720.3. Parry, having now closed his Bank of Lichtenstein (“Glads”) 
account, deposited the money into 720.3; 720.3 now held some £2.6 Million.
Events in Lichtenstein were not over yet. Michael Relton was as busy as the rest of his
accomplices, and having arrived in Lichtenstein on April 26th, promptly set about creating a
“Red Cross” account. More formally referred to as a “foundation account,” attorneys and tax
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professionals use foundation accounts to control monies held by organisations rather than
individuals; the idea being that more often than not, these accounts are held by charities, and
the funds therein destined for good works, hence the “Red Cross” moniker. Moreover, as the
administration is usually under the control of an attorney, there is the additional perception of
propriety. Jeffrey Robinson further explains the benefits of such an account:
“However, while it’s customarily written into the foundation’s charter that a charity is 
to be named beneficiary, the beneficiary is not necessarily the beneficial owner of the 
account. No one is supposed to know who that is, not even the bank’s directors. The 
true identity of the beneficiary owner is protected by the double layer of bank secrecy 
and attomey-client privilege.” (Robinson 1998).
Using Moet, the name of his favourite champagne, Relton established the “Moet 
Foundation”, misspelt by the bank as “Moyet.” Together, Parry and Relton deposited 
£3,167,409.25 into the “Moyet” account. At this juncture, much like Noye, Parry made a 
seemingly innocuous mistake that was to have severe ramifications. Gordon Parry had 
decided to purchase some property -  Gowles Barn Farm, close to Sevenoaks in Kent -  which 
he paid for with a Credit Suisse draft drawn on his 720.3 account. The problem lay in the 
haste in which Relton and Parry had set-up Moet/Moyet; Parry hadn’t troubled himself with 
checking to ensure there were sufficient enough funds in 720.3 after the Moet/Moyet transfer 
to cover the £152,126 draft for Gowles Bam Farm.
As it turned out, 720.3 was indeed empty, but as the Bank of Lichtenstein’s managers 
knew where the money had gone, rather than refuse the draft, they simply transferred money 
back to 720.3 from Moet/Moyet to cover Parry’s draft. This simple transaction was soon to 
provide the authorities with the key that unlocked the complex set of transactions linking the 
secret foundation account, with the criminals at the heart of the Brinks-Mat robbery.
Only £5 Million in gold remained from the original bullion stolen some 15 months 
prior. Relton and Parry, sensing that the window of opportunity for further enrichment could 
soon close, decided some prudent planning for the future was in order. They embarked on a
310
series of property investments using their Jersey-registered “Selective Estates” entity as the 
umbrella for a subsidiary company called “Blackheath Limited”. They settled on a property 
in Cheltenham, and in purchasing the land, wove a complex series of transactions:
1. Relton transferred $300,000 from Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Zurich, to 
South East Bank, located in Sarasota, Florida, where he maintained an account.
2. From South East Bank, he sent $200,000 to his personal account at Midland 
Bank, London.
3. He then sent £104,000 to The British Bank of the Middle East (a London 
subsidiary of Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank).
4. Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank then wired £103,700 to the solicitors acting 
for the sellers of the Cheltenham property.
5. Relton then borrowed £250,000 from The British Bank of the Middle East, 
using his Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank account as security.
Relton and Parry used the same laundering cycle again, this time including Jersey,
Guernsey, and the Isle of Man in the cycle. An estimated £2.1 Million was laundered this
way; the pair then swooped down on London’s Dockland’s real estate market, purchasing
several wharf properties for £5.4 Million, using what appeared to be legitimate loans to
finance the deals and obscure the true source of the money. At this point the proceeds of
Brinks-Mat had been fully integrated and legitimized.
8.6.3 Integration is completely achieved
Noye’s subsequent arrest and the linkage of the evidence uncovered at his home with 
the Brinks-Mat robbery, led to the eventual unravelling of the laundering enterprise and the 
arrest of those involved. At the time Noye and Parry were taken into custody, the authorities 
had frozen accounts in four countries, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and had 
discovered £1.5 Million hidden away in Noye’s Dublin account, and yet had somehow 
missed the £2.5 Million Jeannie Savage had hidden in Dublin. It had sat for 5 years, accruing 
interest, and when the authorities finally located it, the £2.5 Million had turned into £4.1
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Million. Eventually the accounts of all those involved -  Brian Perry, Gordon John Parry, The 
Elcombes, and a latecomer, John Lloyd -  were seized, resulting in the recovery of close to 
£21 Million of the original £25 Million. Ironically, Mickey McAvoy, the man whose 
enlistment of Parry and Perry got the whole enterprise underway, ended-up with a lengthy 
prison sentence and not much else. Kenneth Noye, having been imprisoned in 1986, was 
granted early release in 1994, having served 8 years of a 14-year sentence for his Brinks-Mat 
participation. Noye returned to crime, having gained further notoriety for a road-rage murder 
on the M25 and subsequent flight to Spain. In 1998 he was returned to the UK to face trial for 
the M25 murder, was convicted and is now serving a life sentence. John and Ann Elcombe 
were the only members of the conspiracy to not serve any jail time (Bosworth-Davies and 
Saltmarsh 1994; Blunden 2001; Robinson 2003).
The Brinks-Mat affair illustrates many of the considerable obstacles that money 
launderers can employ to avoid detection, along with further detailing the omissions in legal 
processes and investigative methods that make the detection and cessation of money 
laundering a problematic undertaking. For instance, within the Bank of Ireland and Hong 
Kong & Shanghai bank, the lack of defined intra and inter-bank communication in regards to 
suspicious transactions, allowed Noye and his associates unfettered access to exploit the 
dispersed geographic isolation of their respective branches.
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Figure 8.6.1 -  Brinks-Mat Placement Stages - (Blunden 2001)
Furthermore, it was a suspicion, rather than any pre-defined anti-money laundering 
processes or procedures, that led to the staff at Charterhouse Japhet Bank on the Isle o f Jersey 
to contact the authorities in regards to Noye’s activities. Indeed, they were more concerned 
about the apparent gold certificate fraud than any perceived money laundering; the actual 
laundering o f Noye’s gold dealings doesn’t occur until well after his initial Charterhouse 
Japhet deposits.
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Figure 8.6.2 -  Brinks-Mat Layering and Integration Stages (Blunden 2001)
A further consideration in assessing the whole affair was the fact that at the time of 
the robbery and subsequent laundering activity, circa 1983-85, most global jurisdictions did 
not view money “laundering” per se as a crime. While law enforcement was beginning to 
understand that money laundering was a separate crime from more traditional forms o f fraud, 
and that large unaccounted for sums o f money were regularly transiting borders throughout 
the world, creating a means to track - let alone convict - money launderers was proving 
difficult and time-consuming.
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